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ABSTRACT
This research demonstrates an overview of the performance of water quality trading
programs currently implemented within the U.S. The role of trading in water quality
management is identified through systematical comparisons of all possible aspects related
to trading process, structure, and scale of existing water quality trading programs. The
role of trading focuses on the output of achieving standard ambient water quality and on
increasing the flexibility of water quality management to enhance effectiveness and
accommodate economic growth. The trading encourages independent polluters to make
pollution control decisions that best suit their own situations. The trading reduces overall
operating costs and distributes equity on water pollution control abatements between
point sources and nonpoint sources.
The achievement of each program is mainly affected by various factors that include (a)
the flexibility of trading rules and water pollution regulations, (b) the polluters'
obligation and financial ability to meet regulatory requirements, and (c) the localized
characteristics of water pollution problems and diversity of polluters in a watershed.
Any water quality trading framework should promote the principle of simplicity,
reliability and minimal costs. The recommended approaches for improving program
implementation are to (a) shift towards a cap-and-trade system; (b) allow the execution of
a multi-party permit; (c) establish a statewide trading policy; (d) set up a hybrid system
(between tradable permit and tax/rebate system); and (e) test the practicality of a program
on a smaller scale before actual implementation at a larger scale.
Thesis Supervisor: A. Denny Ellerman, Ph.D.
Title: Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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"Let us endeavor so to live that when we come to die even the undertaker will be sorry.
By Mark Twain
. .msaln aan q 'oWVI TeT n2. . .
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CHAPTER 1
Background and Objectives of Research
The first chapter consists of two parts. Part A describes background information which
laid the foundation of the research investigation; and Part B explains the research
objectives with specific questions and approaches for the investigation. Part A is divided
into 3 sections (1) definition of water quality and water pollution, (2) water quality
regulation and policy reviews, and (3) introduction to water pollution trading. Part A
describes how water quality and water pollution are defined, and on which principles and
parameters are used in the measurements of water quality. Additionally, to help
understand why current water quality management is ineffective, a history and evolution
of the existing water pollution control system and regulation in the U.S. is presented. This
basic principle will lead us to have an idea of the problems existing in the current
pollution control system, to know where to increase efficiency of water quality control
and what would need to be done. Definition and experience of water quality trading
systems are explained in comparison to the air trading system. The examination of why
the air trading program is far more advanced than the water trading program is also
presented.
Introduction
There are two major mechanisms currently use to manage water quality; a direct
regulation (or command-and-control mechanism) and a market-based mechanism.
Command-and-control type policy is predominant and preferred by regulators after the
passage of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972. Major point sources are controlled under
command-and-control regulation. However, agriculture and other nonpoint sources have
largely escaped direct regulation (Ribaudo 1999). Traditional command-and-control
regulation does not appear to be able to meet the challenges of the water pollution
problems that result from nonpoint source pollution. The failure to extend pollution
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controls to nonpoint sources increases the costs of water quality protection by precluding
efficient allocation of control between point and nonpoint sources (Milliman 1982;
Davies and Mazurek 1997; Freeman 2000).
In the past, a lot of attention on water pollution control was placed only on how to clean
the water without considering costs (Davies and Mazurek 1998). Based on economic
theory, the way we clean our water is not really efficient and cost effective (Vig and
Kraft 2000; Tietenberg 2004; Rosenbaum 2005). Problems of water pollution control can
be difficult and complicated to manage efficiently; mainly because water is public goods
serving many beneficial uses; and also due to the nature of water which is affected by
many factors; e.g. sources, types of pollutant, waste collections and treatment systems.
With beneficial uses for different classes of waters and localized nature of water
pollution, it is difficult to determine the optimum level of cleaning water that is
economically achievable for each water body. Currently, increased experience in market-
based policy particularly in controlling air pollution indicates that it has a good potential
for improving water quality cost-effectively and can help face new challenges in water
quality management (Stephenson 1999; Rousseau 2001; Tietenberg 2003).
Recently, there has been an increase in applying market-based mechanism in controlling
water pollution, particularly for a tradable permit system. A number of water trading
programs have been installed in the U.S.; however, the water quality markets are not
functioning well nor do they have active trades. Successful implementations of other
pollution trading programs particularly that of SO2, can help us understand the difficulties
of the implementation of water pollution trading. The use of trading as a regulatory
instrument to control air pollution is increasing. The air tradable permit program - the
SO2 program - stimulated more aggressive pollution prevention behavior that resulted in
lower compliance costs than the credit trading program (Ellerman 2000). Will this
practice occur with regards to water pollution control?
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The motivation of my study came from a desire to identify the most efficient way to
control water pollution. My focus is on the study of "tradable permit" systems for water
pollution and on the examination of problems existing within these systems. My goal was
to investigate the U.S. water pollution trading system because extensive experiences
(successes and failures) with both water and air pollution trading have occurred within
the U.S. Eventually, I want to be able to establish the role of trading in water quality
management and determine how water trading can be introduced and implemented
effectively. What should be essential elements for a water quality trading program to
promote successful trading in the future?
Part A Background
1.1 Definition of Water Quality and Water Pollution
1.1.1 Water Quality
Water Quality reflects the composition of water as affected by natural causes and man's
cultural activities, expressed in term of measurable quantities and related intended water
use (Novotny and Olem 1994). For scientific and legal purposes the following definition
of water quality is most often used: "Water quality is the ability of a water body to
support all appropriate beneficial uses" (Novotny and Olem 1994).
Within a water body, there could be more than one designated use (USEPA). For
instance, water suitable for drinking can be used for irrigation, but water used for
irrigation would not meet drinking water guidelines. The quality of water appropriate for
recreational purposes differs from that used for industrial processes. The quality of water
needed for drinking, recreation, fishing, and aquatic habitat is higher than that required
for transportation or agriculture.
Water quality is a relative term which makes water quality goals and means to achieve
the end results are sometimes very difficult to be efficiently implemented. The definition
of water quality is not objective, but is instead socially defined depending on the desired
-17-
use of water. The Clean Water Act defines water quality in terms of designated beneficial
uses with numeric and narrative criteria that support each use; i.e. drinking water supply,
primary contact recreations, and aquatic life support (USEPA 1994). Different uses
require different standards of water quality (Revenga, Brunner et al. 2000). For example,
water used for hydropower generation, industrial purposes, and transportation does not
require such high standards of purity for recreation, drinking, and habitat for aquatic
organism (Novotny and Olem 1994). The regulators need to take into considerations of
costs and benefits when setting up a standard according to various beneficial uses.
1.1.2 Water Pollution
Water pollution can be defined into several definitions. One is as a change in the
physical, chemical, radiological, or biological quality of the water caused by man or due
to man's activities that is injurious to existing, intended, or potential uses of the water
(Novotny and Olem 1994). Another is as damage to the services provided by the water
caused by the disposal of residuals from production or consumption activities causing the
emissions of materials into the water that can reduce its service (Milliman 1982). Some
human activities and land uses that can contribute to degraded water quality include:
deforestation/development/construction, urbanization/industrialization, agricultural
operations (largely via runoff from non-point sources), municipal or industrial
wastewater discharges, artificial channelization or habitat alteration. Table 1.1 presents
examples of the water use limits due to water quality degradation caused by water
pollutants.
- 18-
Table 1.1 Water Use Limits due to Water Quality Degradation
1.1.3 Water Pollution System
Many factors control the health of the water, as shown in Figure 1.1. Degree of damages
to water quality depends mainly on assimilative capacity of water, types of receiving
water, pollutant sources, and types of pollutants.
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Use
Pollutant Drinking Aquatic Recreat- Irrigatio Industria Power Transpo
rn g Wildlife, and
water Wllf, ion n I Uses adrtwater Fisheries 1 Uses Cooling rt
Pathogens xx o xx x xx na na
Suspended Solid xx xx xx x x x2 xx3
Organic Matter xx x xx + xx x4 na
Algae x5,6 X7 XX + XX X4 x 8
Nitrate xx x na + xx na na
Salt9 xx xx na xx xx10 na na
Trace Elements xx xx x x x na na
Organic- xx xx x x ? na na
micropollutants
Acidification x x x ? x x na
Note: Table is adopted from Lie, 2000. (Liu and Liptak 2000)
xx Marked impairment causing major treatment or excluding desired use l Food industries 2 Abrasion
x Minor impairment 3Sediment settling in channels Electronic industires
o No impairment 5 Filter clogging 6 Odor and taste
na Not applicable 7 In fish ponds, higher algal biomass can be accepted
+ Degraded water quality can be beneficial for this specific use 8 Development of water hyacinth
? Effects not fully realized 9 also include boron and fluoride "'Ca, Fe, and Mn in textile industries
Figure 1.1 Water Pollution System
, Stock Pollutants 
I. _
Pollutant
Accumnlatin
A
!* T
Receiving Water Pollution
(Surface water and (Damages)
Ground water)
4 I1
Pollutant L
Assimilation 
!
Flow Pollutants 
Source: this diagram is adapted from
(Nguyen, Woodward et al. 2004)
1.1.3.1 Pollution Sources
There are two main sources of water pollution: point sources and nonpoint sources.
Point sources (PS) discharge from a defined route, such as a pipe from sewage treatment
plants, municipal storm water collection systems, and industrial facilities such as power
plants. Municipal and industrial wastewater discharges are the primary contributors to
point sources in the U.S. Nonpoint sources (NPS), on the contrary, have diffuse
discharges that enter a river or lake as runoff from a wide geographic area; e.g., runoff
from agricultural fields, roads and parking lots. Pollution from non-point sources includes
fertilizer and pesticide/herbicide runoff from agricultural fields and golf courses, siltation
from agriculture and logging, acidic drainage from mine tailings, the deposition of
pollutants from the atmosphere, and bacteria from livestock and faulty septic systems.
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Source of pollutants
Point source
Nonpoint source
Pollutant Discharge
Type of pollutants
Hlow pollutant
Stock pollutant
I I |
F
L
Nonpoint source is the leading cause of water quality impairment. Nonpoint sources
problems are becoming more important particularly BOD and nutrients because nonpoint
sources are not fully responsible for cleaning pollution. Overall, more than one-third of
the stream miles in the US appear to be affected by nonpoint pollution (USGS 2000).
Table 1.2 ranks the top five pollutant sources causing water quality impairments from
National Water Quality Inventory 2000. The most frequently reported source of pollution
that is impairing water quality in rivers, streams, lakes and ponds was agriculture (60% of
impaired river miles, 30% of lake acres).
Nonpoint pollution is especially troublesome for several reasons. Its origin is elusive. The
nonpoint pollution typically enters water bodies over a large area and the loads are not
constant through time but vary with natural events such as temperature, precipitation and
wind. Pollution from nonpoint sources is harder to control and measure accurately than
discharges from point sources. Almost all states lack enough information to identify most
of the nonpoint sources polluting their surface water (USGAO 2000). Additionally, many
different sources require many different control strategies. It is challenging to control
nonpoint pollution technically and economically because technological solutions are
rarely available. Many state governments, fearful of damaging a major component of the
state economy, are reluctant to do more than encourage farmers to voluntarily seek ways
to limit their pollution runoff (Rosenbaum 2005). Major national efforts are clearly
required to address this non-point pollution. It is expected by USEPA that the greatest
fuiture gain in water pollution control will come from NPS.
-21 -
Table 1.2 Leading Sources of Pollutants Causing Water Quality Impairment
Rivers Lake, Estuaries Ocean Great
and Ponds, and Bays Shoreline Lakes
Pollutant Source Streams and Shoreline
Reservoirs
Agriculture 1 1 5 3
Atmospheric deposition 5 4 4
Contaminated sediment 1
Forestry 5
Habitat modifications 3 5
Hydrologic modifications 2 2
Industrial discharges 3
Land disposal 3
Municipal point sources 1 5
Nonpoint sources 4 2
Septic tanks 4
Urban runoff/storm sewers 4 3 2 1 2
Source: Water quality condition in the US: a profile from the 2000 National Water Quality Inventory
1.1.3.2 Pollutants
Pollutants differ in how easily they can be assimilated in terms of the absorptive capacity
of the environment. A pollutant that is assimilated slowly is called a stock pollutant.
Examples of stock pollutants include heavy metals, persistent synthetic chemicals and
non-degradable materials. Pollutants that are assimilated quickly are calledflow
pollutants. Examples of flow pollutants are organic wastes, which will be attacked and
broken down by bacteria in water into less harmful inorganic components, thermal
pollution (dumping hot water into water bodies lowers dissolved oxygen), and bacteria
and virus (from domestic and animal wastes, meat packing wastes).
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Moreover, types of substances causing water pollution fall broadly into 6 categories, (1)
Microbiological, (2) Chemical, (3) Oxygen-depleting substances, (4) Nutrients, (5)
Suspended matters and (6) Thermal Pollution. As specified under the Clean Water Act,
conventionalpollutants include suspended solids, coli form bacteria, biochemical
oxygen demand, pH, and oil and grease. Table 1.3 presents some concerns and conditions
associated with several types of water pollutants. The effects on public health are well
explained in Stoddard, 2002. Table 1.4 ranks the top five pollutants for impairing water
quality in rivers, lakes, estuaries, ocean and great lakes shorelines. Overall, EPA found
that the three pollutants most often associated with impaired water were solids (i.e.,
suspended solids, siltation, and total dissolved solids), pathogens, and nutrients.
Table 1.3 Concerns and Conditions Associated with Several Types of Water Pollutants
Pollutant group Water Quality Conditions and Concerns
Nutrients (N&P) Eutrophication Nuisance algal blooms
Ammonia Toxicity Toxic algal blooms
Annoxia/hypoxia Fish kills
Water clarity/transparency Shellfish bed closure/loss
Reduced diversity Loss of seagrass beds/habitat
Metals and Toxics Fish body burden Bird body burden
Shellfish body burden Sediment contamination
Mammal body burden Drinking water supply
Organic Matter Annoxia/hypoxia Adsorption/desorption of toxic
Fish kills chemical
Pathogens Shellfish bed closure Drinking water supply
Recreational beach closure
Sediments Anoxic sediments Habitat destruction/fish
Damage to benthic biota spawning
Hazardous materials Oil spills Fish kills
Chemical spills Drinking water supply
Source: The table is adopted from Stoddard 2002. More technical details about these processes can be
reviewed from standard engineering reference (Metcalf & Eddy, 1991).
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Table 1.4 Pollutants most often Associated with Impairment
Rivers Lake, Estuarie Ocean Great
Pollutant and Ponds, and s and Shoreline Lakes
Streams Reservoirs Bays Shoreline
Habitat alterations 3
Metals 2 1
Nutrients 5 1 2
Oil and grease 5
Oxygen-depleting substances 4 5 3 2 5
Pathogens (bacteria) 1 4 1 3
Pesticides 2
Priority toxic organic chemicals 5 1
Siltation (sedimentation) 2 3 4
Suspended solids 4
Total dissolved solids 4
Turbidity 3
Source: Water quality condition in the US: a profile from the 2000 National Water Quality Inventory
1.1.4 Water Quality Indicators
Since there is no single, universal parameter that adequately describes surface water
quality, investigators typically use several indicators related to sanitary quality, ability to
sustain aquatic life, ecosystem productivity and aesthetics. Monitoring the physical,
chemical and biological markers of a particular water source provides a means to
determine the overall quality of the source water without directly monitoring the infinite
number of potential toxicants that may be present. The following properties are included:
dissolved oxygen (DO), biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), pH, alkalinity, total and
fecal coliform levels, chlorophyll-a (chla), light transparency, turbidity, nutrients
(nitrogen and phosphorus), and temperature. The significance of these properties are
briefly explained by (AUEPA 2005)1 as follow.
1 More technical information can be found in Metcalf and Eddy, I. (1991). Wastewater Engineering. New
York, McGraw-Hill, Inc.
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Dissolved oxygen (DO) supports life functions of most aquatic organisms. DO is
considered a key indicator of overall water quality. Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)
is used as a measure of organic wasteload strength. Historically, the BOD was
determined using an incubation period of 5 days at 20°C. For domestic sewage and many
industrial wastes, about 70 to 80% of the total BOD is decomposed within the first five
days at this temperature (Metcalf and Eddy 1991). BOD5 has been adopted as the
notation because of the incubation period. The BOD5 measurement allows scientists to
compare the relative pollution "strength" of different wastewaters and natural waters. The
widest application of the BOD5 test, however, is for measuring the strength and rates of
wastewater loadings to and from Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) and
evaluating the BODs removal efficiency from the treatment system (Stoddard, Harcum et
al. 2002).
ThepH of a water sample is a measure of its acidity. Alkalinity is a measure of the acid-
neutralising (that is, buffering) capacity of a water. While alkalinity can beneficially
prevent pH fluctuations (for example, due to acid rain), excessive alkalinity and low pH
may adversely impact fish development and growth. Total and fecal coliforms measure
sanitary quality in terms of bacterial counts within a given sample volume. High faecal
coliform levels indicate the presence of feces in a waterway and, perhaps, the presence of
other more dangerous pathogens. In natural waterways, measurements of peak
chlorophyll-a concentrations are often used as a surrogate measure of how much
phytoplankton there is and how much excess algae (called eutrophication) is present.
Major nutrients in the subject waterways include various species of nitrogen and
phosphorus. Reduced forms of nitrogen include total ammonia, un-ionized ammonia
(NH3) and organic nitrogen. Ammonia, an inorganic form of nitrogen, is an oxygen
consumer and an indicator of water health. Organic nitrogen hydrolyses to ammonia. Un-
ionised ammonia is toxic to various aquatic species and is regulated. The sum of
ammonia plus organic nitrogen is another indicator, Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen
(TKN). Major sources of TKN include wastewater discharges and rotting plants.
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Oxidized nitrogen species include nitrate (NO3) and nitrite (NO2). Nitrate and ammonia
are common forms of dissolved inorganic nitrogen (DIN). Nitrite oxidizes rapidly to
nitrate. Also, ammonia is oxidized to nitrate. Sources of ammonia include sewage
treatment plants, animal waste and decaying organic matter.
In most freshwater lakes and nontidal streams, phosphorus is the key nutrient regulating
algal growth. Predominant phosphorus species include total phosphorus (TP) and
orthophosphate (P0 4 ). Total Phosphorus has three components: dissolved inorganic
phosphorus, particulate inorganic phosphorus and organic phosphorus. Orthophosphate
is water soluble and readily available for uptake by algae and plants. Sources include
runoff, soil weathering, sewage discharge and atmospheric deposition.
Another important indicator of water quality is the amount of solids in the water column -
both dissolved (filterable) solids and not dissolved (suspended) solids. Suspended Solids
are small particles (such as fine silts and clays, mineral particles, microbes, and detritus)
that absorb sunlight and color or cloud water. Suspended sediments include wastewater
treatment plants, storm water outfalls, bank erosion, bed resuspension and atmospheric
deposition. High Total Suspended Solids (TSS) concentrations may adversely impact
water quality in several ways, including: reducing the depth of the photic zone, and
binding contaminants to suspended sediment particles.
Turbidity and water temperature are physical properties of natural waters that often
affect water quality. Turbidity is a condition of reduced water clarity resulting from the
presence of suspended solids in the water column, including silts, clays, industrial wastes,
sewage, plankton and other suspended organic matter. Turbidity - an optical
measurement that compares the intensity of light scattered by a water sample with the
intensity of light scattered by a standard reference suspension - is commonly recorded in
Nephelometric Turbidity Units (NTU). Secchi depth is a measure of the limit of vertical
visibility in the upper water column. The latter is a direct function of water clarity. High
Secchi depth readings correspond to high water clarity. Low Secchi transparency
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measurements are also indicative of limited light penetration and limited primary
production.
Water Temperature is a measure of the heat content. Since the solubility of DO
decreases with increasing water temperature, high water temperatures limit the
availability of DO for aquatic life. Also, water temperature regulates various biochemical
reaction rates that influence water quality. Heat sources/sinks to a water body include
various surface heat transfer mechanisms (that is, incident solar radiation, back radiation,
evaporative cooling and heat conduction), thermal dischargers (for example power
plants), tributary inflows and ground water discharge.
As degraded water quality conditions may reduce the productivity and diversity of an
aquatic ecosystem, ecological indicators are sometimes used to assess overall water
quality and health. Such indicators focus on abundance and diversity of aquatic
organisms such as algae, aquatic plants, benthic macroinvertebrates and fish. For
example, elevated algal concentrations (blooms) are often indicative of excessive nutrient
inputs (usually phosphorus and nitrogen) to a water body that result in a eutrophic state.
Likewise, reduced benthic macroinvertebrate abundance (such as crayfish) and diversity
may indicate degraded water quality conditions since these organisms are generally
localized and display varying degrees of sensitivity to pollution.
The quality of water is determined by taking measurements in the field or by taking
samples of water, suspended materials, bottom sediment, or biota, that are then
forwarded to a laboratory for physical, chemical and microbiological analyses. For
example, acidity (pH), color and turbidity (a measure of the suspended particles in the
water) are measured in the field. The concentrations of metals, nutrients, pesticides and
other substances are measured in the laboratory. Another way to obtain an indication of
the quality of water is by biological testing. This test determines, for example, whether
the water or the sediment is toxic to life forms or if there has been a fluctuation in the
numbers and kinds of plants and animals. Some of these biological tests are done in a
laboratory, while others are carried out at a stream or lake.
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1.2 Water Quality Regulation and Policy Reviews
This section reviews prior attempts/experiences for resolving water pollution problems.
This review, in effect, helped in understanding the lack of progress and problems that
existed within the current regulatory and political process before a focus turned more
towards market-based policy.
1.2.1 Brief History and Evolution of Water Pollution Policy in the
U.S.
In the U.S., very little attention was paid to water quality until such notorious events such
as the Ohio's Cuyahoga River catching on fire in 1969. The Cuyahoga fire, in fact,
helped spark the rise of environmental movements2. Responding to these concerns,
Congress passed a major revision to the federal water pollution control policy in 1972
(FWPCA-72), later called the Clean Water Act (CWA) (Freeman 2000). The CWA
established a national goal for water pollution policy: the attainment of fishable and
swimmable waters by July 1, 1983, and the elimination of all discharges of pollutants into
navigable water by 1985. In the last decades, federal law and policy have been
strengthened several times to achieve these goals. Freeman summarized the key features
of federal laws dealing with water pollution-control policy, as explained in Table 1.5
(Freeman 2000).
2 For more information "The Cuyahoga River Fire: June 22, 1969"
http://www.cwru.edu/artsci/engl/marling/60s/pages/richoux/index.html accessed on 06/03/2005.
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Table 1.5 Federal Water Pollution Control Laws
Title and year of Key Provisions
enactment
The Refuse Act, 1899 Goals: Protection of navigation
Means: Barred discharge or deposit of refuse matter in navigable
waters without permit
Federal vs. state responsibility: Federal permits and enforcement
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: None
Water Pollution Control Goals: Encouragement of water pollution control
Act, 1948 Means: Authority for federal research and investigation
Federal vs. state responsibility: Left to state and local government
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: Authorized federal
loans for construction, but no funds were appropriated
Water Pollution Control Goals: Authorized states to establish water quality criteria
Act Amendments, 1956 Means: Federally sponsored enforcement conferences to negotiate
clean up plans
Federal vs. state responsibility: Federal discretionary
responsibility to initiate enforcement conferences for interstate
waters
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: Authorized federal
grants to cover up to 55% of construction costs
Water Quality Act, 1965 Goals: Attainment of ambient water quality standards required to
be established by states
Means: State-established implementation plans placing limits on
discharges from individual sources
Federal vs. state responsibility: State responsibility for setting
standards, developing implementation plans, and enforcement;
federal oversight through approval and strengthened enforcement
conference procedures
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: No significant change
Federal Water Pollution Goals: fishable and swimmable waters
Control Act, 1972 Means: Enforcement of technology-based effluent standards on
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Clean Water Act, 1977
Municipal Wastewater
Treatment Construction
Grant Amendments, 1981
Water Quality Act, 1987
individual dischargers
Federal vs. state responsibility: Federal responsibility for
establishing effluent limits for categories of sources, and for
issuing and enforcing terms of permits to individual discharges;
state option to take over responsibility for permit and enforcement
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: Federal share
increased to 75% and total authorization substantially increased
($18 billion over 3 years)
Goals: Postponed some deadlines established in the 1972 act;
increased control of toxic pollutants
Means: No significant changes
Federal vs. state responsibility: No significant changes
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: No significant
changes (authorizations for an additional $25.5 billion in federal
grants over 6 years)
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: Reduced federal
share to 55%, changed allocation priorities, and lowered
authorizations to $2.4 billion per year for 4 years
Goals: Further postponement of deadlines for technology-based
effluent standards
Financing of municipal sewage treatment: Transition from
federal grants to contributions to state revolving load funds
Sources: This table is adopted from Freeman, 2000 (adapted from Kneese and Schultze 1975).
The main sections of the CWA (described below) established programs for reducing
pollution from both point sources and nonpoint sources (Davies and Mazurek 1998;
Shortle and Abler 2001).
Section 402 of the CWA established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
Program (NPDES) permit to control pollution from point sources dischargers. Each point
sources discharger must obtain a discharge permit before it can discharge into surface
water. The permit requires point source dischargers to comply with technology-based
controls (uniform USEPA-established standards of treatment that apply to certain
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industries and municipal sewage treatment facilities) or water quality-based controls3 that
invoke state numeric and narrative water quality standards (Moreau 1995). Currently,
over 500,000 discharge sources are subject to NPDES permits (USEPA 1998). Besides
the NPDES programs, the National Pretreatment Program is designed to reduce the
amount of pollutants discharged into municipal sewer systems by industry and other non-
domestic wastewater sources. The program prevents pollutants from being introduced
into the Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) that may interfere with plant
operations and may pass through untreated while improving opportunities for the POTWs
to reuse wastewater and sludges that are generated.
Section 303(d) requires states to identify those waters which cannot meet the water
quality standards to develop total maximum daily loads (TMDLs). A determination of
TMDL is an analysis of all sources of pollutants to a water body to calculate the
maximum pollutant load a water body can receive without violating water quality
standards. Regulators establish wasteload allocation (WLA) for point sources and load
allocations (LA) for nonpoint sources and natural sources and margin of safety to ensure
achievement of water quality goals (USEPA 1997).
Section 309 of the CWA established the nonpoint sources control programs for
addressing polluted runoff from land surfaces. It consists of a national program that is
implemented by the states with federal approval and assistance. All states currently have
USEPA-approved management programs. The states are free to choose the policy
instruments contained in the management plans. Most states are relying on voluntary
approaches that emphasize education, technical assistance and economic incentives
(Shortle and Abler 2001).
Section 208 calls for the development and implementation of area-wide waste treatment
management plans. Section 208 makes explicit reference to nonpoint sources and also
authorizes federal grants to share in the cost of developing area-wide management plans,
3 Note: More information about the standards are reviewed in the http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/
standards/handbook/ and http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes"
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administered through the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture,
that would cover up to 50% of the cost to rural land owners for implementing and
maintaining "best management practices" to control nonpoint-source pollution (Freeman
2000).
The Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments (CZARA) is a second federal
statute that directly addresses non-point sources pollution. It establishes a coastal
nonpoint source pollution control. The programs are administered by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Under CZARA, state coastal
nonpoint source programs must provide for the implementation of best management
practices specified by USEPA with national technical guidance (Shortle and Abler 2001).
Shortle and Abler 2001 explained that the Clean Water Act and CZARA focus primarily
on surface water. Section 102 of the CWA encourages groundwater protection. The
CWA provides a framework for states to develop their own programs for reducing,
eliminating and preventing groundwater contamination, rather than specifying or
requiring specific actions to be taken (Shortle and Abler 2001).
As shown in Figure 1.2, monitoring water quality is a key activity for implementing the
CWA. The CWA requires states to set standards for the levels of quality that are needed
for bodies of water so that they support their intended uses. States report to the EPA on
the condition of their waters every two years. States also identify waters for which
existing pollution controls are not stringent enough to enable them to meet applicable
standards, and then place these waters on their TMDL lists with suggested
implementation strategies. Forty-five states reported lack of resources being a key
limitation for fully assessing their waters for making more progress on improving water
quality (USGAO 2000).
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Figure 1.2 Process of Managing Water Quality
Meet
Do not meet
standards
Source: This diagram is adopted from USGAO 2000.
1.2.2 Progress and Challenges for the Trading Approach
Over the past decades, the approach in the CWA has been greater control of water
pollution from PS under the NPDES programs than from NPS under voluntary approach.
The success of the programs is measured by the large number of improvements in the US.
The proportions that fully support the designated uses are in the range of 47-55% (see
Table 1.6). Waters that are safe for fishing and swimming have doubled. The number of
US populations served by sewage treatment facilities has doubled (USEPA 1998). BOD
loading to POTWs (influent loading) and BOD removal efficiency increased significantly
(Stoddard, Harcum et al. 2002).
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Establishing water
quality standards
Monitoring water
quality
Develop and implementing
strategies for restoring water
quality and attaining water
quality standards
Compare water quality
monitoring data with water
quality standards to assess
whether a body of water is
of acceptable water quality
Prioritize actions needed
on the basis of the
seriousness of water
quality problems
Table 1.6: Waters that Support Designated Uses on the 2000 National Water Quality
Inventory.
River and streams Lakes, ponds, Estuaries
(miles) and reservoirs (square miles)
(million acres)
Fully supporting 55% (463,441) 46% (7.9) 47% (13,439)
Threatened 10% (85,544) 9% (1.6) 9% (2,766)
Good but impaired 35% (291,263) 45% (7.9) 44% (12,482)
Percentage of total water 23% 42% 32%
assessed (840,402/3,662,255) (17.4/41.6) (28,687/90,465)
Source: USEPA Nation Water Quality Inventory Report 2000, (in percent of area or length assessed).
The traditional focus on point sources, however, is becoming less effective in eliminating
major threats to water quality that are increasingly being attributed to nonpoint sources
(Freeman 1994; Davies and Mazurek 1997). The current institutional structure for
protecting water quality in the U.S. is weighed heavily towards dealing with pollution
from point sources, particularly at the federal level. The key mechanisms for attainting
water quality objectives under the CWA are the establishment and enforcement of
technology-based effluent standards. These standards are quantitative limits imposed on
all dischargers where quantities are determined based on what can be done with available
technology, rather than on what needs to be done to achieve ambient water quality
standards or to balance costs and benefits (Freeman 2000). On the contrary, responsibility
for nonpoint source pollution control has been given to the states, largely addressed
through voluntary incentives that support best management practices and land-use
changes through education, technical assistance, financing and research provided by
USEPA and USDA and state programs (Shortle and Abler 2001).
A consequence of the different approaches taken for point and nonpoint source pollution
is that gains in water quality have come at a higher cost than if both sources had been
treated more evenly (Freeman 2000). Additional evidence of inefficiencies in the CWA
comes from comparisons of marginal pollutant removal costs between point sources and
nonpoint sources. Nationally, allowing point sources at 470 sites to reduce treatment
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costs by enabling them to purchase nutrient reductions from nonpoint sources in a point-
nonpoint trading program would save dischargers between $611 million and $5.6 billion
(USEPA 1994). Evidently, a water quality goal at these sites can be achieved at a lower
cost by reducing nonpoint source dischargers rather than point source dischargers.
Recently, President Bush proposed for the first time to reduce the federal funding on the
Clean Water Fund, FY 2006. Based on Congressional Research Service, Present Bush's
FY 2006 request $730 million for grants to capitalize on clean water state revolving funds
which would be a 33% reduction from the FY2005 appropriated level for a program4. In a
study done by the water infrastructure network, America's water and wastewater systems
will face an estimated funding gap of $23 billion a year between current investments in
infrastructure and the investments that will be needed annually over the next 20 years to
replace aging and failing pipes that meet mandates of the Clean Water Act and Safe
Drinking Water Act (WIN 2000).
In the future, water pollution management will require serious attention for improving the
treatment efficiency because of resource/budget problems. The underlying trends that
generate these needs include: (1) increase in nonpoint source pollution problem, (2)
increasingly stringent federal requirements to improve water quality and drinking water
safety, (3) increasing unit costs of attaining these requirements using more complex
technology due to the concern of toxic pollutants, (4) increasing use of chemicals and
energy, and (5) increasing the cost of replacing aging and failing water distribution
systems and wastewater collection systems (WIN 2000).
Therefore, decentralization of water pollution control policy (i.e. water trading policy)
will significantly help with increasing efficiency in controlling point sources and
nonpoint sources. Trading can potentially increase efficiency in water pollution
management; i.e. trading can help limit upstream discharges as a mean of deferring
renewals or avoiding expanded treatment capacity. The coordinated implementation
4 Source: http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/02-16-05/02-16-05memo.html accessed on 01/10/06
for additional information.
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programs in watershed management will provide the greatest opportunities for cost-
effective control of all sources affecting water quality; e.g. promoting trading pollution
credits between point sources and nonpoint sources.
1.3 Introduction to Water Quality Trading
1.3.1 Description
Water quality trading or effluent trading is an innovative approach for achieving water
quality goals more efficiently. Trading is based on the fact that sources in a watershed
can face very different costs to control the same pollutant. Trading programs allow
facilities facing higher pollution control costs to meet their regulatory obligations by
purchasing environmentally equivalent (or superior) pollution reductions from another
source at lower cost, thus achieving the same water quality improvement at lower overall
expense.
A tradable permit system starts by selecting water quality objectives and establishing the
total amount of permitted pollution equaling the maximum allowable load cap that will
assure the water quality objective is met. At the initial start, all identifiable dischargers
will receive the permits to discharge a certain amount of pollution based on some rules
set by the government agency. From then on, dischargers can voluntarily reallocate their
pollution control responsibility in the market by buying and selling their permits which
would reduce the amount of a problem pollutant elsewhere in the watershed. For
example, if polluter A can achieve an equivalent amount of reduction at a lower cost than
polluter B, polluter B can pay polluter A to reduce its discharge. By buying such permits
from polluter A, polluter B can then increase its discharges without installing additional
abatement technologies. However, polluter A would need to control its discharges to a
lower level than would otherwise be required, to be at least the equivalent of the amount
purchased by polluter B. Polluter A also generates income by selling permits to polluter
B. Trading allows both polluters to achieve an overall level of reduction at a less
- 36 -
expensive cost. The government agency, however, would have to monitor emissions to
ensure that they were conforming to the discharge permits.
Experience to date with water quality trading indicates a number of economic,
environmental and social benefits. Economic benefits can include: allowing dischargers
to take advantage of different marginal costs of treatment and efficiencies that vary from
source to source; reducing the overall costs of achieving water quality objectives in a
watershed; and providing the means to manage growth while protecting the environment.
Environmental benefits can include: achieving water quality objectives more quickly;
encouraging further adoption of pollution prevention and innovative technologies;
engaging more nonpoint sources in solving water quality problems; and providing
collateral benefits such as improved habitat and ecosystem protection. From a social
standpoint, trading efforts have helped promote productive communication among
watershed stakeholders and have helped to create incentives for water quality
improvement activity from a full range of dischargers (Hoag 1997; Jarvie and Solomon
1998; Kraemer, Eleftheria et al. 2003).
1.3.2 Incomplete Experience of Effluent Trading in the U.S.
Pollution trading in the U.S. started in 1974 with air quality. A key program of emission
trading is the Acid Rain Program which achieved exceptional success compared with
other applications. The Acid Rain Program employs a system of tradable SO2 emission
allowances to reduce the abatement costs while still meeting environmental goals.
Experience with an allowance system has been proven to be the superior economic and
environmental performance of the market-based instruments (Ellerman 2000; Ellerman
2003). Schmalensee el al. evaluated the program comprehensively and the most current
ex post evaluation of the program by Ellerman provided several lessons to be learned
from the Acid Rain Program. In addition, Stavin discussed the experience from the
program in the broader views (Schmalensee, Joskow et al. 2000; Stavins 2000; Ellerman
2004).
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After the success of the Acid Rain Program, the U.S. policy makers have now shown
renewed interest on water quality trading as a potential policy expecting the same success
as found in air trading policy. In 1996, the USEPA released a draft of a framework to
encourage and facilitate development of watershed-based effluent trading programs.
Based on pilot projects and research, in 2003, the USEPA released its final Water Quality
Trading Policy identifying general provisions necessary for creating credible watershed-
based trading programs. The policy provides regulatory and technical guidance to states
and other local governments for developing and implementing trading programs.
To date, a number of water trading programs have been installed in the U.S. However,
the water quality markets are not functioning well or have been largely stagnated. For
example, the earliest application of water pollution trading was the Fox River program in
Wisconsin in 1981 (O'Neil, David et al. 1983). It was not until 1995 that a successful
trade was complete (Jarvie and Solomon 1998). The most common forms of water quality
trading to date includes point source-point source, and point source-nonpoint source
trades. Nonpoint sources (e.g. agriculture) generally have much lower marginal
abatement costs for common pollutants such as nutrients and sediments. Therefore,
trading between point sources and nonpoint sources should yield the highest cost-savings.
However, there are several market challenges in point sources-nonpoint sources trading
and other types of trading. More details about barriers of the trading are discussed in the
following chapters.
1.3.3 Comparison between Air and Water Trading
Regarding the different performances between air and water trading, the main factors
causing these differences are important to investigate. Since water and air are similar in
nature of media and are controlled with a similar regulatory structure, why then is water
quality trading not as successful as air quality trading? Shabman et al 2002 explicitly
compared trading experiences in the air and the water by elaborating on the distinctions
between allowance markets, credit trading and command-and-control (Shabman 2002).
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They argue that trading in the water program is in its infancy relative to the air program.
They pointed out program design and institutional setting as having significant effects on
the behavior and performance of the trading programs. Adler 1999 argued that the legal
differences in the CAA and the CWA explain much of the differential levels of success
for emission trading programs in the air and the water (Adler 1999) (see Table 1.7).
Adler explained that mainly, the CWA does not establish a strong connection on
achievement of ambient water quality goals and the lack of explicit regulatory
requirements as compared to the CAA, but rather focuses on the use of technology-based
performance standards. Approaches used to control pollution from NPS for water and
mobile sources for air are different. Nonpoint source credit offsets are a unique approach
to control water pollution. Whereas, mobile sources emitting air pollution face a number
of regulatory requirements (e.g. catalytic converters and fuel quality) under the CAA. Air
emission trading program, as opposed to nonpoint source credit offsets, do not allow
trades between mobile and stationary source or between regulated and unregulated
sources.
The relative ineffectiveness of water pollution trading programs can be traced to physical
and institutional of the water pollution problems. Table 1.8 presents the comparisons
between the nature of water pollution and air pollution which can result in different
trading performances between water trading program and the Acid Rain Program. Water
pollutants are non-uniformly dispersed over a wide area, unlike many air pollutants.
Characteristics of water pollutants are non-uniformly dispersed; flow downhill within a
single watershed and concentration changes over time. Unlike many air pollutants often
drift over into a rather large region. Water pollution problems are confined to a
watershed, therefore, the number of potential participants in an effluent trading is quite
restricted. Consequently, polluters have limited ability to find suitable trades and the
markets are typically smaller in size (Woodward 2003). The transaction costs due to
search information and negotiation processes are high in water trading programs. This is
because the water trading program often involves nonpoint source pollution. There are
three main problems when a trading program include NPS; monitoring and enforcement
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costs are quite high; predictions of load are likely be expensive or imprecise; and legal
conflicts may arise between the estimated pollution reduction achieved through the
trading program and the actual reductions required by the CWA (Ribaudo 1999).
According to current experiences with water trading, some of the water quality trading
programs are well-functioning; e.g., the Tar-Pamlico Program and the Long Island Sound
Trading Program. Emission trading for other air pollutants may not always be as
successful as SO2 trading which has an exceptional success rate for example; NOx and
VOC emission. The SO2 trading program successfully reduces aggregate SO2 emission
because most of SO2 emission came from large stationary sources. NOx emission trading
programs among stationary sources are successful as trading programs. However, they
are probably less successful in dealing with the environmental problem because NOx
emissions from mobile and small sources constitute a large proportion of total emission
and these latter sources are not as effectively controlled. The difference is extent to which
the trading program covers all sources contribution to the environmental problem. The
NPS problem in water quality is similar in many respects to that of mobile and small
sources for air quality problems, such as ozone, for which difficult-to-control sources are
significant contributors.
Therefore, what gives rise to a different level of success in air trading and water trading
are dependent on the nature of the pollution (completely mixed, disperse and
heterogeneity), sources of pollution (mobile vs. from the stack, density of identifiable vs.
unidentifiable sources), the majority of sources contributing to the environmental
problem, and program design (credit trading vs. cap-and-trade). It may be that the issues
of the fluid nature of air and water are not really the key to the different performances
found between air and water trading programs. The existing arrangement of a political
and institutional system and permit program implementation and design features may be
considerably more relevant to the success of the program.
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Table 1.7 Water Pollution Regulation vs. Air Pollution Regulation
Issues The Clean Water Act The Clean Air Act
Ambient
National Ambient Air Quality
Environmental Water Quality Standard (WQS) tna A A
Standard (NAAQS)
Standards
The nature of air does not differ
Water bodies can differ significantly in
greatly throughout the country. Most
many ways that might be relevant to the
of the air quality standards are
Nature of establishment of water quality standards,
designed to protect human health, and
pollutant especially for standards designed to
the human health effects of air
protect ecological as opposed to human
pollution are not likely to vary greatly
health
among citizens of different states
Diverse approaches and methods include
narrative, numeric, whole effluent NAAQS employ a purely numeric
toxicity, and biological criteria. A highly approach. The air quality monitoring
Monitoring
itrin focused monitoring effort is not possible program is more comprehensive in
Criteria
in the water quality area such as with geographic scope (AQCR) but not in
wide scale rural land uses such as its coverage of contaminants.
grazing and mining
Number of Only six air pollutants (the criteria air
A large number of pollutants
pollutants pollutants)
NPDES and Total maximum daily loads:
Implementation State Implementation Plan (SIP)
TMDLs
Analogous to air program by focusing on
Each state or region is divided into
whole watersheds rather than individual
AQCRs under the CAA. It is easier to
water bodies, state monitoring officials AQCRs under the CAA. It is easier to
Compliance assess compliance with NAAQS in
can tailor their monitoring as necessary
contiguous airsheds than to measure
to assess the health of the entire
attainment in watersheds.
watershed
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The link
between The combination of air pollution
pollution controls must be tested against a
The CWA include this link for point
controls and fundamental and appropriate
sources, but not for nonpoint sources
attainment of benchmark: attainment and
the ambient maintenance of the NAAQS.
standards
In non-attainment area, the apparent
Attainment
WQS is not addressed with care and conflict between growth and
Versus
Growth: precision about how to accommodate attainment is resolved in theory by
Growth:
growth while attaining and maintaining prohibiting new emissions, offsetting
Offsets
emission reductions elsewhere
The CAA has been most successful in
analogous program when they
identified specific control measures
Mobile versus Efforts to control nonpoint source
that states are required to adopt. Such
nonpoint pollution under the CWA have failed to
control measures have included
sources produce significant progress mandatory regional changes in
mandatory regional changes in
vehicle fuels or fuel dispensing
techniques.
Reference: Table is adapted from Adler, R.W ,1999.
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Table 1.8 Observations and Comparison between Nature of Air and Water Pollution
Factors Air Water
Regulation The CAA: Mandatory to reduce The CWA: 1.mandatory to reduce
SO2 pollution from point source, voluntary
from nonpoint source
2. Technology-based standard is an
obstacle in achieving WQ goals cost-
effectively
Source of Pollution Homogeneous, identifiable Heterogeneous, many different types
sources (SO2:Power Plants), of industries discharge, many
majority of polluters for SO2 different pollutants (single or
emission are responsible for the multiple) only identifiable sources are
treatment controlled
Nonpoint Sources 1) Small amount of SO2 emission 1)Relatively large amount of water
from NPS source 2) NPS (i.e. pollution from NPS
cars) can move to different areas 2) amount of pollution is difficult to
depending on transportation be identified and quantified
3) NPS (i.e. farms) do not move
Transport of -Airshed is larger than watershed - Watershed size is relatively smaller
pollutants -Air pollutants are dispersed - Water pollutants always flow into
multi-directionally by wind. the lowest level (downstream) uni-
-No one move air from system. directionally
- Water can be withdrawn from river
by human to use in different purpose
Easy to be Reliable equipments installed, Only point source can be monitored
monitored reliable monitoring accurately. Nonpoint sources
pollution use indirect monitoring
method e.g. based on predicted load
Alternative: Change the material to use low Prevent pollution in the first place,
Available Advance sulfur coal, scrubber redesign production process, use less
Technology water (pollution prevention)
Mass Balance in Less complex mass balance: SO2 Complex mass balance .e.g. Nitrogen
Airshed or is a stock pollutant, slowly (4 major species, org N, ammonia,
Watershed assimilated nitrite, nitrate,) and highly assimilated
(SO 2 vs. Nutrient), by bacteria and nutrients are uptake
Transformation by aquatic organism
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Part B Research Objectives
1.4 Specific Aims
The objective of my research was to understand the role of trading in water quality
management. The study particularly focused on tradable permits of water pollution rights
considered within the institutional and existing regulatory context of the U.S. The study
breaks down into three aims with several questions relating to each aim.
Aim 1: Examining the overview of water quality trading programs in the U.S.
1. How well do all the water quality trading programs in the U.S. function after
implementation?
2. Has trading worked for water pollution management? Recently, has there been
any success in water quality trading programs in term of cost saving and/or
environmental improvement?
Aim 2: Analyzing factors causing market failure and promoting successful trading
3. What are the significant factors supporting, and barriers hindering, the success of
water trading programs?
4. How do the restrictions of existing regulatory, market features, nature of water
pollution problems and technical challenges affect the program's success, and to
what degree?
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Aim 3: Understanding the roles of trading in water quality management
5. What should the roles of trading be when applied to controlling water quality in
the future? Is it likely a decentralized mechanism to enhance water pollution
control rather than being a real market mechanism?
6. Based on experiences, what are the essential and critical elements for establishing
successful water quality trading programs?
7. What can be done to stimulate the use of trading to increase effectiveness in
controlling water pollution and to promote the flexibility of trading
implementation?
1.5 Approach
The approach is divided into 5 steps (1) Data collection, (2) Preliminary analysis, (3)
Program structure analysis, (4) Comprehensive analysis, and (5) Recommendations.
Approaches are described in detail in Figure 1.3 below. The observations are drawn
mainly from available data provided by Dartmouth College, Environmental Trading
Network and the USEPA. The data was organized to identify problems and important
factors affecting the program performance. Data was grouped into 2 categories (1)
general information (i.e. drivers for trading, administrative body, size coverage, and
measurement methods), (2) usable statistics and specific information (i.e. number of
trades, number of participant, pollutant trade, market structure, approval process,
communication mechanism, specific characteristic of study area).
The preliminary analysis was done to study overall experiences of all trading programs in
the U.S. in order to identify common factors shared by all programs and the relationships
of each factor to a program's success. While most of the existing study provides the
comprehensive understanding of a specific program, this study is different from others in
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that it provides systematic analysis of all water quality trading programs in the United
States. A framework for a systematic analysis of all current trading programs was
developed to evaluate major factors affecting the success of trading programs from a
general standpoint, and to identify the roles of trading in water pollution management.
The observation provides facts with an explanation as to why water quality achieved
limited success. All trading programs are categorized based on their market structure as
to whether they are cap-and-trade, credit trading, pretreatment trading or offset. Selected
numbers of programs which have unique characteristics are further analyzed to identify
factors promoting trading activity.
A number of selected successful water trading programs implemented in the U.S. are
examined systematically and comprehensively to identify the unique characteristics
which led to programs' success. The important analysis recognized from each trading
program is the unique and generic roles of trading in water quality management. Barriers
for the success of the program were studied including three main barriers of water quality
trading success: (1) existing arrangement of a political and institutional system, (2)
economic-related barriers, and (3) nature of water pollution and technical challenges.
The final step was to provide an analysis of the generic roles of trading for water
pollution trading in the future. The requirements and frameworks needed for a pollution
control system, and the strategies for introducing market-based instruments for
stimulating trading activities were analyzed. General situations are provided where
trading may or may not work. A recommendation drawn from the analysis will be given
for someone who needs to develop a new water trading program as an option suitable for
solving localized water pollution, to fine-tuning the system after implementation and to
overcome trading obstacles.
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Figure 1.3 Diagram of an Analytical Approach
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CHAPTER 2
Concept, Framework and Considerations
for Water Quality Trading
This chapter explains the basic concepts, the fundamental elements, and the mechanics of
how trading operates which will lay the essential foundation for establishing a WQT
program. This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explains concepts about
tradable permit system for water quality trading including definition and classification,
permit lifetime, allocation strategy and tradable permit schemes. The second section
describes significant elements (legal, economic and technical) required for establishing
the water quality trading program. The third section discusses issues affecting the
program's performance which a program designer needs to take into consideration when
developing a program.
Introduction
Today, tradable permit systems are increasing in importance and acceptance by the
regulators, and the regulated, to manage various environmental problems (Vig and Kraft
2000; Harrington, Morganstemrn et al. 2004; OECD 2004). After Coase proposed the basic
foundation underlying tradable permits on external costs (Coase 1960), and the later
development of the concept and use of marketable permit system elaborated by Crocker
on controlling air pollution and Dales on regulating water use (Crocker 1966; Dales
1968), the theoretical reasons why trading of pollution rights should be superior to the
direct regulation became well known (Stavins 2000; Ellerman 2003; Tietenberg 2004).
Hahn et al and Tietenberg made a review and evaluation of several attempts to introduce
market-based instruments into environmental regulation and were optimistic about the
applications (Tietenberg 1985; Hahn and Hester 1989; Hahn 1989; Tietenberg 1990). In
applying transferable permits to water problems, the earlier experiment conducted in the
Fox River was studied by O'Neil et al. (OrNeil, David et al. 1983). Within the past
decade, interest in investigating the application of tradable permits has increased. Water
pollution trading may be referred to as effluent trading or water quality trading (WQT).
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2.1. Concept about Tradable Permit Systems
2.1.1 Definition and Classification
The most general use of a tradable permit defined by Ellerman (2005) is as "a
transferable right to a common pool resource". The definition of a tradable permit for the
environmental application is "a transferable right to emit a substance that can create
pollution" to a common pool resource; i.e. air and water (Ellerman 2005). The author
pointed out that the tradable permit for pollution trading is different from the
conventional permit implemented in command-and-control regulation in that it is
transferable and may not define specific conditions to operate, set standards, or prescribe
specific technologies to limit discharges.
Contents of permits and conditions of user rights for resource usage may have a
significant effect on trading program performance. Under most environmental regulatory
regimes, ownership of the tradable permit generally is not a true property right - it is a
license or permit right that does not have the same legal protection of the courts from
being redefined or even being revoked by the regulators (McCann 1996). Titenberg
argued that the permit should at least provide some security to the permit holders, while
still making it clear that it is not a property right (Tietenberg 2000). The crucial features
for tradable permit systems are; (1) Entitlement - legally protected entitlement of
discharge to a specified limit, (2) Transferability - right to convey all or part of the
entitlement to others, and (3) Enforceability- right to protect the entitlement and ensure
compliance of the terms of transfer5(Tietenberg 2003). The entitlement, transferability
and enforceability must be established through governmental actions.
5 Tietenberg 2003 (Chapter 4) provides concise discussion of the importance of well-defined property right
to a tradable permit system.
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2.1.2 Type of Tradable Permit
Kraemer et al. (2003) categorized tradable permit systems related to water into 3 major
types based on fields of application. (1) Tradable water abstraction rights are used to
manage the water resource mainly within the agricultural sector. Concerns mainly relate
to inadequacy of steam flow. Trading water abstraction rights can be exchanged in
volumetric terms. (2) Tradable permits to water-based resources are applied in fisheries
or in the potential energy of water. (3) Tradable discharge permits or tradable water
pollution rights are used for the protection of surface water quality.
The focus of this study is on tradable discharge permits. Tradable discharge permits can
be further divided into 2 general categories by Sorrel 1999;flowpermits and stock
permits. A flow permit refers either to a rate measure where the time dimension is
explicit (e.g. lbs/hour), or to a concentration measure where the time dimension is
incorporated into the averaging period (e.g. hourly average ppm). In contrast, stock
permits refer simply to total quantities, such as tons of emissions.
Flow permits and stock permits accommodate the spatial and temporal dimensions. In the
spatial dimension, uniformly mixed and non-uniformly mixed pollutants can be
distinguished by whether pollutant concentration is independent of the location of the
sources (Tietenberg 1985). Source location is matters for non-uniformly mixed pollutant.
In the temporal dimension, the pollutants can be separated into pollutants that accumulate
in the environment and those that are assimilated (Tietenberg 1985). Combining these
spatial and temporal considerations leads to a general classification of permit
denomination, summarized in Table 2.1 below (Sorrel 1999). A major point is that a
trading scheme becomes much more viable if the pollutant can be treated as uniformly
mixed. In this situation, the trading scheme can be based on emission permits for
individual sources that can trade with each other regardless of their location. In contrast,
for non-uniformly mixed pollutants, the freedom to trade is constrained. In this instance,
the theoretical solution is to denominate permits in terms of pollutant concentrations at
particular location (Sorrel 1999).
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Table 2.1 Permit type based on spatial and temporal dimension
Permit Spatial Temporal Permit Example
Type characteristics characteristics denomination
Flow Uniformly mixed Assimilative Rate Volatile organic
compounds (air, water)
Flow Non-uniformly mixed Assimilative Concentration SO2 (air)
Nutrients (water)
Stock Uniformly mixed Accumulative Quantity CO2 (air)
Stock Non-uniformly mixed Accumulative Deposition Heavy metals
(air, water)
Source: Sorrell, 1999.
2.1.3 Permit Lifetime
Permit lifetime may either be finite, where the right of use expires at the end of a
specified period, or indefinite, where no termination date is defined. Either type may be
made contingent upon review and renewal by the regulators (Rousseau 2001). Permits
with a short duration, would allow the regulator more flexibility in adapting the program
to new information concerning abatement technologies or water quality. Long-term
permits, however, would allow dischargers to plan capital investments with less
uncertainty and might allow improved cost efficiency in water management (Rousseau
2001). Rousseau suggested that regulators might build a margin of safety into the
baseline load since banking can lead to some variation in pollution over time.
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2.1.4 Allocation Strategy
There are a number of allocation strategies for tradable permits. To choose the proper
method, regulators need to consider several issues; i.e., allocation frequency, reference
period, preserving the cap, or incorporating new sources (USEPA 2003). Permit
allocation may either be once-off at the initiation of a scheme or periodic at regular
intervals over the duration of the scheme. Updating allocations periodically can influence
future compliance activities of the discharger due to an incentive to obtain more
allowance. Periodic distribution is most appropriate for stock permits and allows
declining pollution to be more easily targeted. For example, a source could be allocated a
single permit to emit N tons/year of pollution, which would then be valid for a specified
period of time. Alternatively, it could be allocated N stock permits each year, with each
permit worth 1 ton of pollution.
It is important to emphasize that instead of allocating credits or permits, Beder (2001)
proposed the "share" concept to deal with the problem of revising baseline levels or
allowances over time. Each discharger will receive their shares of allowed discharge in
proportion to total pollution per time period. Their shares can be bought and sold. The
share would be owned forever, but the volumes/amount of pollution allowed could vary
(Beder 2001).
The commonly used methods for distributing tradable discharge permits are auction or
grandfathering. Under the auction approach, the source purchases the permit from their
governments at the market-clearing price. Regulators need to decide on how to distribute
the auction revenues and permits. Under the grandfathering approach, the permit is
distributed to each source based on some allocation rule (typically historical use). Firms
that polluted more in the past would have larger shares. Under grandfathering, existing
sources only have to purchase any additional permits they may need over and above the
initial allocation (as opposed to purchasing all permits in an auction market) (Tietenberg
2000).
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Although the auction method has advantages over grandfathering, in that it can generate
revenues and give a price signal to the market which can facilitate trading, firms would
have to pay additional costs for permits at the auction. Stavins (1995) argued that the
grandfathering rules allocation tend to predominate. Grandfathering may increase the
likelihood of adopting the trading policy (particularly from the existing sources) and
would be the easiest strategy for the regulator to implement. Only a transferable permit
system that allocates permits free of charge to sources on the basis of their historic
emission rate would guarantee that existing sources would be no worse off than they
would under a command-and-control system imposing the same degree of control
(Tietenberg 1995). However, the free distribution system imposes a bias against new
sources, in the sense that their financial burden is greater than that of an existing source,
even if the two sources install the same control devices. This new source bias has
hindered the introduction of new facilities and new technologies that embody the latest
innovations (Tietenberg 2003).
2.1.5 Tradable Permit Schemes
Ellerman (2005) classified the tradable permit systems into 3 forms: (1) credit trading, (2)
averaging and (3) allowance trading. Table 2.2 compares features of each form of
tradable permits with the conventional permit6 (which will be discussed in the following
sections). The degree to which a trading program shifts management responsibility of
pollution control from the regulator to the discharger primarily distinguishes the systems
(Shabman 2002). Shabman et al. emphasize that the difference between centrally directed
trades, and market-based programs is fundamental to understanding the varied
performance of the trading programs. The authors point out that a trading program where
regulators have authority and responsibility for approving where and when a trade can
occur will be called credit trading. The authors argue that a credit trading system
(regulator-directed trades) is not a typical market but rather a market-like system. An
allowance market is a true market system where dischargers make their own decision on
how they will meet pollution control obligations including trading arrangement.
6Note: Ellerman et al 2005 clearly explained the classification with examples.
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Table 2.2 Type of Tradable Permit Schemes
Permit Scheme Distinctive Feature Limitation/Example
Conventional Permit The regulatory authority - Regulators ensure that ambient
identifies the pollution control environmental goals are not violated
technologies that are available by manipulating and revising
and affordable for each pollutant technology-based permit limits
source. The technology then is rather than identifying a mass load
used to establish a maximum cap.
allowable rate of pollutant - Example: the NPDESpermitfor
discharges. Permits cannot be controlling waterpollution from
transferred. point source dischargers
Credit Trading Certification of credits (more - High transaction cost associated
than required to meet the with certification may outweigh the
conditions of its permit) can be cost saving
transferred. Regulator-approved- - Example: The U.S. federal offset
trades ensure that a facility will programs control water pollution
not receive credit for what it from nonpoint source in PS-NPS
would have done anyway. trading
Averaging Automatic credit trading, firms - Total amount of pollution has not
that do better than required in been capped and may escalate due
their permits automatically to economic growth
receive credits even if the firm - Regulatory burden is to set up
would have reduced emission standards as a baseline and need to
anyway be revised regularly
- Example: The mobile source
emissions program in the US.
Allowance Trading Optimal quantity of pollution is - Intensive resources and funding is
(Cap-and-trade) specified by regulators instead of required at the beginning of the
emission standards program to set up an acceptable
quantity of mission, allocate
allowances and consider limits to
spatial and temporal trading
- Example: The Acid Rain Program
Reference: This table is adopted from Ellerman, 2005.
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2.1.5.1 Credit trading system
In credit trading system, the regulators have to set an emission baseline as a benchmark
for measuring trading performance. Usually, the baseline is determined by references to
traditional technology-based standards (Tietenberg 2000). Credits are generated when
polluters reduce discharge below the baseline set by regulators. The reduction credits
have to be certified by the regulatory agency, before or after the fact (Ellerman 2005).
In averaging system, firms that do better than required in their permits automatically
receive credits without being certified by the regulatory agency (Ellerman 2005).
Ellerman described that averaging is automatic credit trading. Credit and automatic credit
trading programs place severe restrictions on the exchange process. Dischargers face
limited ability to decide how pollution will be controlled while dischargers may have
better information to initiate credit creation for their firms. For these reasons, Shabman
(2002) argued that credit trading is an extension of conventional command-and-control
regulation that keeps firm-level abatement decisions in the hand of the regulators.
Dewees notes that credit trading systems are not typically designed to create low cost
systems of decentralized exchange, but rather depend on a case-by-case amendment to
the permit issued in the traditional regulatory process (Dewees 2001).
2.1.5.2 Allowance trading system
An allowance system is also known as a cap-and-trade. The system contains a mandatory
cap on discharges and individual allowances to participating sources. Firms are required
to surrender a permit for every unit of discharge in allowance trading without any
mandate to meet a specific standard (Ellerman 2005). The cap is established by the
regulator to limit effluent load from all sources to achieve certain environmental
objectives. Ellerman (2005) pointed out that "the cap is frequently set at a level that
would be achieved if some best technology were to be required by all.. .or at a level that
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is presumed to be a step in the direction of reducing emissions to some ultimate goal." In
the U.S., caps can be set for individual watersheds through the TMDL process.
A pre-specified number of allowances are allocated to the dischargers. Dischargers are
granted authority to make their own pollution control decisions, and there must be a
program to readily and reliably monitor discharges. The initial allocations are not
necessarily based on traditional technology-based standards. Typically the number of
issued allowances declines over time. Therefore, the aggregate reductions implied by the
cap-and-trade allocations can exceed those achievable by standards based on currently
known technologies (Tietenberg 2000).
2.1.5.3 Allowance vs. Credit: Open vs. Closed system
Allowance vs. Credit
The essential feature of a credit is that it is given either for over-compliance with some
pre-existing regulatory requirement or for reductions below business-as-usual discharges
from uncontrolled sources (such as NPS in water). In both cases, credit is given for
reductions which would not have occurred but for the possibility of transferring the
reduction obligation form the buyer to the seller of the credit. The key point is that a
reduction is created at a specific source for use in meeting some regulatory obligation at
another source. In contrast, there is no "creation" ofsource-specific reductions in an
allowance system. Permits are distributed in some manner to sources as tradable rights to
discharge a certain quantity and those rights can be exchanged among the recipients of
these allowances. The allocation of the permits may correspond to an assumed
application of some control standard, but there is no requirement on specific sources to
meet that standard. Therefore, over-compliance loses much of the meaning it has in a
credit system. One might refer to the seller of allowances as one that has over-complied
with the standard implicit in the initial allocation of permits, but the standard is
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theoretical only and has no practical force upon the specific source, as is the case in a
conventional regulatory system (Ellerman 2006).
Allowances set a cap on aggregate emissions that cannot be eroded by economic growth.
This characteristic is not shared by either technology-based, source-specific emission
standards, or by an emission credit system that is linked to technology-based standards.
Credit trading did not prevent pollution growth resulting from economic growth since
new firms were given the same baselines as existing firms. There is no control over the
aggregate emission from all sources; therefore, total pollution will escalate unless some
additional constraints are built into the system. For example, a constraint requires new or
expanding sources made up for all emission increases by acquiring sufficient credits from
existing polluters (known as "offset") (Sorrel 1999; Tietenberg 2000).
The two approaches have the different implications for the extent and timing of
regulatory involvement (Ellerman 2005). Credit trading depends upon the existence of a
previously determined set of regulatory standards, but allowance-based trading does not.
Allowance schemes may require a great deal of investment at the inception of the
scheme, but relatively little oversight during operation. In contrast, credit schemes require
less initial design work, but the regulator must be involved in certifying individual trades.
Allowance schemes represent a purer form of emission trading, but credit schemes may
be easier to implement (Ellerman 2005). Frequently in water pollution trading, a credit
trading system is more preferable to an allowance system by the regulator.
Open Vs. Closed System
The relation between credit and allowance systems and open and closed systems is
approximately at best. It is true that allowance systems have an explicit absolute limit on
emissions form some pre-defined set of sources, whereas the regulatory system in which
credit may be earned typically do not. Thus, one might think of the allowance system as
closed and the credit system as open, but this is confusing different attributes. For
example, the trading of credits in a conventional regulatory system implies some level of
- 58 -
total emissions within the relevant time period that is unchanged if the additionality
requirement is met by the source earning the credit. One might think of this
counterfactual level of total emissions as an assumed or implicit cap. Alternatively, an
allowance system may be open in that either credit earned outside the system may be
used or uncontrolled sources "opt-in" to the system. In both of these cases, the initially
specified cap is increased by the credits injected into the system or by the allowances
issued to opt-in sources. But, note in both of these cases the scope of the program, that is,
the number of sources has also increased. One could say as well that the absolute cap
remains closed but has been adjusted to reflect the inclusion of more sources (Ellerman
2006).
The terms, open and closed, which are used occasionally in the literature, refer mainly to
the ability to generate credits. "Open market" systems allow the generation and use of
credits for compliance with implicitly "closed" conventional, prescriptive systems that
would not allow such flexibility. This is nothing more than the introduction of cost-
reducing credit trading into an otherwise prescriptive system. Unfortunately, several
experiments in these so-called "open-market" systems were badly compromised by being
too lax on the requirement to demonstrate additionality. As noted above, allowance
systems may be "open" in allowing opt-ins or credits as the case may be. One might think
of them as "closed" if such mechanisms were not included. As alternative, frequently
encountered expression is an "off-system" credit. In the case of water quality
management, open systems hold the greatest interest in facilitating the inclusion of
off-system, nonpoint sources, whether the underlying controls are conventional
prescriptive regulation or a decentralized allowance cap-and-trade mechanism for point
sources (Ellerman 2006).
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2.2 Framework for Establishing WQT Systems
There are several elements, agents, and entities contributing to the development and
implementation of effluent trading. Benkovic and Kruger provide a delightful discussion
about the specific prerequisites for a pollution trading program (Benkovic and Kruger
2001). The reading by OECD (2001) provides detailed information on the overall design
and implementation of a tradable permit in environmental management (OECD 2001).
The study of the OECD discussed extensively the principal issues that arise when
designing a tradable permit system. The USEPA (2003) provides the framework for
watershed-based trading as generic guidelines for establishing a trading program7 . More
step-by-step details conducting an analysis with examples for determining the viability of
watershed scale trading is referred to in the WQT handbook by USEPA 2004.
Outstanding issues that should be considered for the introduction of tradable permits for
water pollution and relevant theory are discussed in detail by Kraemer et al (Kraemer,
Eleftheria et al. 2003).
The following section explains specific elements of a water trading program, which are
required but not necessarily limited to, to be credible and successful as suggested in
several of the trading frameworks (USEPA Draft Framework, Chesapeake Bay Program
Fundamental Principles and Guideline, National Wildlife Foundation 1999, Idaho
Trading Guidance, Michigan Rules, Colorado Pollutant Trading Policy, Tar-Pamlico
Trading Program, Connecticut DEP (Long Island Sound), and An Effluent Trading
Policy Review for Texas). Each of the elements described below are adopted from
guidelines in these frameworks and becomes potential problems in water trading
programs unless they are appropriately designed. Elements in designing a WQT Program
may be roughly divided into 3 groups; legal elements, economic elements and technical
elements.
7 The WQT framework has been reviewed several times in 1996, 1999 and 2000. For more information
about the final water quality trading policy (2003) from USEPA Office of Water, available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/ watershed/trading/finalpolicy2003.html
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2.2.1 Legal Elements
Element 1: Trading must be consistent with the statutory requirements and water quality
standards outlined in the CWA and otherfederal laws
Element 2: A trading program must have clearly defined goals and objectives. Goals
outline the vision and rationale for the program, and the objective serves as the
qualitative and quantitative measures by which to evaluate the program and judge the
merits of individual trades within it.
Element 3: Trading and transactions may be developed within any authorizing
framework. The TMDL process appears to be the preferred method of the USEPA for
addressing non-attainment watersheds and it may offer the greatest opportunities for
effluent trading.
Element 4: A program must establish trade approval and administration to oversee the
trading program at local, watershed, and state levels. Establishment of a central
coordinating office is an important step to determining costs, setting prices, baselines,
trading ratio, trade facilitation. Accountability and assessment of progress is a critical
component that needs to be established.
Element 5: Enforcement and eligibility mechanisms must exist to ensure trading
performance, including monitoring and periodic program evaluation. The five types of
provisions must be considered within the design of trading enforcement mechanisms: (1)
Anti-backsliding, (2) Anti-degradation, (3) Agency and trading partner monitoring, (4)
Trading partner liability for noncompliance, and (5) Citizen enforcement provision.
Element 6: The regulatory agency must actively encourage effluent trading through
information and education programs. Agency-sponsored or encouraged-demonstration
programs and training seminars on how to develop and structure trades will be crucial
aspects for developing a viable program.
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Element 7: Public participation should be encouraged at all stages in the evaluation and
implementation of the program. Stakeholders' dissatisfaction may delay or impede the
implementation and execution of trading programs.
2.2.2 Economic Elements
Element 1: The benefits from trading programs will be realized only when there is a
significant difference in unit costs of abatement between sources; otherwise if all sources
in a watershed face approximately the same cost of load reduction, there will be little
incentive to trade and a program will likely fail.
Element 2: Trading procedure should be taken to reduce transaction costs. Trading will
be encouraged to the extent that an agency can reduce transaction costs through actions
such as providing more information to traders, acting as a broker, or paying for
monitoring and enforcement activities.
Element 3: Trading should apply to point sources and nonpoint sources. The full
benefits of effluent trading will be realized when trades are made between point and
nonpoint sources. The distribution of baseline abatement responsibilities should be fair to
all market participants.
2.2.3 Technical Elements
Element 1: Trading should be restricted to pollutants that are biologically degradable
and assimilable such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and organic carbon. However, pollutants
that are accumulative within the ecosystem (metals, some organics) are potential
toxicants and not appropriate to trade.
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Element 2: Trading boundaries should coincide with watershed or watershed segment,
so that the impact and improvement to water quality through the trades are measurable.
Reducing a pollutant loading rate in one watershed by increasing it in another is not
consistent with the concept of integrated watershed management.
Element 3: Adequate technical- and economic- related information is needed to define a
clear rule including defining units of trade, creation and duration of credit, determining
eligibility; participant eligibility, and trade eligibility (type of pollutants, water quality
standards, regulatory limitation, eligibility of funds, eligibility of reduction credit, and
pollution reduction mechanisms).
Element 4: Credits available for sale must represent a real improvement in water quality
or must at the very least offset the pollution load for which it is substituting. Establishing
baseline loads for all sources is critical.
2.3 Considerations in Establishing Tradable Permit Schemes
The three requirements for an effective trading system are defining pollution, allocating
pollution rights and measuring emissions (Ellerman 2005). A government agency plays a
significant role in setting a discharge limit and assigning responsibility for effluent
control to create demand for a water quality market (Stephenson and Shabman 1996).
Mainly, the establishment of an effluent trading program requires a structure of reduction
in goals, trading mechanisms, understanding marginal treatment costs of different
technologies, clearly defined rules of compliance measurement, monitoring performance
and penalties. This section outlines and presents some of the major technical, economic,
legal and regulatory issues that need to be taken into account for developing an effluent
trading program.
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2.3.1 Legal and Institutional Consideration
2.3.1.1 Responsibility of Government Agency
Prior to the introduction of a market for tradable effluent permits, there should be an
existing functioning system in place to control water pollution, either based on command-
and-control or other market-based instruments such as effluent charges. The process of
designing and introducing a tradable permit system requires regulatory and institutional
reform to facilitate the introduction of a tradable permit system (OECD 2001). There are
some key elements in regulatory and institutional reforms, as suggested by OECD 2001,
including:
* A shift from regulations focused on technology choice to the formulation of
physical constraints, such as ambient water quality standards that are more in line
with environmental objectives and offer greater flexibility in the choice of means
to achieve compliance.
* A shift from environmental standards expressed in terms of unit and concentration
value to those expressed as absolute/mass values (ceiling or quotas by period).
* Assignment of responsibility for verifying policy implementation to independent
administrative authorities whose long-term mission is to ensure compliance with
regulations and to develop transfer activity and fair transactions.
Market development requires a shift in regulator responsibilities (Stephenson 1999).
Stephenson explained that in an allowance market, the regulator serves the role of a
market designer who creates the condition for decentralized decision making and an
officer who monitors and enforces the rules concerning the disposal of wastes into the
water. This regulatory allocation requirement encounters a number of difficult and
serious questions. For example: How much of the acceptable load (and conversely, the
need for pollution reductions) should be allocated among various sources of pollution,
and according to what principles? How much allocation should be made for a margin of
safety, and how much for future growth? Water quality trading programs need
cooperation between federal, state and local efforts.
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An appropriate definition and assignment of a property right has to incorporate all
polluters into the permit system in order to establish a functioning trading system.
Particularly, when regulators want to manage pollution from nonpoint sources using a
permit system, Young and Karkoski suggest that regulators may need to re-define
nonpoint source as a large collection of small, independent, and controllable sources
rather than a diffuse, uncontrollable, and unmonitored source, or define it based on
capacity of operations/types of firms or size of activity to be able to assign their
responsibilities (Young and Karkoski 2000).
Multi-party watershed permits is another potential challenge in addressing nonpoint
sources, as parties are potentially subjected to the permit by including synchronization of
permit issuance across a watershed of multiple parties, which allows coordinated
monitoring, assessment and characterization, prioritization, planning and implementation.
This type of permit will lower transaction costs and integrate a large number of sources
with different marginal control cost to create potential trading situations within a
watershed.
The choice to adopt a tradable permit program depends on whether or not the existing
institutional context provides a suitable basis on which to develop a tradable permit
program (OECD 2001). It also depends upon whether the regulators want to deal with the
problem that is already covered by the regulatory framework or deal with a new problem
from the standpoint of public policy (OECD 2001). Table 2.3 presents options for
introduction of a tradable permit suggested by OECD.
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Table 2.3 Option for Introduction of Tradable Permits
Problem (Example)
Institutional Framework
Already Covered New
Extension of existing "Bubbles" for air pollution Extension of the application of
framework and/or addition of from an industrial complex; BATs to the regulation of
greater flexibility on the "Averaging" of energy greenhouse gases, leaving
margin consumption requirement over little margin for the use of
a range of products economic instruments.
New and separate programs Introduction of the Acid Rain Introduction of a separate
for tradable permits and Program in the U.S. in program of transferable quotas
retention of the existing addition to local regulations for carbon emissions not
general framework designed to control S02 covered by the EU directive
emission on IPPC
General regulatory reform to Replacement of a standard General policy of developing
adjust the institutional regulatory control policy by tradable permits in various
framework to the power of the RECLAIM program of areas of environmental
economic instrument tradable permits in LA protection, similar to the
general policy of the EPA in
the US
Source: This table is adopted from OECD, 2001.
Many trading programs face institutional obstacles particularly with regulator-approved
trade (King and Kuch 2003). Moreover, the CWA undermines the incentives and
opportunities to trade credits because of limited choices of control options (Stephenson
and Shabman 2001). Boyd and Krupnick 2003 pointed out that trading between regulated
point sources is inhibited by regulatory provisions that reduce the incentive to trade; e.g.,
trades cannot be used to comply with technology-based standards. The authors argued
that in the credit trading, sources must "over-comply" to have credits to sell but doing so
presents regulatory risks. First, the Clean Water Act (CWA) has anti-backsliding
provisions to ensure that water quality will be sustained. Over-complying sources that
return at a later date to more normal levels of compliance may run afoul of this provision.
Second, over-compliance signals to the regulator that greater levels of control can be
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attained cost-effectively. This can lead to a future increase in stringency of the standards.
In either case, the CWA provisions undermine the incentive to over-comply, and thereby
also undermine the trades (Boyd, Krupnick et al. 2003).
2.3.1.2 Enforcement and Monitoring
Key to success of the tradable permit program requires adequate monitoring, reporting,
and strong enforcement to ensure that the pollution abatement goals are achieved. There
are two distinct problems in monitoring and enforcement which are (1) equivalency and
(2) measurement. The equivalency is applicable to all trading and the measurement
problem is unique to NPSs. For example, a simpler case regarding to the equivalency is a
PS/PS trading. In this case, the assumption about the conventional, no-tradable permit
system is very important. If one can assume that the conventional regulatory system is
designed for the environmental problem in such a way that different control levels are
imposed on sources in relation to their relative contributions to the underlying
environmental problem, then it is hard to imagine how a trading system can achieve the
same environmental results at lower cost. It could do so only if the differing valuations of
the damages and the resulting differing controls were replicated in comparable transfer
ratios for trades between those sources. Otherwise, a 1:1 trading ratio will always involve
a trade-off of environmental effectiveness and cost-savings. For instance, if the
conventional system imposes a uniform control requirement on all sources regardless of
their relative contributions to the environmental problem, then it is easier to see how
trading can reduce costs without also reducing environmental effectiveness. In fact, it
may be possible to improve environmental effectiveness if it is easier to introduce an
appropriate trading ratio than it is to impose different controls on different sources
(Ellerman 2006).
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Measurement NPS pollution is a major problem in trading. Nature of nonpoint sources
pollution makes credits measurement hardly to be done with accuracy at reasonable costs.
There are several concerns in enforcing and monitoring trades involved in nonpoint
sources including; (1) baseline of pollutant discharges, (2) pollution reduction attributable
to Best Management Practices (BMPs), (3) verification of BMPs installation and
maintenance and (4) monitoring frequency and credit assessment. The ability of an
administrative agency is needed to quantify and then verify over time how the amounts of
nonpoint sources are affecting the program's effectiveness. Additionally, it is critical to
know which party (the agency or the sources) must prove that a source is incompliance or
out of compliance, and who will track the monitoring for a trade involving NPSs. For
example might be the requirement to inspect equipment or practice to be sure that they
are in force.
The choice of monitoring strategy is based on the pollutant to be tracked, the cost of
conducting the monitoring, and the level of accuracy acceptable to agencies and
stakeholders. Monitoring baseline and controlled nonpoint sources is particularly difficult
due to the site-specific weather-related nature of discharges. Direct and indirect
monitoring strategies have been developed to determine baselines and to verify the
pollutant quantities over time. The indirect methods of modeling which rely on
information from disparate sources and estimate of overall nonpoint source discharge
loads to the receiving water, dominate the observed program monitoring method.
Measurement and enforcement are presumed not to be problems between trading among
point sources. Because discharges from point sources can be measured and the regulation
or permit surrender requirements effectively enforced. However, PS/NPS trading would
involve all the equivalency and measurement problems. For example, many agricultural
pollutants arrive via dispersed and unobservable transport mechanisms, whether through
runoff, groundwater leaching, or the atmosphere. Therefore, it is difficult to predict with
certainty the amount of discharge reduction (or production of credits) the implementation
of BMPs will produce at the point in the watershed where credits are measured. The
problem is then to establish eligible BMPs that can be observed (and therefore enforced)
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and which can be reasonable assumed to result in real reductions of the relevant
discharges. Generally, credits that are granted to nonpoint sources are based on verifiable
BMPs and predicted reduction of changes in management, rather than being based on
actual measured load. Therefore, establishment of a trading ratio between PS/NPS is
usually estimated with a discount in its effectiveness due to potential uncertainty in the
data and other management factors.
Responsibility and liability are the primary enforcement concerns with trading programs.
The programs should clearly state which conditions make a trade fail. If a trade fails, who
is responsible for remediation and who is liable. Enforcement process could be in the
form of permit-based enforcement by the CWA or by contract (either by a bilateral or
multilateral party). Traditionally, enforcement is usually unidirectional: from the
regulator to the regulated. Whereas, contract enforcement flows are multidirectional
involving the buyer and the seller with the legal support of the courts. Liability must be
assigned to either the buyer or the seller.
Buyer liability refers to tradable permits for which the validity or usability of the permit
is uncertain and the buyer bears the risk that the permit might not be acceptable. These
system simply differing prices corresponding to the risk associated with different permits.
Seller liability refers to rules in which the seller guarantees the validity of the permit sold
and where the buyer has legal recourse against the seller if the permit is not accepted by
the regulatory authority. Nearly all workable systems establish seller liability. A system
of buyer liability creates incentives for monitoring and assuring that the necessary
pollution reductions are achieved. Buyers must take precaution before buying credits,
particularly form NPS. When buyer liability prevails, buyer would pay less for permits
with uncertain monitoring and therefore not be any more motivated to assure the
reduction than with a seller liability rule. Equivalently, sellers are paid more for permit
with better monitoring and better chances of acceptance (Ellerman 2006).
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The ability of a measurement system to produce information to support trading depends
upon how well the system is designed. The information cycle, describing the continuous
process from specifying information needs, strategy to collect data, and data analysis,
provides a quantitative means of connecting monitoring system design and operations for
water management (Timmerman 2000). Implementation of a tradable permit program
needs two kinds of data monitoring. Periodic data on the environmental condition and
data to monitor compliance are needed for evaluating the effectiveness of the program.
Monitoring compliance with the program requires data on the identity of permit holders,
amount of permits owned by each owner, and permit transfers (Woodward and Kaiser
2002). It will be very helpful to input all data into a centralized computer system that is
accessible by eligible users on a real-time basis, so that users can search for the potential
trading partners within the program.
2.3.1.3 Penalties for Noncompliance
To guarantee a successful implementation, regulators need to enforce a set of sanctions
for non-compliance. Stringent penalties for noncompliance are required for a well-
functioning trading program. The penalties should be sufficiently high and determined
based on the nature and severity of the violation. The appropriate penalties will be an
incentive for compliance (USEPA 2003).
The form of penalties could be notice of violation, civil action, excess emission offsets,
financial penalties or criminal penalties (jail sentences and revocation of discharge
permit). Often predetermined administrative fines can be imposed by the enforcing
agency itself for minor or routine non-compliance. More serious non-compliance could
then trigger civil penalties. Criminal penalties should be reserved for falsification of
official reports as being the most serious violation (Tietenberg 2000).
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2.3.2 Economic Consideration
This section will discuss several economic factors affecting the success and efficiency of
effluent trading; including driver for trading, size of the market, type of trading, type of
market, transaction costs, administrative costs, trading ratio and other concerns.
2.3.2.1 Driver for Trading
The leading drivers for WQT market are TMDLs. TMDL allocates pollution wasteloads
to all polluters within the watershed. The difference between marginal costs of treatments
between PS and NPS are the major incentives for trading. For a pre-TMDL trading (a
watershed where a TMDL is not yet established), "nonpoint source baselines are the
levels of pollutant loads associated with existing land uses and management practice and
point source baselines are defined by their NPDES permit or other effluent limitations"
(USEPA 1998). For watersheds with a TMDL in place, trading should be consistent with
the assumptions and requirements upon which the TMDL is established. Power (2002)
examined the issues of pollution trading as a possible mechanism for implementing
TMDLs. TMDLs, which are legally required, can be critical for establishing a foundation
upon which a trading program can be built (Powers 2002).
Many existing water pollution trading programs do not appear to be particularly effective,
and often times do not operate within the context of a TMDL. Some concerns frequently
cited by current program administrators are that the TMDL process is lengthy and
expensive. The important observation is that the ability to develop an effective TMDL is
subject to the availability of funds, and influenced by the interests of the groups involved
in its creation (Stephenson and Shabman 2001). It is crucial for regulators to address
these conditions.
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2.3.2.2 Size of Trading Market
To have a functioning market for tradable discharge permits, enough market participants
should exist. Therefore, the number and size of pollutant sources participating in a
trading program affects the success of trading. King and Kuch pointed out that the
necessary condition for a trading program to be successful is to attract the willingness to
buy and sell from the dischargers. The determinants of demand and supply of nutrient
trading and potential effects to WQT markets in the U.S. studied by King and Kuch, are
shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Determinants for supply and demand in WQT Markets
Determinants of supply
Legal factors
- Waste Treatment Requirements
- Waste Discharge Restrictions
- Enforcement Policies
- Level of Fine and Charges
- TMDL allocations
Economic Factors
- Marginal cost of reducing discharges
- Baseline issues affecting additionality
- Transaction costs to credit sellers
- Liability of credit sellers
- Conflicts with government subsidies
- Conflicts with other green payment
Other Factors
- Concentration of demand
- Geographic scale of credit trading
- Market power of buyers
Determinants of demand
Legal Obligations
- Waste Treatment Requirements
- Waste Discharge Restrictions
- Enforcement Policies
- Level of Fines and Charges
Opportunities to trade
- Availability of credits
- Price of credits
- Trading ratios
- Liability of credit buyer
- Reliability/validity of offsets
Other Factors
- Marginal cost of on-site treatment
- Transition costs to credit buyers
- Equity of discharge restrictions
- Public and government relations
Source: This table is adopted from King and Kuch 2003.
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To have viable trades, the trading systems need to involve many traders (credit generators
and credit buyers). There should be many pollutant sources affecting the same parameters
(e.g. nitrogen, phosphorus, BOD) within the same watershed. The sources must have
different abatement cost curves so that benefits from trades are possible. Demand for
trading will be driven by the degree to which dischargers perceive there will be potential
cost saving from purchasing credits rather than from installing control (King and Kuch
2003).
It is critical to have a large number of buyers and sellers for a competitive long-run and
equilibrium price that will minimize abatement costs and yet distribute emission among
sources at various locations to meet certain water quality standards. If too few sources
are involved in the trading, the trading can be difficult and there may not be enough of a
difference in the marginal cost of reduction to make trading worthwhile. The limited
number of participants may result in fewer trades and there will be less information
available regarding prices paid for abatement credits. In contrast, with a larger number of
participants, high transaction costs and uncertainty are related to diversity of sources and
activities (Jarvie and Solomon 1998).
2.3.2.3 Type of Trading
In the WQT programs, the regulator must choose the type of trading allowed.
Characteristics of pollution sources (i.e. point sources/nonpoint sources) are used to
design types of trading allowed and eligibility of participants in the programs (USEPA
2003). USEPA grouped trading into 5 types (USEPA 1996).
1. PS/PS- a point source trades with other point sources on the same water body that can
reduce more pollution than required at lower abatement costs instead of upgrading its
own treatment.
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2. Intra-plant - a point source allocates pollutant discharges among its outlets to a river in
a cost-effective manner. Combined permitted discharge in trading has to comply with the
requirements to meet applicable water quality standards.
3. Pretreatment - a POTW arranges for indirect dischargers that send waste to the POTW
to reduce the amount of pollution beyond required reduction from its facility before
discharging to achieve water quality goal more cost-effectively.
4. PS/NPS- a point source arranges for nonpoint source discharges control instead of
upgrading its own treatment.
5. NPS/NPS - instead of installing or upgrading its own control, nonpoint sources arrange
for more cost-effective control of other nonpoint sources.
2.3.2.4 Type of Markets
USEPA (2004) recommended the WQT markets have essential functions including
* Assuring compliance with the CWA and relevant state and local requirements
(predominantly relying on NPDES and TMDL)
* Defining and executing the trading process (i.e. negotiating a transaction,
accounting for water quality equivalence, completing appropriate paper work,
reviewing and approving trades, monitoring and verifying reductions, reporting to
regulatory agencies, auditing reported information, and taking enforcement
actions)
* Communication between buyers and sellers, and providing information to the
public and other stakeholders (encouraging electronic publication of information
of boundary of watershed and trading areas, discharge sources involved, quantity
of credit generated and used, market price).
Woodward and Kaiser categorized the principle types of water quality trading (WQT)
markets into 4 main types and these categories are not mutually exclusive (Woodward
and Kaiser 2002).
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1. Bilateral Negotiation. Credit buyers and sellers directly negotiate the agreement of
each trade. Currently, bilateral negotiations are the most common structure of WQT
markets. Despite relatively high transaction costs associated with searching for the
information, negotiation and enforcement, the advantage of this system is that it
accommodates trading of non-uniform goods.
2. Third Party Broker. The third-party brokers facilitate trades for buyers and sellers who
are unfamiliar with the trading programs. The brokers can reduce transactions costs in
finding trading partners. However, the brokerage fee may increase the transaction costs.
The government agency can act as a broker to bring together buyers and sellers and play
an active role in providing information to market participants.
3. Clearinghouse. The clearinghouse generates uniform credits from water quality
projects with variable prices and quality. Without direct negotiation between buyers and
sellers, the clearinghouse sets the prices for the credits which then help reduce the search
and information costs.
4. Exchange. A requirement of this system is the uniformity of the credits generated by
the sellers which allows for an open information structure, a market-clearing price for
transaction between buyers and sellers.
2.3.2.5 Transaction Costs
Transaction cost is one of the most important issues to be considered in effluent trading
programs. Montero (1997) notes that the presence of transaction costs and uncertainty
can lead to cost inefficiencies in the markets depending on initial allocation of the
permits, or on the baseline level established (Montero 1997). Stavin (1995) categorized
transaction costs in pollution trading based on three potential sources; (1) search
information about the needs, and potentially available credits; of buyers and sellers, (2)
bargaining and decision making including time, fee for brokerage, legal service, and (3)
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monitoring and enforcement associated with the completion of the trade. Stavins (1995)
argued that search and information costs should be improved somewhat in markets with
relatively large numbers of potential trading sources. A large number of trading
participants can then mean more frequent transactions, more generated information, and
thereby reducing uncertainty (Stavins 1995).
A primary source of transaction costs is governmental oversight and management of
trading. Hahn and Hester (1989) identified three means by which government
intervention can contribute to an increase in transaction costs; (1) a high degree of
regulator oversight of individual trades, (2) a large number of levels of bureaucracy at
which a trade must be reviewed, and (3) expenditure required to obtain adequate
information necessary to establish property rights for trading.
Rules for a statewide effluent trading program in Michigan are being drafted and
proposed to reduce transaction costs by the establishment and maintenance of a Water
Quality Trading Registry. The information in the registry, including the name and
location of the sources, the pollutant-specific quantity of credits, a brief description of
sources and methods to generate discharges or loading reductions, is made available to
the public through an electronic bulletin board which would be updated daily. Such a
bulletin board would reduce the transaction costs involved in search and information.
Effective enforcement requires accurate and consistent measurement of pollution.
Establishment of proper levels of fines can encourage compliance and prevent pollution
damage. Administrative costs can be lower, if the regulator sets up a system in such a
way that burden of proof is shifted to the firm or dischargers. For example, a nonpoint
source discharger needs a verification of BMPs installation in order to receive a
certification for credit generation. Another example is the continuous emission
monitoring (CEM) systems used in the Acid Rain Program. The systems have allowed
the government to easily monitor and enforce emission restriction in accordance with the
permits. Any units that exceed emissions allowed by its permit pay a $2,000 per ton
penalty (Stavins 2000).
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2.3.2.6 Trading Ratios
A trading ratio is the number of units of pollution reduction a source must purchase to
receive credit for one unit load reduction (USEPA 1996). King and Kuch (2003) mention
that trading ratios are used not only to achieve environmental goals via trade, but also to
equalize the inherent risks (expected increase or decrease in discharges). Hoag and
Hughes-Popp (1997) point out that a trading ratio can have a negative impact on the
success of a tradable discharge permit program. Higher trading ratios increase the cost of
achieving regulatory compliance through trading and, in turn, reduce opportunities to
lower emission cap. Higher trading ratios reduce the economic values of a credit and
make it more cost-effective for point sources to treat their discharges on-site rather than
by buying credits (Hoag 1997).
Hung and Shaw 2005 explored a trading-ratio system (TRS) of tradable discharge permits
for water pollution control by incorporating location effect into the tradable discharge
permit for non-uniformly mixed pollutants in water. In their study, the researchers
proposed that the TRS is a model trading system for water pollution control which meets
the predetermined standards of environmental quality at minimum abatement costs. It can
avoid the problem of high-transaction costs, hot spots and free riding. Main
characteristics in the trading-ratio system in their study are (1) the zonal effluent cap is
set by taking into account the water pollutant loads transferred from the upstream zones;
(2) the trading ratios are set equal to the exogenous transfer coefficients among zones;
and (3) permits are freely tradable among dischargers according to the trading ratios. The
specific characteristic of water pollutants which always flow to the lowest level
unidirectionally allows the authority to set an effluent cap for different zones in order to
make the trading ratios equal to exogenous transfer coefficient among zones. Polluters
who want to increase their effluents will need to buy the zonal tradable discharge permit
of the same zone, or upstream zones, to offset their increase. It is not necessary to buy
tradable discharge permits from all zones that are affected by their effluents (Hung and
Shaw 2005).
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Setting up the exact trading ratios is quite difficult because of uncertainty; e.g., run-off
from nonpoint sources varies with the weather, which then complicates the establishment
of trading ratios that would equate point and nonpoint sources (USEPA 1996). Horan
(2001) considers an economically optimal point/nonpoint trading ratio that is adjusted to
encourage more nonpoint controls. In actual trading programs, ratios are adjusted in
response to nonpoint uncertainties (Horan 2001). In theory, permit numbers and trading
ratio must be chosen simultaneously to achieve economic efficiency. However, in
practice, program managers only have control over trading ratio - not the number of
permits (Horan and Shortle 2005). Other additional factors of the optimal choice of
trading ratio include the impact of agri-environmental and other farm payments (Horan,
Shortle et al. 2004).
3.3.2.7 Banking and Borrowing
Emission banking and borrowing allows firms to move emissions between time periods
as well as between sources. The term 'banking' means saving emissions in one period for
use in later periods and 'borrowing' means using more emissions than current standards
allow in one period and by paying back those emissions in the future (Rousseau 2001).
There are some concerns as to whether the trading program should allow banking and
borrowing despite significant economic potential gain and incentives to generate
reduction credits. First, there is the possibility of temporal clustering of emissions, and
second, there is a concern that borrowing is very hard to enforce over time. Imposing
sanctions for non-compliance can be difficult. Another concern is that the reduction goals
may be overachieved in one period while underachieved in another (Tietenberg 2000).
Moreover, dischargers have a certain risk of not being able to use their banked credits in
the future when the cap needs to be tightened. Therefore, in order to encourage
generating reduction credit in advance, regulators will need to, right from the beginning,
set clear trading rules as to what will eventually happen with the banked credits (Kraemer
and K.M.Banholzer 1999).
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2.3.2.8 Other Potential Economic Related Problems
Market Power and Competition
Concerns about market power happen when either the permits or the products of effluent
trading participants are concentrated in the hands of relatively few participants. Maleug
(1990) found that if firms participate in noncompetitive product markets, then permit
trading might reduce social welfare (Malueg 1990). Tietenberg (1985) argued that overall
environmental quality may not be affected by market power since, by design, permit
markets hold the aggregate level of pollution constant. Even though the market power
may not affect aggregate pollution, the concern is that localized concentration of
pollutants may rise. Regulatory agencies must consider the market power and
competition problem which could lead to market distortion and failure, and then take
necessary action to correct it.
Moral Hazard
In the case of water quality trading, particularly with credit trading, pollution sources
may increase or inflate their current pollution levels in order to sell the reduction credits
in the future. For example, land owners could change their practices to increase their
pollution loads for the purpose of obtaining credits that can be sold later. Baseline
measures must be set in a way that eliminates this problem (Fossett, Kaiser et al. 1999).
Free Riding
Free riders may enjoy the benefits from the step of control taken by others but decide not
to take any action (Tietenberg 2003). For example, within the same watershed, where one
source upstream installs the control and benefit transfer to the downstream users who
may not need to control pollution from their properties in order to meet the discharge
limit.
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2.3.3 Environmental Consideration
2.3.3.1 Water Pollution Problems: Relevant factors
The effect of pollution on ambient quality is a function of location and geography, timing
of discharge, the location of other dischargers, and the stochastic elements due to weather
and other factors. There are three fundamental entities that form the problem: a pollution
source, a physical system, and a traded pollutant.
First, source characteristics play a role in determining whether tradable permits should
include point sources and nonpoint sources in the program. There must be enough
sources (scope and diversity of sources) to warrant trading (USEPA 2004). The sources
of pollution need to be identifiable, therefore the credit will be verifiable and trading
rules can be enforced. It is important that the permit authorization be expressed
quantitatively to reflect the activity. When pollution or damage is the inevitable
consequence of a given activity, or pollution is illusive, the trading program may not be
effective in controlling pollution, nor have smaller advantages gained from using the
tradable permit system.
Second, a physical system, the characteristics of the watershed may impose specific
constraints linkage between temporal and spatial flexibility. For example, certain
areas/segments in the watershed contain ecosystems of special ecological values;
therefore it is difficult and less obvious to allow permits of certain activity that will affect
the vulnerable ecosystem due to the complexity of measurement and lack of the
acceptable equivalencies (USEPA 2004). According to the characteristics of a watershed
(i.e. composed of a number of rivers and sub-basins), an appropriate boundary for setting
zones to determine a cap is difficult to establish. Insufficient knowledge of the behavior
and changes in the pollution load of the water system within a local zone and across
zones can lead to technical obstacles for trading.
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Third, pollutant characteristics are important variables in the tradable permit system in
the design of responsibility for effluent control and setting discharge limits for trading
schemes. The WQT assessment handbook explains the approach for analyzing the
stability of trading a particular pollutant in a particular watershed to be able to serve as a
valid commodity. There are four key factors related to inherent pollutant characteristics,
watershed conditions, and the compliance regime (USEPA 2004):
1. Type/Form: a pollutant should be identified in a common form; e.g. trading
soluble phosphorus for non-soluble forms might not be allowed. If different types
of pollutants are traded (e.g. total phosphorus and oxygen demand), the translation
ratio must be applied to have an equivalent effect on water quality.
2. Impact: the water impact of trading has to be equivalent or better than the
pollutant reduction without trading at the location where a pollutant reduction is
made and where the reduction is purchased.
3. Timing: Pollution reduction targets should align among trading partners.
Purchased reduction should be produced during the same time period that a buyer
is required to produce them.
4. Quantity: The amount of demand for credit and supply for excess reductions
should be aligned.
2.3.3.2 Technical Considerations
For an effective implementation, it is important that regulators have enough technical
information to be able to designate a number of permits for pollution activities and
ambient water quality. Modeling transport of pollution in the water is complicated but
important for (1) defining the caps and permits which adequately address water quality,
and (2) monitoring trading performance. Water quality modeling would be required to
simulate various locational patterns of discharges and the outcomes of different zonal
boundaries and temporal patterns. In addition, the zonal definitions in terms of
maintaining ambient quality standards may have to be qualified in terms of the
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requirements of a competitive market. The size and configuration of discharge permit
regions will also affect the number and size of potential market participants and achieve
market equilibrium. Importantly, the regulators should consider whether or not to allow
exchange of permits across zones that may increase trading opportunities but also have
potential to create "hot spots".
The random variability of hydrologic variables and stream flow pollutants create
difficulty in modeling water quality with certainty. Beck (1987) reviewed the uncertainty
in the water quality modeling and concluded that many of the larger, more complex water
quality models can easily generate predictions with little or no confidence (Beck 1987).
Reckhow suggested the use of simple models for thorough uncertainty analysis
(Reckhow 1994). It is important that uncertainties associated with each component of the
effluent trading process be assessed. Potential mechanisms to reduce these uncertainties
should be identified and incorporated into the trading framework.
Since nonpoint sources typically do not face discharge control requirements, there is no
apparent reference level of discharge (baseline) from which to calculate effluent
reductions. Moreover, the quantity and quality of the runoff tends to be intermittent and
can be difficult to model and predict. It may be difficult to establish meaningful
wasteload allocations for nonpoint sources. The method choice for control of polluted
runoff is generally a best management practice approach rather than technology-based
treatment systems. It is more difficult to monitor or predict the effectiveness of best
management practices on reducing the discharge of pollutants into waterways, and
therefore, more difficult for an authority to determine with certainty that the requirements
it places on nonpoint sources will meet a wasteload allocation requirement (USEPA
1998).
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2.3.3.3 Hot Spot
For trades of non-uniformly-mixed pollutants, emission location matters as it could
potentially create 'hot spots' problems. Hot spots refer to local pockets of intense
pollution (Wolman 2003). The formation of hot spots may result from more clustering
than permitted of emissions in vulnerable areas. Hot spots can occur with or without
effluent trading. However, there is great concern that poorly managed trading systems
can worsen this problem.
Trades that create hot spots - localized areas with unacceptable high levels of pollutants -
must be avoided. USEPA 2004 suggests various approaches which are being used by
trading programs to avoid unacceptable localized impacts. One is to exercise some
control over how the permits are used by applying permit limitations to cap the number
of credits used in an area susceptible to localized impacts to avoid transferring pollutant
loadings to sensitive parts of the watershed. Other approaches include limiting the
direction of trades, e.g., upstream versus downstream, and imposing discharger-specific
limits for pollutants that could cause localized concerns.
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CHAPTER 3
Overview of Observations in Water Quality Trading
The development of effluent trading schemes has been increased recently. After, the first
American effluent trading schemes arose in the nineteen-eighties, with the Fox River
Program in 1981, the Lake Dillon Program in 1982 and the Tar-Pamlico River Basin
Program in 1986. A small number of new effluent trading programs arose in the early to
mid-nineties. It has only been within the past five-to-ten years that such programs have
begun to increase. More recently, trading programs have increased in popularity under an
increased (and explicit) regulatory flexibility on the part of the EPA, as laid out in the
1996 Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy, the 2003 Water Quality Trading Policy.
There are approximately 47 effluent trading programs in operation and in developmental
stages in the United States today (Morgan and Wolverton 2005).
This chapter aims to present an overview of water quality trading programs in the U.S. A
summary table listing these programs in details is provided in Appendix I. Individual
factors affecting the functions of the trading systems are explained as well in the chapter.
Main factors controlling the success of water quality trading programs are discussed in
detail both qualitatively and quantitatively when possible. These factors include (1)
program structures, (2) pollutants, (3) market structures, (4) size of watershed, (5)
number of participants, and (6) trading ratios. Furthermore, the observations derived from
trading programs including temporal issues (banking and borrowing), number of trading
occurred, transaction costs, and amount of cost-saving, are studied and explained in
detail. In Chapter 4, experiences drawn from major case studies or trading programs, are
presented and discussed to better understand the function of water trading before and
after implementation of the programs.
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3.1 Overview of Water Trading Programs in the U.S.
Economists for decades have been promoting water quality trading because of potentially
higher benefits and flexibilities for the long term. However, experiences with the actual
water quality programs are discouraging. There are several trading programs already
implemented with slightly different program settings depending on environmental
problems, physical characteristics of the areas, and legal conditions. Only a few of the
trading programs are considered to be successful after long time implementation, while
the majority of other programs are either inactive or have failed in the aspect of trading.
Therefore, the main goal of the analysis was to identify the important factors and their
effects on the successes and failures of the programs in both theoretical and practical
aspects.
Current information about water quality trading programs is based on data collected from
several sources and databases (Podar 1999; USEPA 2003; Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al.
2004; USEPA 2004). The major sources of information used in the discussion are a
database collected and compiled by researchers at Dartmouth College8 and a database
complied by Environomics. This is an excellent and complete database with all relevant
data including program background, trade structure, outcomes and program information
and references. In addition, the information partially comes from personal
communication with the personnel who are responsible for the programs.
Several researches comprehensively investigate individual WQT program separately.
Morgan and Wolverton 2005 presented the most recent comprehensive overview of the
WQT programs in the U.S. The authors suggest that the success of the WQT program
does not appear to be driven by any one factor. This chapter presents further analysis on
how each individual factor affected the success of trading programs and the degree of
significance of each factor. A current situation of water quality trading programs in the
U.S. demonstrated in this chapter is adopted from a systematic overview by Morgan and
8 The most recent version of the database may be found at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~kfv/.
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Wolverton to further analyze the relationship to the WQT programs success, factor by
factor.
An overview of all activities and the current situations of WQT program in the U.S. are
discussed and demonstrated in diagrams within the following sections and in a summary
table presented in Appendix A. More detailed information should be referred to the
original sources (Podar 1999; Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004; Morgan and Wolverton
2005). According to Morgan and Wolverton 2005, presently, within 20 U.S. states, forty
seven (47) water quality trading programs are implemented and/or are in the developing
stages. Figure 3.1 demonstrates approximate location of current water quality trading
programs within the U.S. These programs can be further divided into (a) nineteen
ongoing trading programs (b) eight offset agreements and (c) twenty proposals and small
projects in developing stages under feasibility studies. Among these programs, nutrients
(nitrogen and phosphorus) are the most commonly traded pollutants. The sizes of
watersheds vary significantly from small to very large. More importantly, details of the
trading framework (i.e. market structures, trading ratios) also differ broadly among
programs (Morgan and Wolverton 2005). The following section explains each factor and
their effects on the performance of WQT programs in more detail.
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3.1.1 Program Structures
Structures of trading programs can vary significantly based on criteria used to set up the
program. Several criteria are currently implemented to categorize program structure such
as type of participants, authorization mechanism for trading, and design framework.
Program structures, based on types of polluters participating in the programs, are (l)
point/point source type trading, (2) point/nonpoint source type trading, and (3)
nonpoint/nonpoint source type trading. As shown in Figure 3.2, the most common type of
trading in the U.S. occurs between point sources and nonpoint sources.
Type of Trade Vs Number of Programs
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Figure 3.2 Relationship between Types of Trading and Number of Programs
Of the total 47 programs, 22 programs involve trading between point sources and
nonpoint sources. There are 5 programs where trades occur between point sources only.
Only one program involves trading between nonpoint sources. Fourteen programs allow
trading between both PS/PS trading and PS/NPS trading. It is quite reasonable that
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PSINPS trading is the most common structure because the difference in marginal costs of
treatment between point sources and nonpoint sources are greater incentives for polluters
because of the potential for higher benefits gained from trading.
Another common criterion is based on who has the authority to make a decision as to
whether or not a trade can occur. Using this criterion, trading programs can generally be
separated into 3 structures; i.e. (1) a credit trading program, (2) a cap-and-trade program,
(3) a onetime or ongoing offset program. Specific criterion commonly used sometimes is
interchangeable depending on the local conditions of the watershed.
The structures of trading can also be categorized based on design framework of the
program; e.g. whether they are watershed tradable permits, offsets, NPDES flexible
permit, pretreatment trading or statewide trading policies. Figure 3.3 displays the types of
structures of trading programs in the U.S. However, some of these programs are not
actually implemented but are in developing stages or pilot projects. The next section
discusses each trading structure in more detail.
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Figure 3.3 Program Structure and Number of Programs
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3.1.1.1 Tradable permits
Watershed tradable permit programs within the same watershed are the most predominant
structure of trading. Among these 19 out of 47 programs, there may be a credit trading
program or a cap-and-trade program. The majority of trading programs in the U.S are
credit type trading programs where the polluters obtain credits if pollution reduction is
below a certain baseline set by the regulators. The polluters need approval from the
regulators to adjust the pollution permits when the decisions are being made to trade. The
cap-and-trade type trading program, which is more similar to a real market mechanism, is
found in a small number of water quality trading programs. Within this type of structure,
regulators need an estimate of the total amount of pollutants to allocate the allowances9
based on the desired amounts of discharge allowed. As long as the polluters have enough
permits to cover amounts of their discharges, the buyers and sellers can directly trade
their allowances without the regulators being involved in the negotiation and change of
permit titles.
An example of the water program, which is the closest to the cap-and-trade type
structure, is the Long Island Sound Program with the General Permit System. The point
sources in this program have individual permits in proportion to their discharges in order
to meet a collective nitrogen cap. The point sources can buy and sell their credits directly
to the Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program which facilitates trading among the polluters.
Another program example is the Tar-Pamlico Trading program. In this program, the
regulator handed out permits to a group of polluters. The group then set up an internal
trading agreement to meet the pollution limit without the regulators being involved.
However, the regulators set a penalty if the polluters exceed the given limits. The
program can also be categorized as a tax-exceedence structure (this will be discussed in
Chapter 4). The last example is the Grassland Area Farmers trading program. In this
program, the state of California sets up selenium limits to seven irrigation districts which
discharge into the same watershed. Each district has authority to set up management rules
9 An allowance is a type of pollution permit entitled as an absolute amount of pollution. The polluters can
directly trade allowances in a cap and trade program without the necessity of a credit approval process from
the regulators before trade, as in a credit trading.
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with farmers located in their districts to keep the selenium under the permits and where
trading only occurs between irrigation districts. No direct trading between farmers is
allowed.
There are several reasons which may explain why credit trading is the major type of
structure. One reason is that it makes it easier for the regulators to set up because it does
not need a change in the permit system which is already in place; i.e. changes of NPDES
permits to be an allowance system. This is partly due to the fact that regulators do not
have enough information to estimate the total maximum loads since it is costly and takes
a longer time to establish a TMDL. Therefore, the allocation of an allowance is a little
more complicated for the regulators than just setting up a baseline for polluters to pursue.
The tradable credits will be issued from the regulators when the pollution is reduced
below a certain baseline set by the regulators. Under this mechanism, regulators still have
the power to decide whether trading will improve the water quality and whether it should
be allowed or not.
The majority of the programs are not a cap-and-trade type, except for the Long Island
Sound Program, the Grassland Area Farmers Program, and the Tar-Pamlico Program. All
the water quality trading programs use the grandfathering method to allocate permits to
either individual polluters or to a group of polluters in the program. There is no auction
mechanism used in the water trading program for permit allocation. Legal liability and
penalties are determined under the NPDES or WWTP permit limits, unless specified
individually; i.e. with offset agreement. In the majority of cases, point sources are held
responsible for obtaining and verifying the nonpoint source credits generated.
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3.1.1.2 Offsets
The second most common type of trading structure is the offset, being either a one-time
agreement or an ongoing offset. Offset structure occurs primarily in the areas where the
watershed has limited assimilative capacity and where firms need to increase their
discharges permit for future business expansion or to meet new regulatory requirements.
Therefore, polluters have to make an arrangement case-by-case with other polluters in the
near-by areas to offset their discharges. In most cases, the offsets only occur when the
need for expansion exists. Moreover, there is a sole-source offset's where no money is
actually transferred to other parties and the polluters arrange an offsite offset.
The offset structures rely significantly on state policies. There are eight programs which
are one-time offset agreements occurring in 4 states; 1 offset in CO, 4 offsets in MA, 1
offset in IL, and 2 offsets in MN. Only Colorado has state trading policies in place. The
others have no standard framework under which the trading agreements take place
(Morgan and Wolverton 2005).
All of the offset agreements are undertaken by point sources to reduce nonpoint sources
pollution in the watershed. In most cases, offsets have been generated as a condition of
the renewal of a NPDES or WWTP permit which requires a plant to improve water
quality through offsets or upgrades; for example, the Edgartown WWTP (MA), the
Special Minerals (MA), and the Rahr Malting Co. (MN) programs. Most offsets have
been negotiated to reduce discharges in one pollutant while allowing increases of the
same pollutant elsewhere. The exception is Rahr Malting Co. agreement, which pertains
to offsets across three possible pollutants (BOD, phosphorus and nitrogen) (Fang and
Ester 2003).
10 Sole-source offset is one in which no actual trading occurs. The source takes action offsite to offset its
own increase in discharges (Morgan, 2005).
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3.1.1.3 NPDES flexible permit
One program categorized as a NPDES flexible permit is the Cargill and Ajinomoto
trading (IA) (Podar 1999). Cargill and Ajinomoto are neighboring industrial plants
discharging into the same water body (the Des Moines River) where the stream does not
have the capacity to accept new discharges but Ajinomoto wants to expand its plant
capacity. The state of Iowa arranged for two plants to jointly meet the effluent limit. The
Cargill plant agreed to accept and treat Ajinomoto's effluent stream and Ajinomoto
helped Cargill with its nutrient control to meet its limit (Podar 1999). This particular case
can also be viewed as an informal offset agreement among two firms.
3.1.1.4 Pretreatment trading
There are two pretreatment trading programs, (1) Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission
Effluent Trading Program (NJ), and (2) Illinois Pretreatment Trading Program (IL). The
Public Owned Treatment Works (POTW) aims to reduce the overall level of metals from
the sludge. Both programs trade multiple metals. The shared characteristic of these
pretreatment trading programs is that a POTW sets local limits and trading as an
alternative for indirect dischargers who send their wastes to the POTW to cost-effectively
meet the limit. Since different factories discharge different types and amounts of waste,
the POTW set a limit on the levels of metals as a baseline for indirect discharges to trade
among them if their discharges are above or below the baseline (USEPA 1998).
3.1.1.5 Statewide trading policy
Morgan and Wolverton (2005) explain that there are 6 states and regions developing a
statewide trading policy and implementing a pilot study, including Maryland, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In addition to these states and
11 NPDES flexible permit is slightly different from an offset in that in this program structure the regulators
agree to adjust the permit according to agreement among firms to lower the limits.
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regions, Colorado, Oregon and Idaho are in the process of implementing their own
pollutant trading policies. In all cases, the policies address trading among point-point
source and point-nonpoint sources. Only Maryland, Michigan and Wisconsin consider
trading between nonpoint sources. All trades are allowed only within the same watershed.
Most of the policies prefer the clearinghouse structure or bilateral negotiation. Not all
policies allow banking even though the benefits of cost-saving in trading from banking
can be significant. Only Virginia and Michigan allow banking but with different terms of
use (Morgan and Wolverton 2005).
3.1.2 Pollutants
A wide variety of water pollutants were recently traded in the trading programs. These
pollutants include nutrients (both nitrogen(N) and phosphorus (P)), N only, P only,
ammonia, BOD, COD, pH, selenium, water flow, temperature, TSS, and heavy metals.
Two major pollutants that will become significant water pollutants, and play major roles
in trading, are nutrients and BOD. Because marginal costs of NPS for nutrients and BOD
control are lower than that of PS, there is a higher potential benefits gained via trading.
Figure 3.4 shows pollutants traded and numbers of programs trading each pollutant.
Phosphorus is the most common pollutant in trading within twenty six programs. The
second common pollutant traded is nitrogen, which occurs in seventeen programs. There
are eleven programs in which both P and N are traded in the same program. Phosphorus
and nitrogen, which can affect the level of oxygen in water if high concentrations of them
are present in the water body, are essential nutrients for plants and algae. However,
nutrients cannot cause an acute impact to human health as that of when heavy metal is
accumulated; therefore, trading nutrients is gaining increased acceptability and becoming
the major traded pollutant.
Nineteen programs (as listed in Table 3.1) allow trading of more than one pollutant in the
program. Twenty eight programs only allow one type of pollutant to be traded. Most of
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the water trading programs trade only for the same water pollutant. With the exception of
for Rahr Malting Co., the program also allows cross-trading between different pollutants.
It sets up offset ratios 2: 1 in general, for cross parameter ratios 8: 1 for CBOD:P and 4: 1
for CBOD:N (Podar 1999; Fang and Ester 2003).
Nutrient trading is implemented in either a tradable permit system or an offset type. On
the other hand, temperature, TSS, pH and mercury are found to be implemented or
proposed frequently in an offset type trading program. In addition, some pollutants
mentioned in the discussion here are already in developing state or in pre-approval
process to be traded but no actual trading structure have yet been developed; for example,
the mercury offset program in San Francisco Bay.
Trading Pollutants Vs Number of Programs
18
C/) 14
E
~ 12
0)e 10c..-0 8
CD
.0 6E
:l
Z 4
Pollutants
Figure 3.4 Relationships between Pollutants and Number of Programs
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Table 3.1 Number of Programs Allowing Trading more than One Pollutant in the Same
Program
3.1.3 Market Structure
Market structures refer to a market's standard for obtaining information and exchanging
rights. Woodward (2002) separated pollution trading markets into four main structures:
exchanges, a third party broker, bilateral negotiations, and clearinghouses. An exchange
is characterized by its open information where offers are publicly available and products
are uniform, for example the SO2 market. Bilateral negotiation is common where there
are a wide variety of sellers from which a buyer might choose, and where the goods are
heterogeneous. Bilateral negotiations require substantial interactions between the buyers
and the sellers to exchange information and negotiate the terms of trade for each
transaction. The transaction costs for this mechanism are generally high. Bilateral
negotiation is the most common structure for the water quality trading market; e.g. the
Fox River Program, the Tar-Pamlico Trading Program (NC), and the Kalamazoo
Program (MI). This structure is particularly common in programs that seek to include
NPS polluters. A third party broker is usually a broker using bilateral negotiation to
identify potential parties interested in buying or selling credits.
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Pollutants in the program Number of programs
N, P 11
Multiple metals 2
NH3, BOD/DO 1
P, BOD/DO 1
Water flow, N, P, TSS, Temp 1
N,P,TSS, NH3 1
CBOD, P,N,SS,NH3 ,Acid, Metals 1
NH3, Temp, pH 1
Woodward explain that in a clearinghouse, the state or some other entities pays for
pollution reductions and then sells generated credits at a fixed-price to polluters. Buyers
and sellers do not interact directly. A clearinghouse works best when the impacts of
pollution discharges are similar enough to allow for the transfer of rights between a large
number of buyers and sellers in the watershed. A water quality clearinghouse differs from
a broker in a bilateral market in that it eliminates all contractual or regulatory links
between buyers and sellers. The benefit of water quality clearinghouses is its ability to
create a uniformed good for final sale, and is able to reduce transaction cost in the
market. The PS/NPS trading program in the Tar-Pamlico Trading Program and the
Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program in the Long Island Sound Trading Program are good
examples of a clearinghouse structure.
Finally, another structure that actually does not involve trading at all is a sole source
offset where a source is allowed to meet water quality standard at one point if pollution is
reduced elsewhere, either on-site or by carrying out pollution reduction activities off-site
(Woodward and Kaiser 2002). Many water quality trading programs are a sole source
offset including; Rahr Malting Co. (MN), Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative
Plant Permit (MN), Falmouth WWTP (MA) and Boulder Creek Trading Program (CO).
A market structure may evolve over time in response to changes from information
received regarding the market, legal restrictions, and market size to reduce transaction
costs. The market structures are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Sole source offsets
can remain part of any trading program. A gradual evolution from bilateral negotiation to
an exchange or clearinghouse might then occur. The choices made regarding
authorization, monitoring and enforcement help to determine a market structure as they
establish which structures are feasible which ones will influence the transaction costs that
will occur under those structures. The market tends to use the structures that minimize
transaction costs (Woodward and Kaiser 2002).
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As shown in Figure 3.512, out of a total of 47 programs, bilateral and clearinghouse
structures are the relatively most common use. Additionally, eight programs are
implementing more than one market structure within the same program which is the most
common practice currently found in trading programs. At the beginning of any trading
program, it may be more beneficial to allow the implementation of more than one
approach. One mechanism may work better than another given different situations or if it
is for a long term. The mechanism which does not function will later disappear. Only 3
programs are third-party brokers (i.e. Clear Creek (CO), Charles River (MA), and Great
Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot Program (OH)). This is possibly due to the small
amount, or none, of the benefits gained from being a broker in the water quality trading
market, and the high transaction costs of the localized nature of water pollution problem.
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Figure 3.5 Market Structure vs. Number of Programs
12 N/A in the graph means that the market structure of the program is under development.
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3.1.4 Size of the Watershed
The size of a watershed covered by each trading program varies significantly. The size of
the program is categorized based on the approximated areas of the watershed. Watershed
areas, in acres, range from small (area<100,000), medium (100,000< area <1,000,000), to
large (area >1,000,000). In theory, the size of the program can affect the success of the
program; i.e. in general, the larger the watershed, the more number of polluters are
located in the watershed and have the bigger the market size. Therefore, the higher
potential for trades occurs. While the size of a watershed may be a significant factor,
other factors can sometimes become more significant in precluding trading activities.
There are many trading programs covering large watershed areas that had no, or minimal,
trade occurring in the program. For example, the Minnesota River Nutrient Trading
program which covered 10.9 million acres had no single trade occurring in the program.
In contrast, in some smaller watershed areas, i.e. the Lake Dillon Trading Program, which
has 3,200 acres, was successful with a number of the active trading activities and had
significant cost-saving (Woodward 2003).
Figure 3.6 displays the number of the programs located in each watershed-size category.
The majority of the watershed areas of trading programs are in the larger category. It is
difficult to know whether or not the program size affects the program's success. The
analysis of the big picture regarding the size of programs, and numbers of programs with
active trading occurring in each category, might be more interesting. The numbers of the
programs of trades occurring within each size category are indicated in Figure 3.6. In the
small-size watersheds, there are 2 out of 6 programs where trades occurred. In the
medium-size watershed, trading occurred in 5 out of 7 programs. In the larger-size
watershed, there are 7 programs out of 15 programs where trades occurred. A simple
comparison in terms of the ratio of number of programs with active trading activities to
the total number of programs in each category, the medium size programs are the most
13
successful in numbers of programs with active trading13 . In the larger size programs,
13 This comparison is not based on number of trades (or transactions) but rather based on the number of
programs which trading occurred or did not occur at all.
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other factors may significantly affect trading incentives. These include higher transaction
costs and administrative costs. Monitoring and enforcing the rules becomes more difficult
and resource-intensive, with no establishment ofTMDL.
Area of Watershed Vs Number of Programs
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Figure 3.6 Areas of Watershed and Number of Programs
At this point it is still unclear which size of a trading program has the most significant
affects to active trading; i.e. whether the larger is actually better than the smaller
watershed in terms of trading. However, the size of the trading programs should be
considered with other factors in determining the program's success. Other factors mainly
consist of the program design, market structures, and the characteristics of pollution
sources contributing to the pollution problem in the watershed.
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3.1.5 Number of Participants in a Trading Program
Characteristics of trading participants (e.g. numbers and types of pollution sources) in the
programs can significantly affect trading achievement. Limited numbers of point sources
in the watershed may negatively affect the success of the program. Theoretically, it is
easier to trade among point sources because identification of reduction credits and
monitoring can be done with accuracy.
It is found that number of point sources participate in the program randomly affect
number of active trades occurred in the program. As shown in Figure 3.7, the majority of
the trading programs, 13 out of 47 programs in the U.S., have participants with less than
10 point sources in the program. The numbers in the programs which have active trading
in each category are shown within the bar. For example, nine programs out of thirteen
programs, that have less than ten point sources participating in the programs, have the
highest number of active trading programs. Among seven programs that have point
sources between ten and fifty point sources, two programs have active trading. Only three
programs out of eight programs, that have point sources participants of more than fifty,
have active trading.
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Figure 3.7 Numbers of Programs and Number of Point Sources within Each Program
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Generally, it is expected that the larger number of point sources in the programs, the
higher potential of success (i.e. active trading activities'4 ) because of the greater chances
in finding trading partners and gaining benefits via trading. However, what happened in
water quality trading programs disproves the presumption. There are water quality
trading programs which include a large number of point sources in the programs,
however no/or a few trading occurred in the program. For example, in the Minnesota
River Nutrient Trading Study, even though there are 212 point sources participating in
the trading program, the program has no trading activities (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al.
2004).
There are also many other factors involved in these programs that might prevent trade
activities from occurring. One of these factors is the number of nonpoint sources in the
WQT programs. The remaining pollution problem from NPS runoff is still left out of the
mandatory reduction requirements. The lower marginal cost in treating the pollution from
nonpoint sources is a significant factor to support trading with nonpoint sources.
However, a problem in trading with nonpoint sources is in the difficulty of monitoring
NPS pollution. The costs of monitoring and identifying trading partners could be higher
than the benefits gained from trading.
The majority of sources contributing to the pollution are key to active trades by allowing
all sources contributing to pollution the ability to search for available credits. In the last
decade, the majority of current programs included nonpoint sources in the program. All
current active trading involves trading between point source and nonpoint sources. For
example, Lake Dillon (CO), Red Cedar River (WI) and more programs predominantly
offset their credits from nonpoint sources. However, it is difficult to systematically
compare affects of nonpoint source participation among the trading programs. This is due
to the large number of nonpoint sources involved in the programs, the differences in
characteristics of nonpoint sources among the programs, and the difficulty in the
identification of nonpoint source pollution.
1 4 In this case, the focus is whether or not there are trading activities occurring at all in each program.
However, the focus is not about the number of trades which occurred in each program.
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3.1.6 Trading Ratios
Trading ratios are the ratio between the numbers of credits from sellers to the numbers of
credits eligible for buyers to meet the permit requirement. The ratios vary significantly
from program to program. The most common trading ratio for programs that are trading
nutrient between nonpoint and point sources is 2:1. The ratio between point sources
trading is 1:1 (Morgan and Wolverton 2005).
Trading ratios are applied to serve several purposes. First, the ratios serve to manage
uncertainty associated with the effectiveness of nonpoint source controls. Second, the
ratios account for the difference in locations of the sources in the watershed to prevent
hot spots and to ensure the equivalency of the potential environmental impact between
different locations. For example, the Long Island Sound sets up an equivalency factor
where the credits generated from reductions closer to the problem zone (mouth of the
estuary) is more valuable than the credits generated further from the zone. Finally, they
are used to ensure water quality improvement from trading. In the Passaic Valley
Sewerage Commissioners Pretreatment Trading Project, the trading ratio is set to be 5:4
so that 20% of the credits is retired to ensure the reduction of overall heavy metal
loadings.
There is a wide variety of calculation of trading ratio implementation (Breetz, Fisher-
Vanden et al. 2004; Morgan and Wolverton 2005). Some examples include;
* The Great Miami River sets different trading ratios depending on existing water
conditions. Therefore, trading ratios are set higher (3:1) for sources discharging into
impaired water than those discharging into waters in an attainment area (2:1).
* The Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot Program defined trading ratios in ranges.
There are 2 types of ratios used in calculating the final ratio. The first is a based-trade
ratio (1.0 for point source and 1.75 for nonpoint source). The second is an additional
ratio of 0.125 based on specific requirements of whether trade is not in a target area,
not in the same watershed, not nearby within 20 miles, or downstream of a trader's
location. The trade ratio is achieved by summing a based ratio and each additional
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ratio. The ratio is ranging from 1:1 to 1.5:1 for point/point trading and 1.75:1 to 3.6:1
for nonpoint/point trading.
* In the Lower Boise River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project, the number of
tradable credits are multiplied by 3 ratios, (1) a "river location ratio" from the mouth
of the river where TMDL is calculated (2) a "drainage delivery ratio" to account for
transmission losses within a drainage channel and (3) a "site location factor" to
account for transmission losses between cropland and drainage channels (Breetz,
2004 p. 100).
* The Rahr Malting Co. uses trading ratio to allow trading between different types of
pollutants. The phosphorus to BOD credit ratio is 1:8. The nitrogen to BOD ratio is
1:4. The ratio among correlating nutrient sources is 2:1 (NPS/PS).
In addition to setting trading ratios to reduce the uncertainty in nonpoint source trading,
the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Load Program manages the uncertainty by making
trading retroactive. The trades of selenium credits occur after the BMP installation by
measuring water quality instead of the prediction of effectiveness of BMP(Young and
Karkoski 2000).
3.2 Observations Derived from Trading Programs
Apart from the factors affecting performance of trading programs, there are several other
interesting phenomenon and issues which can be derived from the studies of the current
trading programs. The following discussions are the observations about temporal issues
(banking and borrowing), number of trades in each program, transaction costs, and cost
savings.
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3.2.1 Banking and Borrowing
Emission banking and borrowing allows firms to move pollutants between time periods
as well as between sources. The term 'banking' means saving emissions in one period for
use in later periods, and 'borrowing' means using more emissions than current standards
allow in one period and paying back those emissions in the future (Rousseau 2001). Few
water quality trading programs allow banking. A program allowing or approving
'borrowing' in water quality trading rules is not found.
For example, in the Tar-Pamlico, the Association may choose to make a payment in
anticipation of a future cap exceedence and to bank credit toward that exceedence. The
Association accumulated $343,960 in advance offset payment for 11,860 kg N reduction
credit (NCDENR 1994). The Association can use the credits to offset any loading above
their cap for a 10-year period from 1995. However, the banked credits never were
redeemed. Currently, in the beginning of Phase III of the program, the NC Division of
Water Quality is working on resolving the issues regarding the longevity of the banked
credits and the rate at which banked credits can be redeemed (Agenda 2005). In addition,
in statewide trading policies established within 6 states, Morgan and Wolverton point out
that only two allow for banking. Michigan allows banking for up to five years. Virginia
allows banking for one year for a point source's own use (Morgan and Wolverton 2005).
3.2.2 Number of Trades Occurring in Each Program
A well-known behavior of water quality trading programs in the U.S. is, unfortunately,
the lack of trading activities, as shown in Figure 3.8. There are about 28 out of 47
programs where no trade occurs. In 19 programs, trading occurred only once or more
than once. 12 programs had trading occurring only one time. The market structure for the
majority of these active trading programs is one-time offset (11 out of 12 programs).
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The most successful programs in terms of the number of trades, which have more than 10
trades (collectively), are the following four programs (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
(1) The Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads had 39 trades over a two-year period
(1998-2000). These trades occurred over nine agreements, 38 in 1998, 1 in 1999,
and 0 after.
(2) Long Island Sound had 63 trades over a two-year period (2002-2004), 38 in 2002
and 25 in 2003.
(3) Truckee River Quality Settlement Agreement had 33 trades over an eight-year
period (1996-2004), 17 trades before 2001 and 16 trades after 2001.
(4) The Red Cedar River had 22 trades each year since 2001.
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Even though no trades occurred in many programs, this does not necessarily mean these
programs were not successful. For example, the Tar-Pamlico trading program meets the
collective limits without trading. Moreover, nutrient levels in the watershed are steadily
decreasing over time despite steady increases in flow. In this program, the Association of
point source dischargers in the program pays an advanced fee to start up the trading
program, and the states use the money to fund nonpoint source BMPs and other activities
to improve water quality management. The point sources gain flexibility in pollution
management, receive credits for future use and achieve a significant amount of savings
compared to a traditional command-and-control mechanism.
The total amount of a particular pollutant traded varies widely across programs. For
example, in the Chatfield Reservoir program, the amount of phosphorus traded in the
program was very small (only 2 lbs). In contrast, in the Long Island Sound, the amount of
nitrogen traded was 2.7 million lbs in 2003. The Red Cedar River program has about
5,000 lbs of phosphorus credit traded annually. The larger amount of pollutant traded is
probably due to the larger size of the program (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004;
Morgan and Wolverton 2005).
There is no standard price, or price range per credits, across programs. The price also
depends on market structures; i.e. bilateral negotiation, clearinghouse, broker or offset.
The price of credits for the same pollutant varies significantly for different market
structures (bilateral, broker and offset). In general, programs with a clearinghouse
structure set a fixed price per unit of pollutant before any trading occurred. For example,
in the Grassland Area Farmer, the price or fee for selenium credits was set for both a
monthly and annual rate, approximately $40/lb monthly and $1 00/lb annually.
In the Tar-Pamlico program, the offset rates for nitrogen credit in Phase I was $56/lb. The
offset rate was reduced to $29/lb in phase II because more information and accuracy in
measurements became available. In contrast, the price of nitrogen credit in the Long
Island program is less expensive than the price of that in the Tar-Pamlico program. In the
Long Island Trading Program, the price for nitrogen credit is $1.65/lb (2002) and
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$2.14/lb (2003). Both programs market structure is the clearinghouse. However, it was
noted that the differences were due to there being more participants in both point sources
and nonpoint sources in the Long Island Sound than there were in the Tar-Pamlico. The
area of watershed in the Long Island (3.5 million acres) is also larger than that of the Tar-
Pamlico (2.88 million acres). In the Long Island Program, the agency uses federal
funding to buy excess credits from all point sources. Moreover, point sources are major
sources of nutrient pollution in Long Island Sound. On the other hand, in the Tar-
Pamlico, the price of credit is actually a fee that sources have to pay if they exceed the
cap which will be used to fund nonpoint source BMPs. These factors affect the price of
the credits differently.
3.2.3 Transaction Costs
Costs associated with different trading programs vary significantly due to a lack of
consistent data 5. Generally, there are three main types of transaction costs: search and
information, bargaining and decision, and monitoring and enforcement including costs
associated with transportation and set up (Stavins 1995). Transaction costs may be one
time costs associated with initiating a market, or may be present in each trade. The
administrative costs involved in monitoring and enforcing trades vary considerably across
trading programs. High administrative costs are due to (1) high monitoring costs
especially with nonpoint sources monitoring, (2) extensive review of application for
trading, and (3) oversight and inspection costs for nonpoint sources BMPs
implementation.
Transaction costs differ substantially across different trading programs. This may be
partly due to differences in market structures which are closely related to the problem of
high transaction costs. For instance, a clearinghouse typically has substantially lower
transaction costs because buyers and sellers only need to interact with the intermediary
15 Morgan and Wolverton 2005 point out that the data about costs in trading programs are derived from a
variety of sources that vary in estimation, quality and completeness. It is difficult to accurately discuss the
transaction costs and cost savings issues within different programs.
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and face a fixed price that is not subjected to negotiation transaction costs. However, for
bilateral negotiation, the transaction costs are usually quite high because buyers and
sellers need to pay for processing fees associated with information searching and data
gathering, negotiations and actual contract development (Woodward and Kaiser 2002).
The monitoring process usually results in significant cost especially in the monitoring of
nonpoint source controls. Each program uses different strategies to monitor the nonpoint
source pollution, ranging from no monitoring to verification of all BMPs used to generate
credits. For example, Lower Boise and Red Cedar verify and monitor all BMPs. The Tar-
Pamlico programs inspect only 5-10% of BMP credits. Instead of verifying BMPs, the
Grassland Area Farmers program monitors selenium loads. The Kalamazoo program and
Cherry Creek program monitor water quality to determine the effectiveness of non-point
source controls (Morgan and Wolverton 2005).
Several mechanisms developed in trading programs are found to have lower transaction
costs and administrative costs (Morgan and Wolverton 2005). For example;
* A trade arranged at regular meetings can reduce the costs for information searches
needed to identify sources of credits. In the Bear Creek Program (CO) during annual
meetings and during the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Load Program (CA) at
monthly meetings, all traders attend and negotiate potential trades.
* States assume most transaction costs; therefore, there is no transaction fee for trading
programs; for example, in the Long Island Sound (CT) and the Neuse River Basin
(NC).
* States become a mediator of trading between point sources and nonpoint sources; for
example the state establishes a cost-share fund to minimize transaction costs. As in
Tar-Pamlico Basin (NC), the polluters make an advanced payment to the state agency
to generate credits. The agency then uses that money as funding for nonpoint sources.
* Using the existing federal monitoring system to lower the transaction costs; i.e. in the
Grassland Area Farmers program.
* Low levels of oversight for nonpoint source implementation help reduce transaction
costs; for example in the Tar-Pamlico program, only 5-10% of nonpoint source
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contracts were inspected each year. However, the program needs to make sure that
violations do not occur and water quality goal is achieved.
* Shifting of costs from government to point sources can lower the administrative cost.
For example, in the Low Boise River (ID), the state requires point sources to conduct
most of the identification of sources and evaluation.
On the other hand, high transaction costs are generally due to extensive application,
application fee, and a long approval process. For example, the Cherry Creek Program
(CO) requires a $2,500 application fee which it attributes to high transaction costs.
Negotiation process can also be a time-consuming process and requires a lot of resources
especially when there is minimal/no guidance. For example, the Passaic Valley Sewerage
Commission Pretreatment Trading (NJ) and the Fox-Wolf Basin (WI) are programs
requiring high transaction costs due to the negotiation process. Moreover, feasibility
studies can add significantly to transaction costs as is evidenced in the case of Rock River
(WI).
Bilateral negotiations typically have higher transaction costs while clearinghouse market
structures typically have lower transaction costs (Woodward and Kaiser 2002). There are
some exceptions where there was an indication of other factors being involved that had
significant effects on transaction costs. For example, the Grassland Area Farmers
Tradable Loads arrange all their trades during monthly meetings when all irrigation
districts are in attendance. Therefore, transaction costs with bilateral negotiations are
quite low. The Kalamazoo River program, despite the clearinghouse market structure,
requires a significant amount of information as part of the application process and it has a
long approval process which results in higher transaction costs.
3.2.4 Cost Savings
Estimated amount of cost saved via trading varies considerably across trading programs.
The variation in sources and estimation methods affect the consistency and accuracy of
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available data. It is difficult to discuss the cost-savings between programs because
amounts of cost savings are estimated based on different baselines (program
background). Some programs may report or estimate the amount of cost-savings over a
definite period of time. For example, the Long Island Sound Trading program is expected
to save about $200 million over 15 years. Another example is the Lake Dillon Trading
program which estimates amount of savings to be approximately $1.5 million for an
offset for 1 discharger. Whereas, Michigan Water Quality Rule Development is expected
to save $10-20/lb of P reduced. Tampa Bay Cooperative Nitrogen Management only
estimates a cost-saving from trading qualitatively as an avoided cost of TMDL
implementation. Table 3.2 below summarizes available information about estimated cost-
savings in water quality trading programs already implemented.
Table 3.2 Approximated Amounts of Cost-Savings from Water Trading Programs within
the U.S.
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Name of Program State Cost-saving
Grassland Area Farmers CA Many trades exchanged in-kind of service. Cost saving is difficult to
Tradable Loads Program be estimated, - $14,320 changed hand during the first five years.
2 Bear Creek Trading Program CO Forest Hills saved the cost of system replacement over $1.2 million,
instead it has to pay -$5,000 per year for offsetting discharges
3 Boulder Creek Trading CO The City saved $3-7 million by deferring full nitrification modification,
Program although it needed to upgrade its WWTP
4 Cherry Creek Trading CO NPS projects (pond retrofit) can generate credits worth $456,000,
Program with the cost of the project $400,000.
5 Clear Creek Trading O The ASARCO agreed to pay a clean up cost of -50,000Program
6 Lake Dillon Trad ng Program CO Trading could reduce an estimate cost o maintaining WQ of over
1.5 million dollar annually by about a half.
7 Long Island Sound Trading CT Nearly 200$ million over 15 years
Program
Blue Plains WWTP Credit DCVA With the same money to reduce 1 million lb of N in 2years, result of
Creation trading can reduce 6 million lb in 2 years
9 Tampa Bay Cooperative FL The consortium's action may help avoid TLD costs and legal and
Nitrogen Management administrative costs
10 Cargill and Ajinomoto Plants IA N/A, Offset trading between two neighboring industrial plants meetsPermit Flexibility effluent limits jointly.
Lower Boise River Effluent
11 Trading Demonstration ID Expected cost-savings are 10-158 $/lb of P reduced
Project
Name of Program State Cost-saving
12 Illinois Pretreatment Trading IL - 6.9 million if able to trade federal categorical pretreatment limitsProgram
Piasa Creek W tersh d -3.25 million, Illinois American Water Company avoided capital,
13 Project IL operation and maintenance costs associated with lagoon and
landfill system
14 Specialty Minerals, Inc. in MA avoid estimated capital cost of $300,000 and reduced amount ofTown of Adams money that company has to pay to the Town
15 Town of Acton POTW MA Acton residents save - $2.25 million annually
16 Wayland Business Center MA $ 937,000
Treatment Plant Permit
17 Michigan Water Quality Ml saving 10-20$/Ib of P reducedTrading Rules
Minnesota River Nutrient saving 18 $/lb for PS alone, to 4-5 $/lb for the combination of
8 Trading Study MN subsidies for NPS BMP
19 Rahr Malting Permit MN savings in WWT costs and avoid uncertainty regarding industrial
user fees to POTW
MULTI-Chesapeake Bay Nutrient MLI20 Trading Program STATE Depending on each state's trading rulesTrading Program S
Neuse River Nutrient
21 Sensitive Water NC Estimated cost of control 25-30$/lb but the offset rate is 11 $/lb
Management Strategy
22 Tar-Pamlico Nutrient NC The offset rate is at $29/lb while cost for at-the-plant control wereReduction Trading Program estimated to be 55-65$/Ib
Passaic Valley Sewerage2 mPassaic Valley Seweradge N N/A, Buyers are able to avoid non-compliance fines, whereas
P23 Commission Euent Trading NJ sellers generate revenues from sale of excess reductionsProgram
New York City Watershed
24 sew York City Watershed NY N/A, A pilot program to allow new or expanding WWTP to obtain24 Phosphorus Offset Pilot NY ofst
Programs
Great Miami River
25 Watershed Water Quality OH $314-384 millions over 20 years period
Trading Pilot Program
26 Pennsylvania Water-Based PA These water meet all applicable standards and no TMDL is planedTrading Simulations
27 Fox-Wolf Basin Watershed WI Expected cost-savings are $47/lb of P reducedPilot Trading Program
28 Red Cedar River Pilot WI The trading saved Cumberland approximately $15,000 in 1998Trading Program
Reference: Data in this table mainly are extracted from Austin 2001, Breetz et al 2004, Kerr et al 2000,
Podar 1999, Yong and Karkoski 2000, Jarvie and Solomon 1998, Woodward 2003, NCAB 2003, Fang and
Ester 2003, NCDENR 1998, NCDENR 1994, Gannon 2003, CTDEP 2003, and USEPA 2003.
For more details, please refer to Appendix A-3.
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CHAPTER 4
Analysis of the Role of Trading
Chapter 3 presented an analysis of important factors affecting performance of current
water quality trading in the U.S., including effects of each factor on trading activities in
general. In this chapter, the aim is to examine roles of trading based on knowledge and
experiences with the current trading programs. The analysis is specifically focused on the
performance from a number of selected trading programs which are active and
successfully implemented. These programs are considered successful based on two
objectives of the trading roles of as to whether or not they achieve a desired water quality
cheaper (cost-effectiveness) and/or faster (in a desirable duration).
The analysis is divided into 3 parts. The first part is an observation about the roles of
trading in selected trading programs. Eight trading programs are chosen based upon their
unique characteristics; primarily, program structures, market structures, and
implementation mechanisms which lead to their success. The second part focuses on the
investigation of the barriers restricting the full potential of trading for these programs. In
the third part, the standard roles of trading in water trading programs based upon
observations from the previous section are presented and discussed. Their unique
characteristics supporting trading in each program are examined in order to identify the
roles of trading in water pollution management. Combining the understanding of the roles
of water quality trading with the analysis of the barriers of trading activities can lead to
the correct approach to exercise trading roles and implement a successful trading program
in the future.
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The following table lists the programs chosen based on some of their characteristics.
4.1 An analysis of a specific role of trading
This section discusses the experience of water quality trading from eight water quality
trading programs. The specific role of trading in each program is examined. More details
about the program including references are described in the Appendix B.
4.1.1 Grassland Area Farmers Trading Program (CA)
The program is the first NPS-NPS-type trading program (Young and Karkoski 2000).
The quantitative limits of selenium have been imposed on a regional consortium of farm
districts. The mass-based caps of selenium, which were allocated to seven irrigation
districts in the program, control the total quantity of selenium that is allowed into the
river. The amount of selenium is curbed, independent on the volume of discharge, as
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Name of Program Characteristics of Program
Grassland Area Farmers Program Cap and Trade + NPS/NPS
Fee and Rebate
Tar-Pamlico Program Cap and Trade + PS/NPS, PS/PS
Tax Exceedence
Lake Dillon Program Credit Trading PS/NPS
Rahr Malting Co. Program Offset for one discharger PS/NPS
Long Island Sound Program Cap and Trade PS/PS, PS/NPS
Passaic Valley Sewage Commission Credit Trading PS/PS
Program (Pretreatment Trading)
Truckee River Water Quality Settlement Credit Trading or Offset PS/NPS
Agreement
Chesapeake Bay Program State-wide Trading Policy All possibilities
compared to concentration-based limits and technology-based limits. Trading in the
program is a cap-and-trade-like trading with a fee and rebate system. The difference in a
program from the traditional cap-and-trade system is that the farmers are not allowed to
trade directly. Trading only occurs among districts. Figure 4.1 displays an overview of
the structure of the Grassland Bypass Project.
The primary role of trading in the program is to decentralize pollution control decisions
from the California Regional Water Quality Board to seven locally-controlled irrigation
districts to Grassland Area farmers. The program is overseen by the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Department of Interior. Accountability for the programs is a unique
agreement between groups of farmers locally-organized to the districts and between the
districts and the Bureau of Reclamation, as shown in the diagram below. The number of
polluters are not identified in the program but there is a clear arrangement between each
district to control its' nonpoint sources. Locally organized nonpoint sources management,
by districts, significantly reduces transaction costs in trading identification and
negotiation processes.
The districts play two major roles involving trading in the program. The first role is as a
trader between districts, since direct trading between farmers is not permitted. The second
role is as a regulator to locally manage farmers within their districts to maintain selenium
concentration under the cap. Each district has flexibility to implement its own methods
for complying with the district selenium load allocation; which then would considerably
increase pollution control efficiency. Several mechanisms are implemented to control
discharge including direct incentives and mandatory requirements for farmers to suit its
needs; e.g., tiered water pricing, low interest loans, recycling of drainage water and
workshop.
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Figure 4.1 Overview of Grassland Bypass Project
San Luis & Delta Mendota
Authority (Seven District)
Activity greement
Grassland Area Farmers
(-170 Farmers)
Use Agreement
Source: adopted from Kerr et al. 2000
The continued use of the drain is the greatest incentive for farmers in the programs
(Young and Karkoski 2000). The program sets a strict penalty which is the cut off of use
of the drain after 20% exceedence. Trade agreements are for either monthly or annual
allowances with no banking allowed. The transaction costs of the trade are considered to
be low, despite the bilateral negotiation implemented between the traders in the program.
Under regularly schedule meetings and simple arrangements among the districts, the
transaction cost is kept low since the trade negotiation can be done during a scheduled
monthly meeting between the drainage districts. Also, there is no trading ratio in the
program which is uncomplicated for trade amongst districts.
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The sump monitoring system is a key component in the trading of this program (Young
and Karkoski 2000). The monitoring system provides farmers, districts, and the advisory
committee with weekly updates. The farm drainage in the Grassland Drainage Basin is
collected into a series of pipes and canals and bypassed to the federal San Luis Drain to
the San Joaquin River. The measurement of the selenium loading can then be accurately
measured at the drainage pumps. The government agency of this program measures
selenium concentration, instead of the BMPs effectiveness as in other programs. These
factors increase efficiency in controlling selenium loadings.
Moreover, the unique feature contributing to the success of the program is the incentive
fee and rebate system (Kerr, Anderson et al. 2000). The farmers must pay a fee for any
discharges above the regional selenium cap, which is based on the percentage of the fee
attributed to exceeding its district-level load allocation. The fee increases over time as the
cap is reduced over the life span of the project. No fee is paid if the group, as a whole,
remains below the regional cap. On the other hand, the rebate fee acts as a form of
automatic trading between districts, and addresses inequalities of incentive fees for
districts remaining below their allocation.
Since the program started in 1995, the selenium load was steadily decreased each year
except for the wet year of 1998 (Kerr, Anderson et al. 2000). Moreover, the trading is
found to be less costly than paying for a penalty fee. Farmers have decreased selenium
loading, as well as water usage, through initiatives such as increasing recirculation of
drainage water, or installing more efficient irrigation equipment with low interest loans.
Each farmer chooses to implement the method which is suitable for their individual
fannrming conditions.
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4.1.2 Tar-Pamlico Trading Program (NC)
In the Tar-Pamlico Trading Program, the regulators set annual mass-based caps of
nutrients allowable for point sources, replacing the concentration-based monthly limits.
However, the regulators did not give out the definite number of permits as absolute
tradable rights. The point sources do not receive individual allocation, but instead they
arrange to meet the pollution cap under a group agreement. A group cap agreement is
made among 15 WWTPs (called the Association) and the state of North Carolina. The
members of the Association do not directly trade their allowances but rather use an
internal agreement to keep the discharge level below the collective cap. Moreover, the
Association has to pay an exceedence fee if they exceed the allocated cap. The program
performs like a hybrid system between a cap-and-trade-like and a tax exceedence system
(Gannon 2003).
The program allows trading between PS/PS and PS/NPS. The market operates as a
clearinghouse because the state agency breaks the connection between point sources and
nonpoint sources and sets a uniform price for nitrogen credits. If the Association exceeds
the nutrient cap, it can pay the investment for future credits to the state cost-sharing
program. The credits can be banked and redeemed within 10 years. This feature provides
benefits to both the members of the Association and to the government agency. As an
example at the start of the program, the Association was required to make an advanced
payment and received credits to use as an offset for any future exceedence load. The
agency used the money to support the projects to improve water quality management
including NPS's BMP, and modeling systems (NCDENR 2001).
Allocating the permit to a group of polluters deregulates the pollution control decision
from the regulators to the Association. Point sources are allowed to use any treatment
technology needed to meet a group cap for nitrogen and phosphorus. The Association,
therefore, sets an internal agreement among the members to control nutrient level under
the group cap. This is known by the member of the Association as the penalty-reserve
procedure. The penalty-reserve system in the Tar-Pamlico works by keeping records of
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the actual nitrogen loadings of each member. The procedure is used internally by the
Association to ensure that all members incorporate biological nutrient removal system
(BNR) when they expand. While facilities exceed their allotted portion of the cap, they
accrue penalties. The Association has not required the facilities to make a formal
payment. The penalty amounts are tracked each year and held in "reserve". To offset any
penalty accrued, all members must reduce loading below their cap during the next year.
When the members want to increase the capacity of their operation system, they need to
install biological nutrient removal (BNR). The members can then "buy back" their
accrued penalties without any money ever changing hands (Kerr, Anderson et al. 2000).
A clearinghouse structure set up by the state as a NPS cost-share fund helps keep
transaction costs low because it reduces the cost of identifying the traders in the
programs. Moreover, an internal trading agreement among the members of the
Association provides each firm flexibly to adjust their pollution control level to meet
their individual business needs. This system helps members of the Association save
significant amounts of money while still operating under the permit without actual money
being transferred (Kerr, Anderson et al. 2000).
Several methods are used to help reduce administrative costs of the program. First, the
monitoring system in the program is designed to be collective-to-collective trading. End-
of-pipe mass loads are totaled based on effluent monitoring at all facilities. The
Association has to pay a pre-set fee rate, if the cap is exceeded. Point sources do weekly
samplings and annual reporting to the NC Department of Environmental Management.
Second, the regulator inspects at least 5% of BMPs that generate NPS credits but not all
of BMPs are inspected. NPS reductions are assumed based on research values regarding
BMPs effectiveness. There is no in-stream monitoring next to the agricultural field
(Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
The program focuses on incremental progress by establishing goals for specific time
frames of the program's Phase I, II, and III. With specific achievable goals given for each
phase, relevant parties are encouraged to participate in the initiation. For example, in
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phase I (1991-1994), point sources had to meet a collective and declining cap which was
not considered to be very stringent. Nonpoint source participation was on a voluntary
basis. Therefore, there was a lack of trading activity in this phase. In phase II (1995-
2004), the collective cap changed from declining to be a steady cap. The program also set
nonpoint source reduction requirements. Phase III maintains the steady cap principle and
targets 30% nutrient reduction from agricultural nonpoint source control (Breetz, Fisher-
Vanden et al. 2004).
With trading implementation, the Association significantly reduces nutrient loading
despite a steady increase in flows. It cost less than it would have if it had applied
uniformed technology-based standards (Gannon 2003). The trading played significant
roles in decentralizing pollution control decisions from regulators to the regulated,
transferring funds from point sources to nonpoint sources and increasing the efficiency
and reduction of pollution cost control. The start-up money and the internal agreement
among the members of the Association were the key to the success of the program. The
regulator used an advanced payment system required at the initial start of the program to
reduce nonpoint source pollution. For the polluters, the trading provided the flexibility to
meet the pollution limits in a cost-effective manner compared to the traditional
command-and-control approach.
4.1.3 Lake Dillon Trading Program (CO)
Even though the Lake Dillon Trading Program started in 1982, no trading occurred until
1999. The long-time absence in trading is partly due to a limited number of point sources
in the program (4 WWTPs). Moreover, the strict rules imposed made trading no longer an
interesting option for PSs and precluded any trading activities. In this program, the point-
point sources trading and the banking of nonpoint source credits for the future use were
not allowed. Even though, some upgraded point sources reduced phosphorus levels far
below the cap, the program did not allow banking and trading between point sources.
Only a point/nonpoint trading is allowed and the point sources are liable for all trades.
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Point sources are held in violation of its NPDES limits if nonpoint sources are not in
compliance.
An incentive for trading credits was from the needs for business expansion of the Copper
Mountain Ski Resort. The expansion was expected to lead to violation of Copper
Mountain's NPDES permit, even after upgrading the plant. The demand for offset
phosphorus credits for the Copper Mountain Ski Resort is the main drive for trading in
this program (Woodward 2003). The structure of the program is a point source/nonpoint
source type trading with a trading ratio is 2:1.
The market structure in this program is a bilateral negotiation. The bilateral negotiation
may create high transaction costs for the buyers in general. However, the transaction cost
in the program is not too high because the uniformity of non-point sources is mainly the
private septic system of homeowners. This helps the point source to more easily identify
the trading partners. Also, one credit of phosphorus per home connecting to the sewage
pipeline of the service system has made a credit system identification and measurement
easier to enforce (Woodward 2003).
The role of trading offers a firm cost-effective solution to meet the regulatory
requirement. Trading allows an alternative for economic growth to occur in the area with
limited assimilative capacity. With this program, the Copper Mountain Ski Resort was
able to expand its business. Trading reduced the cost of water pollution management,
provided a cost-saving for the company and allowed funds for a private septic system to
be connected to the treatment system. Trading in this case increased efficiency of
pollution control in the area as it created an incentive for owners of private septic systems
to connect to a central treatment facility.
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4.1.4 Rahr Malting Company Trading Project (MN)
Started in 1997, the reasons for creating the trading project were Rahr Malting
Company's intention to build its own wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) to expand its
production while at the same time reducing wastewater treatment costs and meeting the
total minimum daily load (TMDL) established by the EPA. The Rahr Malting Company
set up a mandatory trust fund, devoted to the trading project in order to achieve the
required nutrient load reduction (Fang and Ester 2003). The trust fund is a unique feature
of the Rahr Malting Company trading project in comparison to other water pollution
trading projects, in that the permit specifies that a minimum amount of the trust fund is
required to assure the financial viability of the trading project.
The trading structure is under the NPDES permit framework. The Rahr Malting
Company bore the burden of identifying nonpoint source trading partners and ensuring
the proper functioning of pollutant reduction measures. A bilateral negotiation is the
trading communication between the Rahr Malting Company and nonpoint sources to
offset the CBOD reduction credits so that the company can construct a new water
treatment plant. The program sets cross-pollution trading ratios to allow trading between
different pollutants (phosphorus and nitrogen) for CBODs credits, 1:8 (phosphorus:
CBOD) and 1:4 (nitrogen: CBOD). The program also applied a 2:1 ratio to account for
the uncertainty of point/nonpoint source trading (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
The role of trading in this program is to allow the company to save more money by
operating its newly-owned treatment plant. There was no waste load allocation available
for the proposed new discharge of 150 lb of CBOD in the watershed area. Also even the
best available technology proposed could not achieve zero discharge. The regulators use
trading as a mechanism to maintain pollution level in the area, by requiring an offset from
a new source to allow for construction of a new treatment plant to achieve cost-effective
pollution control. However, as compared to that in a cap-and-trade program, the offset
trading scheme does not have any mechanisms which could create incentives or
regulatory requirements for PSs and NPSs to further reduce pollution in the long term.
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4.1.5 Long Island Sound Nitrogen Trading Program (CT)
The main driver for trading in this program is the establishment of a total maximum daily
load (TMDL). The TMDL requires the state of Connecticut (CT) and New York (NY), by
2014, to attain a 58.5% collective reduction of nitrogen loads from all sources from an
established baseline (NCAB 2003).
The success of the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Trading Program comes from the
development and passage of Public Act 01-180, codified in the Connecticut General
Statutes in Section 22a-521 through 527((CTDEP) 2003). The statute established a
Nitrogen Credit Exchange (NCE) overseen by a Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board (NAB),
and authorized issuance of a Nitrogen General Permit (NGP). The NCE, the NAB and the
NGP collectively are the foundation of the success of the trading program (CGA 2001).
The General Permit forms the backbone of the trading program by setting all sewage
treatment plants under a single permit (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004). There are 79
wastewater treatment plants participating in the General Permit. The treatment plants are
major sources of nitrogen loading in the Long Island Sound and a 64% reduction goal
was set for sewage treatment plants in CT. The General Permit replaced the need for
separate and complex permits for each individual treatment plant for nitrogen
requirements. Since the majority of pollution is from point sources, the program therefore
does not rely on NPS reduction. The TMDL only sets a 10% nonpoint source reduction
goal. This is a unique characteristic of the program.
General Permits set annual nitrogen limits for each WWTP below its TMDL waste load
allocation to ensure TMDL compliance (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004). The system
generates significant demands for trading because the limit is decreasing every year.
Facilities that discharge lesser total nitrogen than their permits allow receive nitrogen
reduction credits. The facilities having advanced technology can generate credits from an
excess of pollution reduction. The credits are bought and sold through the NCE each
year.
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Unlike other water trading programs, the structure of the program is cap-and-trade. The
total amount of pollution is capped. The permit is allocated to the polluters, proportional
to their discharges. The reduction cap is reduced until the final goals are achieved. Under
this permit, facilities can purchase or sell nitrogen credits annually based on each
facility's performance with respect to their annual limit. The market structure of trading
in this program is a clearinghouse where buyers and sellers trade all excess credit
generated through the Nitrogen Credit Exchange (NCE) program run by the Nation
Credit Advisory Board (NCAB).
The NCAB sets up an equivalency factor to account for the location of the treatment
plants and their varied impact on the hyphotoxic zone. The state also reserves the right to
revoke or modify a point source authorization under the General Permit for reasons
necessary to protect human health and the environment (CGA 2001).
The NCE facilitates trading and helps reduce transaction costs. Since the NCE will buy
all the excess credits generated, this helps to ensure future decision making for the firms.
The General Permit can reduce administrative costs since any additional application
process involved in trading is not required in addition to the procedures under the General
Permit. The role of nitrogen trading in this program is identified as a cost-effective
mechanism to reach an aggregate goal for wastewater treatment plants in CT.
In this program, the treatment plants may need to upgrade in the future in order to meet
the steady decreasing cap. The Clean Water Fund - funding for an upgrade of nitrogen
removal construction - is necessary for certain water treatment plants. Therefore, trading
allows more flexibility and efficient use of the Fund.
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4.1.6 Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners (PVSC)
Pretreatment Trading Project (NJ)
This project is one of the pretreatment trading programs that have an active trade. It is
one of the few programs that use trading to lower levels of heavy metals (Cadmium,
Copper, Lead, Mercury, Nickel, and Zinc) to meet an excepted quality of sludge. The
trading framework is not related to TMDL. The unique driver is from the need for public-
owned treatment work (POTW) to be able to meet sludge requirements. PVSC sets a
pretreatment local limit for its indirect dischargers to achieve an exceptional quality of
sludge. The PVSC established metals limits for its industrial users, tighter than
technology-based standards, in order to improve the quality of the POTW sludge
(USEPA 1998).
A market structure is a bilateral negotiation among indirect dischargers that sends wastes
to the same POTW. There is no nonpoint sources involved in the trading. The program is
credit-type trading where the POTW approves the trades and adjusts the permit limits of
the trading partners. The trading ratio of 5:4 is to make sure that the trade will help
improve water quality as 20% of credits from each trade will be retired. One partner will
not be penalized if the other partner violates the permit level set under the trade (USEPA
1998).
The role of trading in this program is to provide flexibility for the indirect dischargers to
reduce the aggregate amount of pollution at the POTW in a cost-effective manner.
Limited numbers of trading occurred in the program. The POTW should require more
stringent standards or expensive fees, so that indirect dischargers will be forced to find
cheaper alternatives to improve water quality, either by an upgrade or by trading.
Moreover, the POTW could distribute discharge information to facilitate trading and
reduce transaction costs.
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4.1.7 The Truckee River Water Quality Settlement Agreement and
Truckee Meadows Wastewater Reclamation Facility Permit (NV)
A TMDL in the Truckee River is a regulatory driver for the trading program. The TMDL
is in place for total nitrogen, total dissolved solids and dissolved phosphorus in order to
control dissolved oxygen in the Truckee River. The Reno-Sparks Joint Wastewater
Treatment Facility (Truckee Meadows Water Reclamation Facility, TMWRF) sought to
increase its discharge to the River. The municipalities had to develop a creative solution
to both expand the plant and comply with the TMDL. Three possibilities of water quality
trading are being explored to authorize increased discharge at the TMWRF: water rights
purchases and flow augmentation, point/nonpoint sources trading for agricultural best
management practices and septic conversions, and point/point trading with two other
wastewater treatment plants (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
The program is the first and only program involved in water right trading. A water rights
agreement that involves some elements of pollutant trading allows the plant to increase
its discharge while still assuring attainment of water quality standards during the dry (low
flow) season. The local communities and the federal government are sharing the costs of
purchasing upstream water rights. The purchases will both: 1) reduce nonpoint nutrient
loads by precluding the use of the water for agricultural purposes; and 2) mitigate the
impact of increased POTW loading by increasing the river's flow during the dry season
(Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
The Truckee River is the only program that allows trading water rights for the purpose of
improving water quality. The role of trading in the program is a mechanism which allows
the polluter to meet the TMDL cost-effectively when there is no better option. Given the
low river flows in the Truckee River and the difficulty of increased treatment, it
recognized that flow augmentation provided the greatest and most cost effective benefits.
Even though, trading water rights is likely to be a dilution of pollution which is in fact not
a preferred solution.
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By May 2004, 33 water rights contracts, comprising 4,197 acre feet of water, were
signed. The trading program is the foundation for acquiring water rights on a larger scale.
It is, however, still under observation as to whether or not increased flow will lead to a
revised TMDL and higher WLA (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
The water rights are purchased through brokers. Water right trading does not fit any
category of types of trades; however a point/nonpoint trade may be the most fitting
category (Podar 1999). Trading is not an offset or a direct trading as the facility will not
receive a higher wasteload allocation in exchange for increasing instream flow. There is
no trading ratio use. Explicit trading ratios were not calculated, since the offset is not as
straightforward as allowing an additional amount of discharge for each unit of additional
flow in the water. The amount of water rights to be purchased is expected to offset the
effects of increased loadings from the POTW. TMWRF will face the same WLA until the
additional flow leads to a revised TMDL as the TMDL sets nitrogen, phosphorus, and
TDS limits by mass - not by concentration. The higher flows will increase assimilative
capacity and thus enable the river to carry a higher nutrient load, which would then lead
to an increased TMDL and wasteload allocation (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
The structure of point/point trading and point/nonpoint trading in the program is a
bilateral negotiation. These two kinds of trading have less potential for trading than that
of purchasing water rights. In point/point trading, only two other wastewater treatment
plants are potential traders. Moreover, they also face stringent requirements and will not
be able to reduce nitrogen loading enough to trade. In addition, point/nonpoint trades are
more promising but the trading rules are still under development (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden
et al. 2004).
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4.1.8 Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Trading Program (VA, MD, PA and
Washington DC)
The Chesapeake Bay Program has developed voluntary nutrient trading guidelines for its
member jurisdictions (VA, MD, PA and Washington DC). The Chesapeake Bay Program
set Bay-wide collective nutrient caps in 2000 and state and basin allocations in 2003, and
at that time each state agreed to establish Tributary Strategies to meet their goals
(Chesapeake Bay Program 2001). The role of trading in this program is to have the option
of implementing a cost-effective method to achieve nutrient reduction goals and tributary
strategy before implementing the TMDL solution if the goals are not met by 2010.
The guidelines are voluntary and each jurisdiction is responsible for determining an
individual trading policy, establishing a mechanism for certifying and registering credits,
creating a central coordinating office for tracking trades, and developing a system of
monitoring and evaluating performance. Interstate trading within a single watershed may
become a possibility in the future, but trading will likely proceed within each state first
(Chesapeake Bay Program 2001).
The guidelines outline potential trading between both point/point sources and
point/nonpoint sources. Point sources will be responsible for self-monitoring and
reporting on a monthly basis, while nonpoint sources must monitor on a seasonal basis.
Nonpoint sources monitoring should include an annual on-site inspection to ensure that
BMPs are functioning properly (Chesapeake Bay Program 2001). Under the self-
monitoring mechanism, there may be a reduction in administrative costs.
The market structure may be bilateral or clearinghouse; however, it is not finalized. The
guidelines state that the buyer should ultimately be responsible for complying with its
permit and ensuring that adequate credits are delivered. Depending on the contract, a
seller may be required to pay penalties, return the money obtained from trading, or lose
state certification for trades. Therefore, with a clearinghouse, it will be more suitable and
large enough to pool credits for liability (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
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Eligibility for trading will be defined by individual state rules, and therefore it is not
possible to conclusively state the number of potential trading parties. However, one of the
mechanisms for trade identification and communication - an online trading registry -
developed by the World Resource Institute is called NutrientNet. This website provides
information about availability and demands for credits which could help to reduce
transaction costs from trading.
It is a big challenge to develop bay-wide trading guidance in order to balance the interests
of such a diverse set of stakeholders. No trades have occurred in the Chesapeake Bay, nor
have any Bay-states developed state-wide trading regulations. Maryland considered
developing state rules; however, recent legislation requiring POTWs to apply limits of
technology standards may undermine the economic incentives for trading. Pennsylvania
established a pilot trading program for the Conestoga River (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al.
2004).
4.2 Important Barriers Hindering the Role of Trading
Roles of trading in water quality management are not fully utilized due to barriers related
to regulation, nature of water pollution and economic issues. Understanding these
obstacles are very important parts for identifying roles of trading which will lead to future
improvement of the functions and success of the trading program. This section presents
the analysis of the barriers or factors that hinder the success of water quality trading.
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4.2.1 Regulatory Related Barriers
4.2.1.1 A Lack of Optimal Drivers from the Regulators
Regulatory requirements generate demands for credits which then drive trading functions.
TMDL set a realistic and enforceable framework for trading because it takes account of
all potential polluters the ability to be able to protect water quality with a margin of safety
and with a detailed implementation plan. The trading mechanism very much depends on
actual TMDL implementation plans requiring load reductions and BMPs. Currently,
many states do not establish a TMDL because of lack of funding. Setting up a TMDL is a
costly and time consuming process. However, with no TMDL, a non-concrete framework
for trading is created. The delay associated with the establishment of TMDL is a definite
obstacle for trading programs.
It is very challenging for regulators to set an optimal level of pollution reduction goal to
generate trading because if the reduction permit is too loose or too stringent, it could
discourage trading. The environmental group makes comments about caps in that they are
usually set too loose in many trading programs, even in programs where trading has
occurred. The initial allocation can also cause a lack of trade. As in Cherry Creek (CO),
the initial allocations were very generous. Therefore, sources can easily meet limits
without trading. On the other hand, with too stringent reduction goals, it can result in
pressuring the firm to upgrade their treatment facility rather than trade since an upgrading
POTW operation system could significantly reduce the operating costs and discharge
concentration despite high capital costs. Many cases, including Chatfield Reservoir (CO),
Tar-Pamlico Basin (NC), Neuse River Basin (NC) and Lake Dillon (CO), are in question
regarding the stringency of pollution limit causing a lack of trade.
Only when proper regulatory requirements are set up by the regulators, an additional
increase in trading activity will happen and participants will then be more willing to get
involved with the trades. The initiatives and programs set by governmental agencies are
sometimes counter-productive for incentives to trade. For example, the farmers in the
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Minnesota Watershed Trading are reluctant to participate in trading programs because
there are no significant differences between traditional cost-share programs and trading
payments. The farmers are unwilling to make voluntary changes that may later become
mandatory and as a result become targeted as polluters. This was found to be a major
obstacle in the Minnesota Watershed Trading.
Other water quality management initiatives can also make trading unnecessary and/or
easier to meet limits without trading; for example, in the Grassland Area Farmers
Tradable Loads Program, CA. Even though several trades were planned, there has not
been done one since 2000 because of one drainage district that implemented a drainage
recycling project which sufficiently reduced the regional selenium loading to the point
where there was no need for trading (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004). Another
example is Lake Dillon (CO) where methods are available to inexpensively reduce
phosphorus without the need for trading between point sources.
4.1.2.2 A Lack of Central Facilitation to Support Traders
Lowering expenses of trading are a major incentive to participate in trading. In order to
create incentives for trade, either the costs have to be lower than other mechanisms or
there has to be some sort of reward from trading to create incentives to trade. What
happened in most cases is that overhead costs related to trading were higher than benefits
to the firms; for example, costs associated with identifying buyers and sellers. Also, the
uncertainty about trading approval from the regulators sometimes makes an overhead
cost difficult to justify. In many programs, there are no central facilities to assist trading;
e.g. a clearinghouse can significantly help facilitate trading.
Without a central facilitation to guarantee eligibility of credits generated is rewarded, or
to provide information about potential buyers, polluters are thus discouraged to spend
efforts to generate extra credits for trading, especially those who may have limited
funding and knowledge about trading. For example, NPSs are often not able to neither
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invest in future sales nor have the ability to look for buyers to sell their credits. This
uncertainty limits their motives to engage in nonpoint source projects.
A good example of a central system is NutrientNet, an online-trading registry that
provides a simple way for buyers and sellers to connect (Faeth 2000). NutrientNet makes
trading relatively easy for both point sources and nonpoint sources to estimate their
remediation costs using standard, consistent methods, and to make the records of trade
readily accessible. NutrientNet has been developed for two watersheds: the Kalamazoo
watershed (in Michigan) and the Potomac watershed (in Maryland, Virginia, West
Virginia, Pennsylvania and District of Columbia).
A few programs actually create a reward system whereby polluters who could treat
pollution below the requirement would receive cash or rebates. For example, the
Grassland Area Farmers trading program has the fee-rebate system which encourages
polluters to reduce pollution based on their actual ability. They have to either pay a fee if
their pollution exceeds the limits, or they would receive a rebate from the program if their
pollution is below their limits. This system creates an incentive to gain benefits without
additional costs associated with finding sources that need to purchase credits. Another
example of central facilitation supporting trading activity is the Long Island program
where regulators guarantee to buy all the credits generated even if there are no demands
for credits. In this program, the regulators spend federal funds to buy extra credit and
ensure that participants can at least partly recover the overhead costs associated with the
actual set up.
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4.1.2.3 Uncertainty and Disincentives Associated with Trading Rules
Many trading programs are not able to reach a consensus for establishing trading
guidelines because too many parties are involved in the programs. These guidelines
would include; for example, the standard credit estimation methods, credibility of
nonpoint source load reduction and liability after trading. The lack of definitive trading
guidelines creates reluctance, misperception, and hesitation for point sources trading and
for other participants to join the trades.
Trading rules can sometimes be major barriers limiting the trading activities; for
example, in the Lake Dillon Program. The Lake Dillon program prohibits point sources
from trading surplus pollution allowances; and has no provisions that allow banking of
nonpoint source credits for future sale. Together the strict features diminish the incentives
for point sources to further decrease phosphorus beyond the level that the regulatory
requires. The regulators in the program believe that the right to pollute is not a
commodity that can be freely traded between polluters. If a source needs to increase its
discharge, it must compensate the public (in this case through nonpoint source
reductions) rather than compensate other sources (Woodward 2003). This particular point
of view of the regulators inhibits the potential trading activity among point sources.
The credit denomination creates an inconvenient status for trading. The majority of
trading programs are a credit trading system where the permit is not set up as units of
pollutants which can be directly traded as in a cap-and-trade type program. As a result,
credit trading system require long approval processes which would make a trading
process slower and drive up transaction costs. For example, trading under the current
NPDES permit, without central facilitation from the governmental agency, indirectly
forces the firms to negotiate bilaterally. This increases the transaction costs and creates an
inconvenience and uncertainty for trading as it is unclear whether or not the regulator will
approve the trading.
- 135 -
The other most common barrier found in many trading programs is the lack of clear legal
rules and enforcement. Complication arises from the controversy surrounding potential
changes in standards and the trading rule liability which leads to limited incentives for
participating in trading; e.g. some are concerned about anti-backsliding requirements
which will not allow an existing permit to be modified or reissued with lesser stringent
effluent limitations, standards, or conditions than those already imposed.
Currently, point sources face more stringent requirements than nonpoint sources.
Nonpoint sources controls are still voluntary. More and more pressure is being put on
point sources which can lead to upgrade their system rather than buy credits due to
uncertainty of a future regulation. Moreover, the USEPA still requires technology-based
standards be developed on an industry-by-industry basis and does not allow categorical
pretreatment loading allowance to be traded. This creates no incentive for pretreatment
trading between indirect dischargers because the federal categorical limit is more
stringent than local limits. This barrier resulted in a lack of trading in the Illinois
Pretreatment Trading Program, IL, for example.
4.2.2 Economic Related Barriers
4.2.2.1 Problem with High Transaction Costs
Transaction costs and administrative costs can preclude trading if they are too high. It is
therefore essential to keep the costs low by providing an easy means for market
participants to find each other and to identify what they have to sell or need to buy. Many
trading programs face higher transaction costs related to trader identification (e.g., to
reach farmers is a difficult task requiring intensive effort which thus leads to a higher
cost) and trading approval process (e.g. the Cherry Creek Program requires $2,500 for
application fee). This problem can be linked to insufficient information and means of
communication provided by the government.
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4.2.2.2 Information Related to Trading
Available information related to trading is sometimes difficult to obtain and can also
become costly. This is partly due to businesses not wanting to share much of their
information. This needed information is important for firms to decide whether or not to
trade. The absence of trading may be attributable to a lack of distribution of related
information. For example, it is sometimes difficult to obtain favorable pricing for small
quantity trades because overhead costs for retrieving the information can be significant.
Moreover, cost of pollution treatment is different across different areas, industries, and
size of the treatment plant which makes it harder to justify a suitable price. Moreover, the
uncertainty related to nonpoint sources credits monitoring and estimation, associated with
the cost of reduction depending on type of BMPs, significantly increases the cost of
obtaining reliable information needed for trading.
An example of unavailable information of trade resulting in limited trade is the Passaic
Valley Commission Pretreatment Trading Program, NJ. The programs' staff reported that
examining discharge monitoring data from a publicly owned treatment work (POTW) is a
time-intensive process. It is found to be a significant barrier for potential traders in
pursuing other trading options. The suggested solution to this problem is that since the
POTW is more familiar with compliance history of many facilities, the POTW could play
the role in identifying potential buyers and sellers. The POTW can then actively promote
the availability of trading and help buyers and sellers to more readily identify themselves.
A potential solution is to assume a more active role in brokering or promoting trade by
the governmental agency. For example, in the Long Island Program, a government
agency set up a clearinghouse as a trading market. Price of credits was set and publicly
announced so that firms could obtain information about selling and buying credit in order
to decide whether or not trading would be a less expensive alternative. A clearinghouse
system can solve problems related to uncertainties of price negotiation, lack of
information about trading and transaction costs.
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4.2.2.3 Lack of Funding
Funding available from the State can affect trading activity. Because a project
development is expensive and resource-intensive, many programs are delayed due to
deficient funding and insufficient staffing to run the program. For example, in Blue Plain
WWTP, VA, point source was looking for trading as a temporary alternative while
waiting for State Funding to upgrade their system. The state no longer made funding
available; and thus, the trading program has not yet developed.
In the Long Island Sound Program, the point sources are looking for trading as a
temporary alternative while they wait to receive federal support for upgrading their
system. Continued funding from the Clean Water Fund to support the infrastructure
upgrade of nitrogen removal is important for the progress of the program. Upgrades to
municipal treatment plants require stable, multi-year funding. As noted in a report by
NCAB in September 2003, the projected demand for the Clean Water Fund to support
construction projects was more than the amount projected to be available (NCAB 2003).
One of the major drivers for water trading comes from economic needs of expansion of
the business. Therefore, business hardship or change of business operation is found to
cause lack of trades. For example, in the Henry County Public Service Authority/City of
Martinsville, VA, the textile plant that contributed 95% of total waste to the river went
out of business thus making trading no longer necessary. Puyallup River, WA, is another
example of absence of business demand which caused a lack of trading activities.
Originally, there was a plan to modify permits for two PSs to allow for trading of BOD,
but no trading occurred due to changing economic needs of the PSs.
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4.2.3 Technical and Environmental Related Barriers
4.2.3.1 Characteristics of Watersheds and Polluters
Size of trading programs or areas covered by the programs sometimes can preclude
trading. There may be few or not any potential trading partners within a small hydro-
geographical area due to a limited number of sources in each water body. However, lack
of trade did not always result in a small sized trading program. Within a very large area,
the cost of finding partners may outweigh the benefits gained from trading. This has
happened to many larger-sized trading programs where no trading occurred; for example,
the Minnesota River Nutrient Trading program.
Lack of diversity among pollution sources can also become a trading barrier as evidenced
with the first trading program in Fox River. Majority of point sources in the program are
doing a similar type of business (paper industry). They already compete in business; and
as a result, they have no incentive to share information about their operation nor are they
motivated to help other companies.
However, diversity between point sources and nonpoint sources may be less important if
the majority of the sources are participating in the trading. For example, in the Long
Island Trading Program, the program is successful in a number of trades because 79
WWTPs, which are major polluters in the watershed, participate in the program. All of
the point sources are controlled under the same cap. Another example is the Grassland
Area Farmers Tradable Load Program. Even though the majority of the polluters are
agricultural nonpoint sources, all sources are identified and controlled by the irrigation
districts. Trading occurred among districts and was successful in helping to lower levels
of pollution in the area. These examples demonstrate that the success of trading was
primarily due to the majority of polluters who are participating in the program under
proper implementation.
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Recently, statewide trading policies were implemented in many states. These policies are
expected to help increase the potential for trading. It would be more beneficial if trading
within different watersheds were allowed; however, only trading within the same
watershed will be allowed. It is difficult to access the success of the statewide policies as
most of the states are still in the development stage and some are only conducting pilot
studies.
4.2.3.2 Difficulty with Monitoring
Setting up reliable means for estimating and monitoring credits from nonpoint sources is
difficult especially in keeping it at a lower cost. Therefore, processes of verifying credits
usually increase the cost of trading. In addition, there is a complicated issue of defining
the appropriate and accurate trading ratios, especially in cross-parameter trading. For
example, where some of the BMPs - particularly the fencing and tree planting - were not
initially successful; estimating credits became difficult to assess. More consistent and
accurate mechanisms documenting reductions from BMPs are needed before trading for
agricultural nonpoint sources can significantly expand.
An example of a potentially good solution for the problems of an estimation method can
be found in the Lake Dillon program. The program set up an indirect measurement for
credits by establishing a simplified credit calculation method whereby one homeowner
connected to a sewage pipeline is accounted for as one credit. Another example of a good
solution of nonpoint source estimation method is the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable
Load Program. In this program, the staff measures selenium concentration in the water
collected from each farm, instead of measuring BMPs effectiveness. This mechanism
increases accuracy and eliminates the uncertainty related to NPS credit measurement.
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4.2.3.3 Uncertainty of Fate and Transport for Water Quality Improvement
One barrier which may put a constraint on trading and limit the potential for trading is
that most trading programs do not allow downstream trading due to the accumulative
nature of water pollutants. Most trading programs only allow upstream trading where the
sellers are located upstream of the buyers. However, the conditions of trading should be
based on other factors rather than just on upstream trading alone; i.e. whether the trading
occurred in target areas, near regions where there were water quality problems already in
existence or not. If not, perhaps downstream trading should be allowed if this would
provide cost savings to both parties and where the effect on the environment would be
minimal. A solution to the problem may be for the program to set a trading ratio with a
multiplying factor depending on conditions of water and locations of sources to prevent
the hot spot problems, as implemented in the Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot
Program and the Lower Boise River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project.
4.3 Generic Roles of Water Quality Trading
The previous section presented the analysis of specific roles of water quality trading
within several water trading programs. Each successful trading program had a clear focus
for creating and implementing trades. This following section will focus on the common
roles of water quality trading. Roles of water quality trading can serve as a guideline for
initiating or implementing a trading program. Trading in the U.S. can be described in five
major roles which are as follows.
(1) Putting the focus of pollution control back to the overall water quality rather
than on controlling technology
Trading plays a major role in decentralizing pollution control decisions from the federal
to a local regulator, or to the polluters. Trading shifts the water pollution control focus
away from traditional technology-based standards and gears it towards water quality
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standards. The regulators focus on whether the water quality goal is met. The polluters
can then use any technology and can also trade with others as long as they stay under the
limit of their discharge permit. Instead of focusing on the use of specific technology to
control the pollution, the emphasis is on adapting the water quality standards to manage
the pollution. This allows regulators to improve the performance of the overall outcome
of water quality without forcing the polluters to use a specific technology. The firms then
reap benefits in terms of flexibility to use any technology suitable for their company
situation and also from meeting specific requirements from the government.
The regulators set the water quality goal and make decisions on the amount of pollution
allowed in certain areas. The pollution allowances will be allocated to the authorities;
e.g., districts or polluters in those areas will decide on how to control the pollution based
on their individual performance. There are several examples that implement this strategy
including the Long Island Sound program, the Tar-Pamlico Program, and the Grassland
Area Farmers program. Details of implementation of each program can be slightly
different but the major goal of each is to adapt the water quality goals (absolute total
amount of pollution capped) as a new gauge.
(2) Setting the rules to facilitate independent pollution control decision (trading
among participants)
In pollution control regulation, regulators set a specific requirement to control polluters
and to protect the environment. Similar to the command-and-control type policy, trading
mechanisms require specific rules set by the regulators as a driving tool to control water
quality efficiently. Setting appropriate trading structures and rules are important because
different program structures (i.e. cap-and-trade or credit trading) and different
implementations (i.e. market structure, trading ration and etc.) can achieve different
levels of success. Unlike the command-and-control, trading mechanisms do not set the
requirements regarding the use of specific treatment technology; instead it allows
participants to reach the pollution goals via trading with others. The ultimate role of the
regulator will be to set up and enforce trading rules and the maximum amount of
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pollution allowed, and monitor the performance of the system. In the short-term,
regulators can act as an intermediate agency to help promote water quality trading and
help reduce costs associated with trading in the early stages of the program.
A good example of regulators setting the rules to help facilitate trades is the Long Island
Sound Trading Program. The regulators set the General Permit, a framework for trading,
according to the total amount of nitrogen allowed, and allocate permits to point sources in
proportion to their discharge levels. The pollution control decision is then up to the
polluters to meet the requirements by buying or selling credit based on their performance.
The regulators facilitate the trading by setting up a nutrient exchange market for polluters
to buy and sell their credits. Another example is the Tar-Pamlico program. The regulator
delegates a group permit to a group of point sources without getting involved in their
pollution control decision as long as they meet the permit requirement. Also, in the
Grassland Area Farmers Program, the state of CA allocates the pollution permits for
irrigation districts. Each district implements their own strategies to locally manage the
selenium suitable for the farmers in their immediate areas.
(3) Reducing overall operating costs of water quality control
Trading is used as a mechanism to reduce the aggregate cost of a pollution control policy.
In the program where the aggregate level of pollution can be capped, the regulator only
needs to change the amount of pollutant allowed to improve the water quality goal. With
this mechanism, the regulator can then effectively spend more money for monitoring and
enforcing the rules to meet water quality goals instead of having to revise ineffective
technology-based standards. Trading can eliminate problems related to setting up
technology-based standards for different types of sources. The problem with asymmetric
information would be eliminated as the government will have adequate information to set
up water quality goals. Focusing on water quality standards can also help facilitate a
water quality trading program which would place the effort on managing and controlling
the actual amount of pollution, rather than being on the technology required to be used in
the treatment.
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Trading stimulates incentive for the polluters to reduce the cost of pollution abatement.
The Lake Dillon, the Tar-Pamlico, and the Long Island Sound trading programs meet
stringent water quality standards and have demonstrated cost-savings via trading.
Moreover, trading can serve as an indirect source of funding for nonpoint source
management. For example, in the Tar-Pamlico, the program regulators required advanced
payment to start up a trading program and then used that money for nonpoint source
pollution treatment funding and other purposes related to water quality improvement.
Offset is an alternative for point sources to expand new or existing business facilities to
meet the regulatory requirement. Without trading, the point sources would have to pay
more to meet the regulatory requirements or they would not be allowed to expand. The
Rahr Malting Co. is a good example of how trading helps the company to save a lot of
money. Moreover, Rahr Malting Co. exceeded its goal of offsetting 150 lbs of CBOD per
day and BMP implementation was ahead of schedule.
(4) Promoting or increasing efficiency of water pollution management
Trading, in general, can increase efficiency of pollution control and resource usages, as
shown in the Grassland Area Farmers and in the Tar-Pamlico Program, where the
pollution level is steadily decreasing while discharges increase in these programs.
Because polluters focus more on pollution control planning with greater flexibility for
trading, they can also implement a long-term plan that best suits them economically while
still keeping the pollution under the limit.
Trading allows flexibility in business planning to buy or sell credits instead of upgrading
facilities when they are not ready or cost-effective to do so. For example, in the Tar-
Pamlico, trading creates a flexible system for meeting limits with least-cost incurred
according to each individual's plan with penalty-reserve system being implemented
among members of the Association. In the Grassland Area Farmer, the farmers decide
how they will control selenium to meet the limit. In the Long Island Sound Program,
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point sources can buy and sell credits via a clearinghouse which guarantees they will
cost-effectively achieve the requirements.
Moreover, regulators should allow trading as an alternate mechanism to manage pollution
reduction in the area where assimilative capacity of the watershed is limited but
economic growth is necessary. All of the offset-type trading programs are good examples
of this role for trading. The Lake Dillon program is a good example where trading helped
the firm to meet the need of business expansion cost-effectively. The firm generated
offset credits by connecting the homeowner's private septic system (major nonpoint
sources) to the treatment system. This also reduced the nonpoint source pollution in the
area by increasing the efficiency of the household treatment.
In the future, trading can be the mechanism for collaborating and negotiating the
responsibility of pollution control at the local level (negotiation process: case-by-case e.g.
offset, credit trading) and multi-state level (co-operation between states or districts) for a
statewide trading policy. Instead of having more regulators with slightly different set-ups,
it may be more efficient and cost-effective to use a single regulator/agency to manage the
pollution market to achieve the same water quality goal throughout multiple states. In
addition, expansion of the market size could also lead to more profits from trading.
(5) Distribute equity on pollution abatement between diverse groups of polluters
Currently point sources and nonpoint sources face different level of regulatory
requirements to control water pollution. Nonpoint sources in many regions significantly
contribute to the water quality problem however the regulatory control is less stringent or
sometimes just voluntary. Part of the reasons for an inability to effectively control NPSs
is because of the difficulty in identifying the NPS sources and obtaining information
about their operation and treatment.
Trading programs can slowly increase fairness of pollution control responsibility among
point sources and nonpoint sources. Trading may help distribute equity among sources
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which means sources that can reduce pollution with less expensive cost should reduce
more pollution; i.e. NPSs can generate reduction credits at a less expensive cost than do
PSs. NPSs are encourage to generate more reduction and sell reduction credit to PSs.
Trading between point sources and nonpoint sources can provide significant benefits to
all of them. The Tar-Pamlico Trading Program is a good example of a trading program
that increases the reduction requirements from nonpoint sources. In this program, trading
gradually created an equitable distribution of pollution abatement between point sources
and nonpoint sources. In Phase III of the Tar-Pamlico program, the regulators increased
the reduction goal from nonpoint sources by 30%.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
The primary objectives of this research were to understand the roles of trading in water
quality management, to identify the obstacles inhibiting the success of trading programs,
and to eventually make a recommendation for the best course of action for anyone who is
interested in applying a market-based approach to their watershed. This final chapter is
divided into two parts. Part A explains a general conclusion drawn from knowledge
gained as a result of researching trading programs in the U.S.; and also provides an
overview of the current conditions of the trading programs (based on information from
the databases and literature reviews). Factors affecting the WQT program's success are
described as well. Part B describes principles for designing WQT programs and
suggested approaches for developing a trading program framework for WQT program
implementation.
Part A: General Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
Water pollution control is complicated due to the nature of water pollution and its
inability to address water quality in many dimensions. There are two major mechanisms
in place to control water pollution: (1) command-and-control and (2) market-based
mechanism. Traditionally, a command-and-control approach sets technology-based and
uniform-performance-based standards for regulating identifiable sources of water
pollution. The command-and-control effluent standards have been largely ineffective for
achieving additional pollution control (particularly controlling NPS pollution). A market-
based approach, however, when appropriately applied, can be more cost-effective than a
command-and-control approach and can also guarantee environmental improvements.
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Water pollution trading policy aims to tighten the gap of the abatement costs between
point sources and nonpoint sources. Water pollution trading is expected to generate cost-
effectiveness in controlling pollution from point sources and nonpoint sources as
compared to the command-and-control regulation. The tradable permit system is required
for decentralized water quality management. In this permit system, the regulator
establishes a cap on total releases from a defined set of sources, while still allowing for
flexibility to meet the cap by means of trading permits within a market. The desire for
trading arises from significant differences in pollution control costs across various
sources of water pollution. Even though the command-and-control system was the easiest
and least expensive approach to achieve point source reductions, the costs of water
pollution control significantly increased when water quality standards were strengthened.
Moreover, nonpoint source pollution, which is becoming a significant water pollution
source, is hardly controlled by traditional regulation. Trading, on the other hand, creates
opportunities for those with more expensive control (i.e. point sources) to pay those with
inexpensive controls (i.e. nonpoint sources) in order to reduce overall pollution. Whereas,
the command-and-control technology-based standards do not accommodate potential cost
savings that result from differences in incremental costs for operating controls of one
source versus another, or even within the same plant. The tradable permit system can also
generate a strong incentive to innovate, as better pollution control translates into salable
credits. In the command-and-control approach there is a lack of flexibility and incentive
for discovering and implementing superior water pollution control strategies.
5.2 What distinguishes the success of one WQT program vs.
another?
Indications of success for any pollution trading market are signified by both
environmental quality improvement and economic achievement. Success in water quality
trading programs could be determined as a result of either an improvement in water
quality at lower cost, or as an increase in regulatory compliance flexibility in pollution
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control to achieve environmental goals faster than the traditional command-and-control
approach.
WQT programs in the U.S. are predominantly lacking in active trades or have a limited
number of transactions. Therefore, the WQT programs with active trading activities may
be considered successful for having implemented a trading policy. However, not all
activities with money transactions are an indication of a successful trading program. Any
economic and environmental improvement from the traditional command-and-control
approach could be considered an accomplishment of the trading policy.
For example, as compared to command-and-control approach, water pollution trading
provides flexibility of compliance in order to meet regulatory standards. Such as to shift
its discharge obligations to another party or to have ability to determine how to limit its
own discharge (Stephenson 1999). The common use of trading is to offset pollution;
particularly in a watershed area where there is limited assimilative capacity. Point sources
allow buying a way out of tighter pollution reduction requirements by purchasing lower
cost credits from other point sources and/or nonpoint sources. Another example is where
the regulators allow a group of polluters to internally manage the group members in order
to work out the best pollution control strategies to meet pollution reduction requirements
with a minimum level of involvement from the regulatory agency. The internal
agreement may not involve an actual money transaction but would instead allow the
group to achieve a pollution reduction goal at a relatively lower cost.
5.3 How well do the WQT programs within the U.S. perform?
There are approximately 47 effluent trading programs in operation and in developmental
stages within the United States today (Morgan and Wolverton 2005). A large number of
water quality trading programs implemented within the U.S. can be divided into nineteen
ongoing trading programs, eight offset agreements, and twenty various proposals and
small projects in development stages under feasibility studies (more detailed information
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is found in Chapter 3). The majority of water quality trading programs currently
implemented within the U.S. are not typical forms of trading where buyers and sellers
independently and directly negotiate their transactions without a third party becoming
involved, i.e. regulator-approval trades. A water quality trading market is a combination
between a regulatory-directed pollution control decision and the flexibility of shifting its
discharge reduction obligations to another party.
Among all of the WQT programs, nutrients (phosphorus in particular) are the most
commonly traded pollutants, followed by nitrogen (Morgan and Wolverton 2005). On a
regular basis, only the same type of pollutant is allowed to be traded within a single
program. Rarely, is there cross-trading between different pollutants. The most common
type of trading occurs between point sources and nonpoint sources (Morgan and
Wolverton 2005). The offset agreement undertaken by point sources to reduce nonpoint
source pollution is the most common form in the WQT programs and only occurs when
the need for business expansion exists in a watershed with limited assimilative capacity
to defer plant upgrade.
The most predominant structure of trading is a credit trading program. However, a few
water quality trading programs within the U.S are implemented as a cap-and-trade
program; for example the Long Island Sound Program and the Grassland Area Farmers
Trading Program. There are 6 states and regions that are developing a statewide trading
policy but trades will only be allowed within the same watershed (Morgan and Wolverton
2005).
There are several reasons why the credit trading program is the predominant choice for
implementation. First, development of a cap-and-trade system requires an estimation of
the total amount of pollution; i.e. mainly a TMDL or a similar technical assessment. This
is costly and it takes a great amount of time to set up a TMDL. Second, regulators have a
chance to approve the trading in a formal review process to ensure water quality
improvement. Third, it is easier for the regulators to set up and/or transform from the
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traditional system to the credit trading system (as compared to a cap-and-trade system),
because less information is needed at the initial development stage of the program.
The grandfathering method is predominantly used to allocate permits to polluters in the
WQT program. Legal liability and penalties are determined under the NPDES permits.
Point sources are mainly held responsible for obtaining and verifying nonpoint source
credits unless otherwise specified in an individual contract.
Market structure, size of watershed, and number and characteristics of participants in the
programs all combined together affect trading activity. However, the relationship of the
success of each factor is random and unclear. Two types of market structures used in
WQT are bilateral negotiation and clearinghouse. Bilateral negotiation is the most
common structure of a WQT market. This mechanism generally involves high transaction
costs. Clearinghouse structure provides certainty for generating a uniformed good at a
fixed price for buyers, and also reduces transaction costs. A few WQT programs have
clearinghouse markets; for example, the Tar-Pamlico Trading Program and the Long
Island Sound Trading Program. A number of WTQ programs are implementing more
than one market structure. Market structures may evolve over time and are not
necessarily mutually exclusive (Woodward and Kaiser 2002).
The size of a watershed covered by each trading program varies significantly. It is
unclear whether or not the size of a trading program is the most significant factor
effecting active trading since there are many trading programs covering large watershed
areas (> 1,000,000 acres) that do not have any, or minimal, active trades. In some smaller
watershed areas, active trading did occur. The size of the watershed combined with other
factors may sometimes become more significant in precluding trading activities.
The numbers of active trades in each program are not highly correlated with the number
of participants in WQT programs and the diversity of the sources (PS and NPS).
However, having a limited number of point sources and nonpoint sources in the program
could have a negative effect on the success of the programs. Large numbers of nonpoint
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sources with diverse characteristics in the watershed are major obstacles for effective
management.
Trading ratio in WQT programs is applied to manage uncertainties associated with the
effectiveness of nonpoint sources control, to ensure water quality improvement, to
prevent hot spots, and to ensure the equivalency of the potential environmental impact of
different locations. A wide variety of calculations are used to evaluate trading ratios; for
example, defining trading ratios in ranges, setting different ratios for attainment and non-
attainment areas, and multiplying a number of pre-calculation ratios to account for
different characteristics of the source location. Additionally, one approach to deal with
uncertainty of effectiveness of BMPs is to make trading retroactive for NPS. Moreover,
in regards to temporal issues, a few water quality trading programs allow banking.
Borrowing water quality credit, however, is not allowed in any trading programs.
The majority of active trading programs (12 out of 19 programs) had trading which
occurred only once (Morgan and Wolverton 2005). The market structure of these
programs is a one-time offset. Only four programs had more than ten trades within its
program. Numbers of trading alone, however, does not necessarily mean the program is
successful. The Tar-Pamlico Trading Program meets the collective nutrient limits without
trading. With an internal trading agreement among members of the association, nutrient
loading is significantly reduced despite a steady increase in flow. Moreover, with trading
implementation, it cost less than it would have if uniformed technology-based standards
had been applied.
There is no set standard price for credits of the same pollutant across different programs.
In addition, the amount of pollutant trades varies widely. Market structures affect the
prices of credits. Clearinghouse structure normally sets up a standard price/credit with
lower transaction costs as compared to bilateral negotiation. Cost-savings in trading
programs vary significantly. It is difficult to compare the amount of cost-saving between
different programs due to the variation of information from sources and estimation
methods. Transaction costs and administrative costs vary significantly across programs.
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Several mechanisms used in trading programs to reduce these costs included transaction
cost paid by States, setting up a clearinghouse for credits, using the existing federal
monitoring system, and lowering levels of oversight for NPS sources implementation.
5.4 Why did WQT programs fail to have active trading?
A significant number of obstacles inhibiting the participation of water pollution trading
are identified from current WQT programs within the U.S. Several barriers in water
trading programs can be largely divided into 3 categories: regulatory-related barriers,
economic-related barriers and technical- and environmental-related barriers. The
following section describes each category in details.
5.4.1 Regulatory-Related Barriers
A critical element for generating incentives for trading is an enforceable framework to
reduce pollution. Regulators are responsible to set an optimal (financially achievable)
level of reduction to stimulate trading activity. In the Clean Water Act, the regulation for
nonpoint sources is not as effective as in controlling water pollution from point sources.
Point sources and nonpoint sources have inadequate levels of reduction requirements, and
unequal standards for achieving water quality goals. Nonpoint sources are not required to
have pollution permits to control their pollution. To achieve water quality goals via
trading, it is difficult to establish trading programs and promote trading activity further
than point sources, especially where nonpoint sources largely contribute to water
pollution problems.
Many trading programs operate without having a TMDL already set up for the watershed.
The credit trading programs, without having set up a total mass cap for pollutants under a
TMDL, are facing a thin market due to the absence of a realistic and enforceable
framework. In addition, without the TMDL, there is no mandatory requirement for
nonpoint sources reduction. Even though nonpoint sources are not subject to a mandatory
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requirement, they can be sources of reduction credits. Therefore, a baseline still needs to
be established. It is not always clear what that baseline should be; however, it is often
taken to be business-as-usual or at a level of discharge without regulation. The
participation of these sources in trading is voluntary, as is in any trading, even within a
cap-and-trade program since any source can adjust discharges to the level of allowances.
A motivation factor for the NPS to trade is from the resulting payment received from the
regulated point sources. If point sources did not face a mandate to make an additional
expensive reduction, there would be no mandate.
Regulators set up strict trading rules for WQT programs. For example, trading rules
sometimes restrict the opportunity to trade; e.g. point/point sources trading is not allowed
in the Lake Dillon Trading Program. Regulatory provisions inhibit incentives to trade; for
example, trades cannot be used to comply with technology-based standards. In credit
trading, sources must over-comply to have credits to sell but in doing so two regulatory
risks come into focus. Boyd et al 2003 pointed out that the CWA provisions undermine
the incentive to over-comply. Over-complying sources that return to more normal levels
of compliance at a later date may run afoul of the anti-backsliding provision. Over-
compliance signals to the regulator that greater levels of control can be attained cost-
effectively. This can then lead to future ratcheting down of the standards (Boyd,
Krupnick et al. 2003). Thereby, these provisions can discourage the trades.
Technology-based standards implemented on point sources create a hardship for point
sources to concurrently and independently decide whether or not to meet reduction
requirements via trading. Particularly, anti-backsliding and anti-degradation provisions
indirectly discourage trading due to uncertainty of trading approval and possible
additional requirements in the future. Although strict trading rules are set to protect water
quality, it can also at times prevent trading by increasing overhead costs. Additionally,
the controversy regarding potential change in standards and trading liability leads to
limited participation in trading.
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Credit trading still very much depends on regulatory judgment. Credit denomination in a
credit trading system is sometimes not set as a mass-unit of pollutants and therefore it
become more difficult to trade credit directly as in a cap-and-trade system. A
cumbersome and costly process from the government agency to adjust the permit limit
makes trading less-attractive for participation.
There is a lack of communication/coordination and perception among the parties
involved in trading. There is a difference of opinion between the states and EPA over
what may or may not be legally allowed. There are multiple parties responsible for
implementing various actions, and thus coordination is made difficult. Central facilitation
from the government to support trading or educating participants is inadequately
provided.
5.4.2 Economic-Related Barriers
High transaction costs and administrative costs are major trading barriers within most of
the trading programs. Many programs are delayed due to insufficient funding and lack of
staffing to run the programs. Project development has been expensive and resource-
intensive. There has not been a sufficient need to develop guidance for trading.
Transaction cost is high mainly due to the process of searching, negotiating and executing
trades. In addition, gathering data relevant to trading is difficult because information is
either not available or very costly to attain. Processes related to government
administration and approvals make the cost of trading higher. High administrative costs
are due to significant needs for monitoring and enforcement of nonpoint sources,
extensive review of application for trading, and oversight and inspection for nonpoint
sources BMPs.
Demand for and supply of credits trading is restricted by the government agency (King
and Kuch 2003). King and Kuch argued that water management initiative programs and
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subsidies for NPS reduction by local government or states could possibly make trading
unnecessary. These programs affect the viability of credit trading by raising the baseline
for scoring nonpoint source credits. Moreover, the major sources of nutrient impairment
(i.e. nonpoint sources) frequently receive significant government subsidies to manage
their nutrients. It has been proven to be unfair to create demand for credit trading by
further reducing point source dischargers, as nonpoint source dischargers face less
restriction and have subsidy available.
Having a thin market is a major problem in WQT programs. There are not many point
sources interested in trading due to the competition amongst firms (e.g., Fox River
Program), or due to the lack of diversity and the smaller numbers of firms and industries
located in the watershed. The insignificant difference of abatement costs between trading
and not trading is also a problem. The marginal cost of water treatment after the plant is
upgraded is very small. Moreover, due to political uncertainty and unreliable trading
systems, the firms may be better off controlling pollution by upgrading their present
system instead of buying credits.
5.4.3 Environmental-Related Barriers
Water pollution problems are confined to a watershed. The size and complex nature of a
watershed makes program development difficult. The effect of effluents on ambient water
quality is a function of location and geography, timing of discharge, location of other
polluters, and stochastic elements due to weather and other factors. The size and
configuration of effluent permits regions affect the number and size of potential market
participants and the achievement of market equilibrium. Many programs face a limited
number of potential traders and little diversity of activity among pollution sources in the
watershed.
Water pollutant characteristics which are non-uniformly mixed, and potential damages
accumulated from up-stream to down-stream, make trading complicated for establishing
an equivalent trading ratio and for monitoring the trades. Water pollution impacts can be
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highly variable depending upon the point of discharge. Trading could lead to localized
pollution problems or "hot spots". Unlike many air pollutants, water pollution would not
be suitable to treat as uniformly dispersed over a wide area. Water pollution trading,
therefore, is most appropriate for pollutants such as nutrients that are biologically
degradable and assimilable within the ecosystem.
Instead of considering the water quality of adjacent areas from the buyers, most trading
programs allow only upstream trading where sellers are located upstream from the
buyers. As a result, this could eliminate any chance for potential trading. A few trading
programs allow multimedia trading and cross-parameter trading because there are very
complicated issues involved with scoring pollution reduction and establishing an
equivalency ratio.
When a significant number of polluters operate different activities, it is difficult to set up
a system to generate and estimate uniformed credits. Mainly because there is a lack of a
reliable measuring system for water pollution to accurately keep track of their discharge.
Moreover, the impact of pollutants depends on the forms and types of pollutants, and the
time and location of discharge.
Monitoring nonpoint sources pollution is a major problem for achieving potential cost-
savings. It is difficult to accurately quantify and monitor nonpoint sources credit to keep
it at a low cost. Predictions of loads are likely to either be expensive or imprecise.
Therefore, it is difficult to target best management practices (BMPs) to the extent
envisioned in the trading. Moreover, nonpoint sources are concerned that their
participation in generating credits by reducing loads may result in being subjected to
regulations requiring load reductions.
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Part B: Unique Conclusion and Future Work
5.5 What should the roles of trading be in water quality management?
In conclusion, based on observations of current water quality trading programs within
the U.S., water quality trading is likely a regulatory devolution. Water quality trading is a
market-trading-like system but it is not a pure market form. To date, the credit trading
and offset agreement predominate the program's structure (Morgan and Wolverton
2005). Most participants in WQT programs use trading as a temporary alternative for
expansion of their business under a more restricted regulation. A typical water quality
trading market is credit trading towards a one-time offset. One-time offset, even though
providing flexibility in meeting water quality, fails to stimulate an incentive to further
reduce pollution in the long-term as compared to a cap-and-trade system.
The actual active role of trading is to sharpen the water quality goal by shifting the
responsibility for meeting the pollution reduction goal to the polluters. The polluters,
then, based on the information gathered on which methodology would be most suitable
for each operating situation, would decide with flexibility on how to cost-effectively meet
the water quality requirements. The role of the regulators in trading is .to emphasize
improving effectiveness in monitoring water quality and trading compliance.
The generic roles of trading in water quality management can be elaborated on
specifically as an approach to:
1. Shift the focus ofpollution control toward the overall water quality (total amount of
pollution) rather than controlling specific technology choices
The key to achieving water quality improvement is to focus on reducing the total amount
of pollution without being restricted to any technology, as long as the polluters surrender
pollution with their permits and independently decide on how to meet the pollution
reduction without any regulatory requirement on which technology is to be used.
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Polluters who achieve pollution reduction with the least amount of cost involved should
do more. These polluters have incentives to do so because they could make a profit from
selling their permits to other polluters who face higher costs in reducing their pollution.
Costs and benefits drive polluters to decide whether or not to buy credits or install more
advanced technology which would then give them the most cost-effective approach for
their business. Ideally in the future, polluters should be able to install any treatment
technologies best suited to the firm's conditions. Trading rules will allow the traders to
use the most cost-effective technology without facing additional rules (e.g. valid credit
should be from an additional reduction using minimal technological requirements).
2. Establish a system to facilitate an independent pollution control decision
The governmental agency decentralizes pollution control decisions to the polluters by
allowing the trading of pollution permits or allowances. Trading allows regulators to
focus on evaluating the regulated performance and water quality, instead of adjusting the
use of more advanced technology requirements from the polluters, to further improve
water quality. Without a tradable permit system, polluters have limited options to meet
the regulatory requirement. Instead of enforcing technology requirements, the roles of the
regulators will be to oversee the trading transaction, monitor and enforce the trading
rules, and update the environmental goals and trading requirements. The government
agency can then promote the use of trading by being an intermediary for facilitating
trading and reducing costs associated with trading at the initial start of a program.
3. Reduce overall costs of water quality control to achieve more cost-savings to the
polluters under increasing regulatory constraints and economic growth
Current command-and-control approach is not cost-effective. Most frequent use of
trading is to provide an escape for firms having a need for expansion of their business;
however, they are under regulatory constraints in a limited capacity area. Trading
regulators can effectively spend more money for monitoring and enforcing the trading
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rules to meet water quality goals instead of revising inefficient technology-based
standards.
4. Promote effectiveness and efficiency of water pollution management particularly with
nonpoint sources pollution
Trading allows collaborating and negotiating the responsibility of pollution control in all
levels, including the local level to a state or a multi-state level, to achieve a greater scale
of reduction and cost-savings. Trading, when appropriately implemented, can provide
polluters with greater flexibility for planning their pollution control to best suit their
financial situations. Water quality trading can be a way to encourage non-permitted
nonpoint sources to generate least-cost reductions than the permitted point sources could
achieve, and a means to recruit nonpoint source to take responsibility in a non-threatening
manner.
5. Distribute equity on pollution abatement between diverse groups ofpolluters
An urgent concern regarding the current water pollution control is that it does not put
mandatory control on nonpoint sources. Except in a watershed where there is a TMDL
established, point sources and nonpoint sources do not face the same stringency and
responsibility for cleaning up their discharges. The reasons have been well-known
regarding the difficulty in managing pollution from these sources. It is quite unfair to put
more pressure on point sources by making them indirectly share responsibility for the
water quality problem when nonpoint sources are the ones largely responsible for the
problems. With a TMDL and trading policy, trading can provide options for sources to
find the most cost effective solution for their pollution problems. If possible, an adequate
number of point sources and nonpoint sources in the trading program can provide
financial benefits to meet regulatory requirements.
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5.6 What is the suggested guidance for designing WQT programs?
5.6.1 Relevant Issues
The necessary elements and considerations required for structuring and evaluating WQT
trading programs were previously explained in Chapter 2. These trade variables include
pollution selection, load calculation, potential trading partners, credit denomination and
allocation, market structure, size of trading area, approval mechanism, certification and
trading tracking system, center for attaining trading information, period of valid credit
use, trading ratios, banking, directionality of the trade (upstream only or allowing
downstream), cross pollutant trading, state-wide and inter-state trading, assurance of
credits and liability, monitoring report requirements, penalty and responsibility, and
educational programs and public participation.
Observations of trading programs revealed that water pollution problems are highly-
localized problems. Therefore, each area needs specific drivers for trading and slightly
different structures for program implementation. However, key issues involved for all
programs to meet requirements might be grouped into 3 categories: legal, economic, and
technical issues, which are explained as follows:
Legal issues: A legal authority needs to establish an enforceable framework for trading
that is consistent with the requirements in the CWA and other federal laws to meet water
pollution reduction goals. The regulatory agency has to initiate legal rights and allocate
responsibility to all parties. The trading rules must establish a process by which permits
can be issued and can be transferred. There must be an authorized agency to administer,
oversee, and enforce the trading. The agency needs to establish a mechanism to
encourage and facilitate the use of trading to increase public participation.
Economic issues: A trading program and market structure has to make the trading process
as simple as possible to minimize transaction costs and as an attractive option to take full
advantage of flexibility and potential benefits of capturing all point sources and nonpoint
- 161 -
sources located in the watershed to maximize the size of the market. If possible, the
program structure has to be designed to promote competition and prevent market powers
and hot spot problems.
Environmental issues: It is critical to establish baseline loads for all pollution sources.
Coverage of the trading area should be within a watershed boundary or segment.
Pollutants allowed to be traded should be in the classes of pollutants that are biologically
degradable and assimilable including nutrient, and organic carbon, so that they have
biological capacities for treatment within a water body.
5.6.2 Principles
Based on lessons learned from the literature reviews and the current water quality trading
programs (more details were discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), the following section
suggests the principles and guidance necessary for program designers to take into
consideration to improve the current implementation and future design of a trading
program. Three principles recommended are: (1) simplicity, (2) reliability and (3)
minimum costs.
Principle 1: Simplicity
The trading system design (structures and rules) should be as straightforward,
administratively simple, and flexible as possible, and the framework must be enforceable.
The system should allow a broad set of compliance options to attract traders. Processes
which make trading transactions too complicated should be avoided as they will
discourage participation. The governmental agency has to maximize decentralization of a
pollution control decision for the trading participants while minimizing regulator's roles
involved in trading programs; e.g. trade approval process. The simple and standard
trading framework with appropriate levels of policy safeguards for protecting water
quality will take a minimum amount of time and financial investment from the regulators
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and the regulated to switch from the current command-and-control system to a market-
based approach. There are several lessons learned from the successful WQT trading
programs that should be introduced and applied to other programs to make a trading
program simpler and more attractive to the trading participants, including:
* Trading drivers: It is important that all impaired waters eventually have TMDLs in-
place. TMDLs lay out an enforceable framework for trading especially for nonpoint
sources control to estimate pollution cap for total pollution and for allocating the
pollution reduction to responsible parties (both PS and NPS). Without the TMDLs, it
is difficult to achieve pollution reduction goals as there is only vague guidance.
Several elements within a trading program; i.e. credit denomination and allocation,
trading conditions, monitoring and enforcement of the trading program, can be
achieved with TMDL structure.
* Credit denomination: The pollution cap and/or baseline for pollution are best to be
established in terms of the mass of pollutants. Each credit allows the point source to
discharge a unit of pollutant/ time (e.g. pounds of P/day). The unit should be the same
as the unit of measure used in the Waste Load Allocation. Forms and impacts of
pollutants, time and quantity of generating and using credits, are necessary to take
into consideration when defining the term-of-use of the credits. There should be an
expiration period for unused credit to prevent locally-increased pollution loads for the
long term. The cap may have to be tightened over a certain period of time (after
program initiation) in order to stimulate market demand for and supply of pollution
reduction credits.
* Assigning NPS the right to trade: It is essential to create an enforceable permit for
nonpoint sources to allocate the legal responsibility for NPS pollution. Permit
language may need to re-define nonpoint sources as a large collection of small,
independent and controllable sources based on their units of operation, capacity of
operations, type of firms and activity, and area of farm coverage; rather than define
them as diffused, uncontrollable, and unmonitored sources (Young and Karkoski
2000). If there are many nonpoint sources in a watershed with a variety of operations,
it might work better if permits are allocated to a group of polluters to share a single
- 163 -
group permit or a group cap, instead of issuing permits to individual nonpoint
sources.
* Water quality standards should be used instead of technology-based standards
(Stephenson 1999). Regulators may have to shift their focus from technology choices
towards the formulation of physical constraints, such as ambient water quality
standards that are more in line with environmental objectives and offer greater
flexibility in the choice of means to achieve compliance.
* Defining upfront the trading requirements and eligible conditions for credits. Cleary
defined rules in trading guidance and regulations, as well as in the permit itself, help
polluters to make their management plan with necessary information and eliminate
unnecessary administrative approval process when the program is implemented. For
example, the regulator can establish a list of acceptable best management practices
associated with potential reduction credits generated. The lists of acceptable practices
enable the sources to screen the qualifying trades themselves. Setting up trading
requirements and conditions upfront at the initial start of a program that participants
must follow, will help minimize administrative review process and transaction costs.
Qualified trades that meet these requirements should be able to automatically adjust
the permit limit without a formal review process (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004).
* Establish an information center or market center: A clearinghouse will help create a
standard commodity and central facility for providing necessary information for
buyers and sellers who are looking for an opportunity for current and future
transactions; i.e., to buy credit or to report demand for credit (Woodward and Kaiser
2002). An internet-based central database may be a good approach for developing a
communication channel among participants and with the regulators (Faeth 2000);
e.g., a trading forum to obtain information related to trading process, regular update
or news from trading programs regarding trading rules and acceptable requirements
for BMPs.
· There should be a trading cycle for performing a trade (Schary and Fisher-Vanden
2004); e.g., monthly or every two months to report available credits and post credit
demand on a regular basis. The agency can then help identify potential buyers to
potential sellers. The reduction credit can only be valid within a trading cycle. The
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permit holder may require submitting a trading report (credit certification, total
allowance) and monitoring report to the regulatory agency after transactions take
place during each trading cycle.
Principle 2: Reliability
An accurate and reliable monitoring system is key for a successful trading program.
Discharge estimation, as a currency for trading, has to be correctly measured. Usually,
the polluters are liable for the credits they generate; however, requirements for the credits
to be reviewed and approved before they could be traded shifts liability to the regulatory
agency. The review process ensures that water quality will not deteriorate as a result of a
trading transaction; however it can slow down the trading process and significantly
increase trading costs. Thus, instead of establishing trading rules and safeguards that are
too restrictive, there are a number of mechanisms to ensure that trading will improve
water quality.
* Fully closed allowance trading programs are encouraged because they give
regulators greater assurance that total discharge will not exceed the wasteload cap.
From before trading to after trading, net pollutants from all participants should not
change.
* Establish a certification and trading report system to verify transactions between
buyers and sellers (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004). The regulatory agency can set
up the trading report system where both buyers and sellers will have to sign a credit
certification when they perform a transaction, and will have to report to the agency on
a regular interval. This certification should include information about buyers and
sellers, their treatment technology, and amount of credits before and after it is
transferred. A trading report should also include the monitoring of water conditions.
The agency can then check the validation of the trades after the transactions. If
discharge levels exceed permits limits, the polluters will face penalties. With credit
certification, the regulator should allow buyers and sellers to arrange their trades
outside the permit process. Trading with qualified trades can automatically adjust the
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permit limit without a formal review process, which would then help in reducing
administrative costs and transaction costs and ensure that environmental goals are
being met (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004).
* Monitoring both direct method and indirect method should be encouraged if possible.
The discharges should be measured in the same way across all dischargers. By direct
monitoring and measuring of the real discharges, collection and measurement
methods and equipment use, should be as uniform as possible. For indirect
monitoring, usually based on an estimation using equations or modeling with some
real data, the regulators have to provide the standard information of the credit
calculations for point sources and nonpoint sources; for example, types acceptable
BMPs associated with number of potentially generated credits.
* Establishment of an independent administrative authority can ensure compliance with
regulation and develop fair trading activity and transactions for the long term.
* Generation and use of credit must occur in the same period. Credit after generated
should be used concurrently within the same cycle of buying and selling trade
(Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004). Banking may not be allowed in order to prevent an
impact of pollution within a small area.
* Make trading approval from NPS retroactive (Young and Karkoski 2000). Credits
from nonpoint sources should be established after the reduction has taken place.
Nonpoint sources reductions are only considered valid if they are proven to be surplus
or additional to the reductions specified by the nonpoint sources load allocation.
* Point sources should be liable for the validity of any credits purchasedfrom nonpoint
sources. Before trading, the point sources have to check on whether or not the credits
are valid. In a credit trading system, permit holders assume all liability for the validity
of credits used to adjust their permit limit and therefore are subject to any
enforcement action if a credit is proven to be invalid. Nonpoint sources that create an
invalid credit are subject to the penalties or action agreed upon in private contracts
with point sources.
* Private contracts should be used to manage the uncertainty between nonpoint sources
andpoint sources (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004). Since the traders know more
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about their operating conditions, regulators should encourage trading parties to
negotiate the terms to manage the trading risks in private contracts.
* Stiffpenalties should be set to provide incentives for high degrees of compliance.
* Prevent localized impacts by setting up protective limits, trading ratios, and trading
zones (Tietenberg 1995).
- Protective limits: establishing an upper discharge limit in the permit that cannot
be exceeded no matter how many credits the point sources holds to offset its
discharge.
- Trading zones: upstream trading only allowed within the zones. Inter-zone trading
will apply the trading ratio for the zones that are not adjacent to each other. The
trading ratio is a product of the ratio from all zones.
- Trading ratios: set a location-based ratio and set a common reference point to
limit the direction for allowing trades only within a small zone, not for the whole
watershed because the whole watershed at large may gain more benefits from
down stream trading between different zones (Hung and Shaw 2005). There is no
reason to prohibit a trading direction along the river. Only the direction of trade
that would increase loads to the problem zone should be restricted.
Principle 3: Minimal costs
Costs involving trade have to be minimal in order to attract trading participants. Costs
related to trading processes are probably the most significant barriers inhibiting the
success of WQT trading. Some suggestions to reduce these costs are explained as
follows:
* Frequency of monitoring schedules and in-stream monitoring should be adjusted
according to the polluter's monitoring report. Transaction costs due to credit
verification can be reduced by requiring point sources to have the burden of certifying
the credits they bought and by subjecting them to legal penalties if the credits are
falsely reported.
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* Funding: the regulator may set up an initial requirement for potential participants of a
WQT program to get start-up funding by asking for an advanced payment from the
majority of polluters located within the watershed; e.g. industrial sectors or POTWs.
* Spread the costs across allparties involved in trading and trading processes or
require the primary beneficiary to cover a substantial portion of the administrative
costs. For example, an innovative approach adopted in the Tar-Pamlico Trading
Program, was that a substantial amount of costs (in terms of time and money) were
borne by the association of point source dischargers (Green 1997).
* In a credit trading -which is the predominantform of water quality trading- the rights
for discharge are granted free to permit holders as they are under conventional
regulation. In the cap-and-trade type trading, the regulatory agency should move
towards auctioning in order to shift away from establishing a rule for the
grandfathered allocation and to provide fair chances to incorporate new sources
(Stavins 1995). OECD 2001 suggests introducing gradual increases (e.g. 5%, 10%
and 25%) in proportion to credit quotas offered for auction over a number of periods.
* Maximize the number ofparticipants and numbers of trading: anyone should be able
to buy or sell reduction credits regardless of their purpose of credit uses. Regulators
should encourage brokers, speculators, environmentalists and other citizens to
purchase the credits to either resell them or retire them (Fossett, Kaiser et al. 1999).
* Minimize the government's role by creating a quasi-governmental entity/a thirdparty
to launch and administer all aspects of the trade; including identifying and
facilitating potential trades, and quantifying the number of credits generated by a
particular practice (Fossett, Kaiser et al. 1999). The regulatory agency should
establish an information center to provide relevant information of the trades; e.g.
trading rules, demands for, and future available credits to help traders save money on
searching for information they need to acquire to complete their trades.
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5.7 What are the recommended approaches for promoting a WQT
implementation?
There are several strategies suggested to introduce a WQT program to improve
effectiveness of existing policies, or to design a new framework separate from the
existing control system. Five potential approaches are recommended for a program
designer to introduce and implement the water pollution trading programs into a
particular watershed. These approaches are not comprehensive nor are they mutually
exclusive. Specific strategies may be required to be developed for a particular watershed
situation.
Approach 1: Develop a real cap-and-trade program for WQT
Approach 2: Encourage a general permit or a multi-party permit
Approach 3: Promote a statewide trading policy
Approach 4: Set up a hybrid trading system
Approach 5: Support pilot programs/simulations
Approach 1: Develop a real cap-and-trade program for WQT
To set up a real cap-and-trade program for water pollution, the TMDLs must be in-place
for the watershed to establish an enforceable framework and to estimate the total mass of
pollution cap which can then be allocated to all responsible parties contributing to the
pollution in the watershed. The trading programs can then be developed and implemented
based on the TMDLs requirements. A significant requirement for a cap-and-trade
program is to set up a reliable monitoring system. Standard measuring methods and lists
of allowable devices and acceptable BMPs have to be clearly defined to ensure that
credits generated are uniformed and accurately measured and therefore tradable.
It is important that the regulator define pollution permits in terms of the mass of
allowable pollutants; so that permits can be tradable and transferred. All types of trading
structure (PS/PS, PS/NPS, or NPS/NPS) should be allowed since market scale is for the
entire watershed. The brokerage market structure should be encouraged if there is a need
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for larger trades. However, relatively small trades from many sources may not create
enough financial profits due to brokerage fees. The regulatory agency may assist and
promote the trade by setting up a central facility providing information about trades; e.g.
future demands and supply, and prices of the credits.
Certainty for achieving and maintaining the pollution reduction goals and the financial
benefits to the polluters will be high if the real cap-and-trade program is implemented.
The government role involved in the trading process is minimal. However, a real cap-
and-trade program requires a significant amount of time and money at the initial start of
the program; i.e., establishing a TMDL for a watershed, distributing allowances to all
sources, and setting up standard equipment for monitoring.
Approach 2: Encourage a general permit or a multi-party permit
Multi-party watershed permits for both point sources and nonpoint sources is another
potential challenge, particularly in addressing nonpoint sources pollution problems. A
group permit allows a group of polluters to become a bubble where they can set internal
rules and agreements among its group members to meet a group reduction requirement.
In this case, the regulators only focus on final water quality, not individual discharge.
There may be more than one group permit in the same watershed. Each group is
potentially subjected to synchronization of permit issuance across a watershed of multiple
parties, which allows coordinated monitoring, assessment and characterization,
prioritization, planning, and implementation. This type of permit will lower transaction
costs and integrate larger numbers of sources with different marginal control costs to
create potential cost-saving situations within a watershed.
Two approaches that the regulators may use to decentralize pollution control decisions
are (1) development of a general permit and (2) allowing the establishment of an
association. For a general permit approach, the main idea is that pollution sources will
share a portion of a total number of permits which also correlate to the pollution cap of a
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watershed. The general permit system can be set up based upon the NPDES system
which is already well established and implemented in the U.S. This approach is easier to
set up and to adjust for a reduction goal over time because each pollution source owns a
share of the permit. The general permit approach is successfully implemented in the Long
Island Sounds. The approach includes all point sources under a single permit. Each
WWTP owns a share of the permit proportionate to the historical record of their
discharge compared to the total allowable discharge. This approach provides an
advantage for separating complex permit processes for each WWTP.
The second option is to allow a group of polluters to form an association, which may
consist of polluters from similar industries or businesses discharging the same pollutants
into the same water body. The association can implement any internal agreement or
trading strategy among its members to meet a pollution cap allocated to them as a group.
The government agency only oversees and monitors pollution reduction at the level of the
association as a whole.
A successful example of a group approach is the Tar-Pamlico program. A group cap
agreement is made between the NC state and group of WWTPs. The advantage of having
a trading association is to have a flexible compliance with the regulation and minimum
requirements from the government to reduce costs for the agency to oversee the program.
The members of an association can share information and thus internally manage their
pollution to meet a group cap more cost-effectively. Another example of a group
approach is the Grassland Area Farmer Trading Program where the mass-based cap of
selenium loads is allocated to the irrigation districts as a group of large collectors. Each
district applies local management strategies among farmers within their districts. Trading
is only allowed between districts. It has been proven that districts can efficiently manage
their pollution with fairly low administrative and transaction costs.
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Approach 3: Promote a statewide trading policy
A statewide trading policy regulated through administrative rules provides a general and
uniformed trading framework that could be implemented across an entire state. Statewide
trading policies have several advantages including: (1) expanding market coverage to
increase the number of trading participants and potential benefits gained from trading, (2)
coordinating water pollution management for a region, and (3) increasing overall
efficiency of pollution management on a larger scale.
The difficulties of this approach are in (1) not being able to create an accurate oversight
mechanism to prevent conflict among different agencies, (2) having a high probability of
no water quality improvement, (3) not being able to establish sufficient protection for
preventing local adverse impact, (4) reaching consensus for several different parties in
order to get a program started, and (5) having significant amounts of administrative and
transaction costs for overseeing, monitoring and enforcing the rules for an entire state.
There are a number of states developing a statewide trading policy; for example,
Colorado Pollutant Trading Policy, Idaho Pollutant Trading Guidance, and Maryland
Nutrient Trading Policy. The success of this type of policy is still unclear as many
programs have only just started and thus it may take a number of years before an
evaluation can be conducted.
Approach 4: Set up a hybrid trading system
A hybrid trading system which is a combination of two different market-based
approaches (quantity-based and price-based) may be appropriate in situations where there
is uncertainty about cost and damage functions. The combination between tradable permit
and tax, or between tradable permit and fee-and-rebate, can provide certainty for
improving environmental performance (by setting a pollution cap), while the regulatory
agency would avoid excessive costs when only a tradable permit is implemented. A tax
exceedence and a fee should not be confused with a penalty for sources that exceed
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permit limit. A penalty is usually set at a very high price to prevent any intentions of non-
compliance with permit requirements. Whereas, the level of a tax or fee would be set to
represent the estimated maximum unit cost which would be reasonable in order to obtain
pollution reduction. There are a few WQT programs implementing a combination of a
credit trading with a tax exceedence or a credit trading with a fee-rebate.
An example of the tax-exceedence and a credit trading system is the Tar-Pamlico Trading
Program. With tax exceedence, the government agency generates revenues from the
polluters who exceed their permit allowances. The regulators can then use this payment
to fund NPS pollution reduction. This situation often happens in credit trading where
non-permitted nonpoint sources only voluntarily participate in the trading program. The
polluters may choose to pay a tax exceedence when there are no credits available, or
when searching and buying credits from other parties become difficult and more
expensive for them than having to pay a tax.
Another example is the Grassland Area Farmers Program. This program implements a
cap-and-trade with a fee-and-rebate system. A group of farmers in each district must pay
a fee for any discharges above the regional cap. The groups who maintain the cap below
their allocation will receive a rebate. The fee-and-rebate system ensures that the
distribution of pollution abatement will be fair for all districts. The fee will increase over
time as the cap is reduced during the lifespan of the program. This system generates
incentives for the districts to reduce pollution below their allocation.
The hybrid system may require significant amounts of resources (time, funding, and
staffs) to establish clear program rules that ensure environmental protection, create a
well-fimunctioning market, and establish an appropriate tax rate to stimulate incentives for
reducing pollution. In addition to developing a tradable permit system, additional
information is also needed in order to set up a tax system and a fee-and-rebate system
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Approach 5: Support a pilot program/simulation
A pilot project or simulation should be undertaken for testing the program's principles
and trading rules on a smaller scale to obtain data and experiences before it actually gets
implemented on a larger scale. Program designers encourage performing trading
simulations before developing a pilot program in order to predict the trading results with
different scenarios; e.g. different pollutants, different trading zones, different trading
ratios, and different types of structure (PS/PS, PS/NPS, NPS/NPS).
After the pilot program is successfully implemented, the regulatory agency can then
adjust the total cap and extend the coverage area on a larger scale. If the program fails to
meet any objectives, the regulatory agency can then decide whether or not to discontinue
the program or to find other solutions. The pilot program provides an opportunity to
readjust certain factors the program administrator may not have taken into considerations,
and/or the opportunity to make an adjustment if something just does not quite turn out as
expected or predicted.
It is critical to choose a section of a watershed with an appropriate size that well-
represents the rest of the watershed. A pilot program has to include enough participants
with a diverse group of polluters in order to evaluate the relation to the imparted waters
and pollution trading initiatives. Based on the limited area and unique characteristics
covered by the pilot program, there is a challenge for choosing good representatives of
point sources and nonpoint sources, and scale and scope of the system. Therefore, with
precaution, the program designers in a pilot program should fine-tune conditions to
become the actual size program of a program.
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5.8 What additional research is needed?
Potential trading can be improved through institutional upgrades, technical advances,
better monitoring and shared information, and new technology for trading. Additionally,
better defining the relationship between best management practices, effluent discharges,
and changes in land use will help to reduce uncertainty in measuring and monitoring NPS
pollution, and therefore increase trading performance. Several aspects related to water
pollution trading that need to be researched further include;
* Development of credit quantification tools and approaches to evaluate which
nonpoint sources credit associated with types of best management practices, modeling
and effective monitoring protocols for NPS, will increase the effectiveness of trading
programs.
* Financial assessments (pre/post-trading) of water pollution programs are significantly
in need of further investigation; particularly systematically compared economic
effects for including NPS pollution in WQT programs, and for a hybrid system.
* A clearer understanding of the relationship between numbers of nonpoint sources in
trading programs and scale of markets will help in suggesting a solution to control
NPSs due to the large numbers and diversity of NPSs located in the watershed that
increasingly affect water quality.
* Further investigation into developing trading zones within a watershed. Water quality
modeling should be required to simulate various locational patterns of discharges, and
the outcomes of different zonal boundaries and temporal patterns, to develop a
relationship between ambient water quality and discharge of pollutants from different
combinations of sources in a watershed.
* Investigation of effect of potential flexibility in allowing trading water rights in order
to improve water quality and how to ensure in water quality improvement with this
type of trade. More research about data on the actual improvement of WQ due to
trading.
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Appendix A
Summary Details of Water Quality Trading Programs
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Appendix A-1: Part I Regarding Activity, Type of Participants, Pollutants and
Market Structure
Type of MarketName of Program State Activity Tpat Pollutants MarketParticipants Structure
Grassland Area Farmers1 Grassland Area Farmers CA Watershed TP PS/PS Selenium BilateralTradable Loads Program
2 San Francisco Bay CA Regional offset PS/NPS Mercury N/AMercury Offset Program program
3 Bear Creek Trading CO Watershed TP PS/NPS P Bilateral
Program
4 Boulder Creek Trading CO Watershed TP PS/NPS Ammonia, Sole source offset
Program Temp., pH
Chatfield Reservoir Clearinghouse;5 Tai rorCO Watershed TP PS/NPS P Bilateral; ThirdTrading Program .Party
6 Cherry Creek Trading CO Watershed TP PS/PS, PS/NPS P ClearinghouseProgram
Clear Creek Trading CO Mine clean up Multiple heavy7 CO Watershed TP (PS/NPS) Metal Third Party BrokersProgram (PS/NPS) metals
8 Lake Dillon Trading CO Watershed TP PS/NPS P BilateralProgram
Lower Colorado River Conceptual PS/PS, PS/NPS, Selenium,
9 Selenium and Aquatic CO stages NPS/NPS possibly N/A
Habitat Offset Program habitat
Trading Program10 Tradig Progra CT Wateshed TP PS/PS, PS/NPS N Clearinghouse
Blue Plains WWTP Credit Single trade,11Creation DC,VA offset for 1 PS/PS N N/A
discharger
12 Tampa Bay Cooperative FL Regional N/A N N/ANitrogen Management Cooperation
13 Cargill and Ajinomoto IA NPDES Permit PS/PsAmmonia, N/A
Plants Permit Flexibility Flexibility BOD/DO
Lower Boise River Effluent Bilateral: Third
14 Trading Demonstration ID Watershed TP PS/PS, PS/NPS P Party
Project
15 Illinois Pretreatment IL Pretreatment Pretreatment trade Multiple N/A
Trading Program Program (PS/PS)
Piasa Creek Watershed Watershed16 Pasa Creek Watershed IL projet PS/NPS Sediment Third Party BrokersProject ~~~~~project
Bilateral:
17 Specialty Minerals, Inc. in Offset for 1 PTlea : Town of Adams MA disetafor PS/NPS Temp. Clearinghouse:Town of Adams MA dischargerThrPat Third Party
Offset for 1 N/A, possibly third18 Town of Acton POTW MA Offset for PS/NPS P N/A, possibly thirddischarger party facilitation
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Type of MarketName of Program |State | Activity Papic Pollutants StructureParticipants Structure
19 Wayland Business Center MA Offset for 1 PS/NPS P Third partyTreatment Plant Permit discharger facilitation
20 Charles River MA Watershed PS/NPS Water Flow Clearinghouse:project Third Party
no official offset or21 Edgartown WWTP MA Offset PS/NPS N no official offset ortrade
22 Falmouth WWTP MA Offset PS/NPS N sole source offset
23 Massachusetts Estuaries MA Watershed PS/NPS N N/AProjects MA project
Banking andMaryland Nutrient TradingBaknad24 Maryland Nutrient Trading MD State-wide TP PS/PS, PS/NPS N, P Clearinghouse
concepts
Kalamazoo River Water Clearinghouse;
25 Quality Trading Ml Watershed TP PS/NPS P Third Party
Demonstration
26 Michigan Water Quality Ml State-wide TP PS/PS, PSNPS, N P BilateralTrading Rules NPS/NPS
27 Minnesota River Nutrient MN Watershed TP PS/PS, PS/NPS P N/ATrading Study
28 Rahr Malting Permit MN Offset for 1 PS/NPS P, BOD/DO Sole-source offsetdischarger
Southern Minnesota Beet Sole-source offset
29 Sugar Cooperative Plant MN Oset for PS/NPS P with bilateral
Permit negotiation
Watershed TP
30 Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Multi- (Regional VI, PS/PS, PS/NPS, N P
Trading Program States WV,MD,PA,DE,N NPS/NPS TBD
Y,DC)
Neuse River Nutrient
31 Sensitive Water NC Watershed TP PS/PS, PS/NPS N Clearinghouse
Management Strategy
Tar-Pamlico Nutrient
32 Reduction Trading NC Program PS/PS, PS/NPS N, P Clearinghouse
Program
ePassaic Valley Sewerage |N Offset for 1 Multiple Bilateral; Third33 Commission Effluent NJ discharger PS/PS metals Party
Trading Program
Truckee River WaterFlwNP Flow, N, P,34 Rights and Offset Offset for I PS/NPS TSS.TDS, Bilateral
New York City Watershed
35 Phosphorus Offset Pilot NY Regional TP PS/NPS P Bilateral
Programs
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Type of ~~~MarketName of Program State Activity Type of Pollutants MarketParticipants Structure
36 Clermont County Project OH Watershed TP PS/NPS P N/A
Great Miami River Watershed
37 Watershed Water Quality OH t PS/NPS NP Third Party
Trading Pilot Program
Pennsylvania Water- N, P,
38 Based Trading PA Watershed TP PS/PS, PS/NPS TSS/TDS, N/A
Simulations NH3
ClearinghouseConestoga River NutrientClaigos39 Conestoga River Nutrient PA Watershed TP PS/NPS N,P (trading registry
and credit bank)
Pennsylvania Multi-media Simulation State PS/PS, PS/NPS, CBOD, PN,40 PASS, NH3, bilateral (likely)Trading Registry PA Wide project NPS/NPS Ai, metals
Acid, metals
Henry County Public
41 Service Authority and City VA Single trade PS/PS TSS, TDS N/A
of Martinsville Agreement
Virginia Water Quality
42 Improvement Act and VA State-wide TP PS/PS, PS/NPS N, P N/A
Tributary Strategy
43 West Virginia Trading WV State-wide TP PS/PS, PS/NPS N, P N/AFramework
Wisconsin Effluent
44 Trading Rule WI State-wide TP PS/PS, PS/NPS P N/A
Development
Fox-Wolf Basin
45 Watershed Pilot Trading Wl Watershed TP PS/PS, PS/NPS P Clearinghouse;
Program ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Third PartyProgram
46 Red Cedar River Pilot Wl Watershed TP PS/NPS P BilateralTrading Program
Rock River Basin Pilot WatershedTP S/ Bilateral: Third
Trading Program WI Watershed TP Party
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Appendix A-2: Part II Regarding Size of Watershed, Number of PS, Trading Ratio,
Number of Trade, and Characteristics of Participants
Name ofPrSize of Number Trading Number Characteristics of
Name of Program Watershed of PS Ratio of Trade Participants
1 Grassland Area Farmers 97000 acres 7 1:1, 39 7 Irrigation and AgriculturalTradable Loads Program 97,000retroactive Drainage Districts
2 San Francisco Bay N/A 33 3:1 0 20 POTWs and 13 industrialMercury Offset Program dischargers
3 Bear Creek Trading 83,700 acres 17 1:1 1 6 POTWs and 7 industrial
Program dischargers
Boulder Creek Trading 286, 642 N/A One time The City of Boulder and4 IAoffsetProgram acres agreement nonpoint sources
agreement
_Chatfield Reservoir 19mil6 POTWs and 1 industrial
5 Chatfield Reservoir 1.92 million 7 2:1 or less 1 discharger and nonpoint
Trading Program acres
6 Cherry Creek Trading 243,000 acres 6 1.3:1 to 3:1 3 6 WWTPs and nonpointProgram sources
Clear Creek Trading N/A N/A N/A 1 N/A
Program
2'12:1 4 POTWs, several miner
8 Lake Dillon Trading 3,200 acres 4 (PS:NPS), 3 4WTP, and nonpointProgram 1:1 sources
(NPS:NPS)
Lower Colorado River
9 Selenium and Aquatic N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A
Habitat Offset Program
10 Long Island Sound 3.5 million 79 N/A 63 79 PS (mostly POTWs) and
Trading Program acres nonpoint sources
11 Blue Plains WWTP N/A>2 1:1 Several POTWs, the Blue
Credit Creation Plain WWTPs
24 consortium members (9Tampa Bay Cooperative 1.4 million 2 osrimmmes(12 T ampa Bay Cooperative 1.4 million N/A N/A 0 private sectors, 3 counties, 3
~~~Nitrogen Management acres ~cities, 3 regulatory agencies)
13 Cargill and Ajinomoto N/A 2 1:1 0 2 industrial plantsPlants Permit Flexibility
Lower Boise River 3 type f 7 POTWs, 3 industrial
14 Effluent Trading 41,000 acres 18 ratios 0 dischargers, 8 irrigation
Demonstration Project districts
Illinois Pretreatment N/A 0 45 POTWs and hundreds of
15 Trading Program N/A>100 P significant industrial users
Piasa Creek Watershed 7,0ace 11:One time Landowners, City of Alton,
16 Project 78,000 acres 1 1.5:1 offset IEPA
agreement
One time Specialty Mineral, the Town
17 Specialty Minerals, Inc. 2.2 miles of 1 2:1 offset of Adams, envi groups, the
in Town of Adams channels agreement Army Crop of Engineers,
USEPA, MEPA
The Town of Acton, USEPA,18 Town of Acton POTW 241,280 acres 1 3:1 0MEPA, nonpoint sourcesMEPA, nonpoint sources
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Size of Number Trading Number Characteristics of
Name of Program Watershed of PS Ratio of Trade Participants
Wayland Business 28 IOne time The Wayland Business
19 Center Treatment Plant r mile ong N/A 3:1 offset Center, 25 property owners,
Permit ver agreement the town of Wayland
WWTPs, stormwater
20 Charles River 197,000 acres N/A 2:1 - 2.5:1 0 systems, residential andindustrial developments,
water supplies, municipalities
One time
21 Edgartown WWTP 5,150 acres N/A N/A offset N/A
agreement
One time Sewering 400 properties
One time waste of Route 28, installing
22 Falmouth WWTP N/A N/A 1:1 offset waste of Route 28, installing
onsite denitrification systems
agreement east of Route 28
23 Massachusetts Estuaries N/A N/A N/A 0 N/AProjects
24 Maryland Nutrient N/A N/A 2:1 0 N/ATrading Policy
Kalamazoo River Water 1.28 million 2:1-4:1 50 PSs(POTW, paper
25 Quality Trading acres 50 PS:NPS,1:1 0and many NPS
DemonstrationaPS:P companies) and many NPSDemonstration PS:PS
26 Michigan Water Quality N/A N/A N/A 0 N/ATrading Rules
27 Minnesota River Nutrient 10.9 million 212 3:1 0 212 point sources and a
Trading Study acres number of nonpoint sources
2:1 (8
10.7 million CBODIP Onetime Rahr Malting plant and 3
28 Rahr Malting Permit 1rs I cross offset nonpointsouresa~~~~~~cross ff et e t sources
2 aparameter agreement
ratio
Southern Minnesota 107 ilOne time Southern Minnesota Beet
29 Beet Sugar Cooperative 1. 1 2.6:1 offset Sugar Cooperative and
Plant Permit acres agreement multiple farmers
Chesapeake Bay 40 members of negotiation
30 Nutrient Trading N/A N/A N/A 0 team
Program
Neuse River Nutrient 3.96 million
31 Sensitive Water acres 22 2:1 0 22 PSs and many NPSs
Management Strategy
Tar-Pamlico Nutrient .88 million 16 members of the Tar-
32 Reduction Trading 28 16 2:1 0 Pamlico Association and
Program acres NPSs
Passaic Valley 260 PSs (Industrial users and
33 Sewerage Commission 534,000 acres 260 5:4 2 POTW)
Effluent Trading Program
Truckee River Water -1.4 million
34 Rights and Offset acres N/A 1:1 33 The city, 3 PSs, many NPSs
Program
New York City 1.26 million
35 Watershed Phosphorus acres>100 3:1 1 100+ WWTPs, many NPSs
Offset Pilot Programs
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Size of Number Trading Number Characteristics of
Name of Program Watershed of PS Ratio of Trade Participants
36 Clermont C:ounty Project 320,000 4 N/A 0 4 major point sources
acres
Great Miami River 2 56 million 314 PSs with NPDES permits
37 Watershed Water Qaulity 314 1:1 - 2:1 0 and upstream agricultural
Trading Pilot Program acres producers
Pennsylvania Water-
38 Based Trading N/A N/A 1.1:1 0 POTWs, landowners
Simulations
39 Conestoga River N/A N/A N/A0 Many parties, PSs and NPSs,
Nutrient Pilot -1,250 small farms
40 Pennsylvania Multi- N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A
media Trading Registry
Henry County Public Two POTWs from
41 Service Authority and N/A N/A 1:1 0 neighboring municipalCity of Martinsville jurisdiction
Agreement
Virginia Water Quality
42 Improvement Act and N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A
Tributary Strategy
43 West Virginia Trading N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A
Framework
Wisconsin Effluent
44 Trading Rule N/A N/A 2:1 0 N/A
Development
Fox-Wolf Basin 4.1 million
45 Watershed Pilot Trading 100 2:1 - 10:1 0 -100 PSs, many NPSs
Program acres
46 Red Cedar River Pilot 1.92 million 18 2:1 22 each 18 PSs, many NPSs
Trading Program acres year
1.1-1.5:1
Rock River Basin Pilot 1.15 million PS- -60 participants, 24 are47 ~~~~~~~~~~24 PS;1.75:1- 60 pa~rtipns,2arTrading Program acres 3.61 PS-POTWs
3.6:1 PS -NPS
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Appendix A-3: Part III Regarding TMDL in the Program and Cost-Saving
Name of Program TMDL Cost-saving Ref.*
Grassland Area Many trades exchanged in-kind of service. Cost (1),(2)
1 Farmers Tradable no relation saving is difficult to be estimated, - $14,320 (3) (4) (5)
Loads Program changed hand during the first five years.
2 San Francisco Bay coordination N/A (2), (3)Mercury Offset Program
Bear Creek Tr ding control Forest Hills saved the cost of system replacement
3 rr regulation over $1.2 million, instead it has to pay -$5,000 (2), (3)
per year for offsetting discharges
Boulder Cr ek Trading control The City saved $3-7 million by deferring full
4 r regulation itrification modification, although it needed to (2), (3)Program regulation ugaeisW T
upgrade its WWTP
Chatfield Reservoir control (2), (3)
Trading Program regulation N
Cherry Creek T ading control NPS projects (pond retrofit) can generate credits
6 Program regulation worth $456,000, with the cost of the project (2), (3)
$400,000.
Clear Creek Trading N/A The ASARCO agreed to pay a clean up cost of (2), (3)
Program -50,000
Lake Dillon Tradin. Trading could reduce an estimate cost o (2), (3),
8 Lake Dilon Trading N/A maintaining WQ of over 1.5 million dollar annually (6), (7),
Program9~~~~~ by about a half. (8), (9)
Lower Colorado River
9 Selenium and Aquatic no relation N/A (2)
Habitat Offset Program
control ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(2), (3),Long Island Sound control ()()
10 Trading Program uo Nearly 200$ million over 15 years (10),(16),
Trading Program regulation(17)
Blue Plains WWTP With the same money to reduce million lb of N
11Credit Creation no relation in 2years, result of trading can reduce 6 million lb (2), (3)
in 2 years
12 Tampa Bay Cooperative not required The consortium's action may help avoid TMLD (2), (3)
Nitrogen Management ntrqie costs and legal and administrative costs
Cargill and Ajinom oto tN/A, Offset trading between two neighboring (3)
13 Plants Pemit Flexibilt no relation industrial plants meets effluent limits jointly.
Lower Boise River codntn Expected cost-savings are 10-158 $/lb of P (2), (3)
14 Effluent Trading coordination reduced(2), (3)
Demonstration Project
15 Illinois Pretreatment coordination - 6.9 million if able to trade federal categorical (2), (3)
Trading Program pretreatment limits
no relation, -3.25 million, Illinois American Water Company
16 Piasa Creek Watershed related to avoided capital, operation and maintenance costs (2)
roject NPDES associated with lagoon and landfill system
17 Specialty Minerals, Inc. control avoid estimated capital cost of $300,000 and
17 in Town of Adams regulation reduced amount of money that company has to (2), (3)in Town of Ads regulpay to the Town
18 Town of Acton POTW control Acton residents save - $2.25 million annually (2), (3)
regulation
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Name of Program TMDL Cost-saving Ref.*
Wayland Business
19 Center Treatment Plant no relation - $ 937,000 (2), (3)
Permit
20 Charles River In N/A(2)development
21 Edgartown WWTP no relation N/A (2)
22 Falmouth'V WWTP no relation N/A (2)
23 Massachusetts no relation Provide roadmap for trading and watershed-wide (2)
Estuaries Projects permitting
24 Maryland Nutrient under N/A (2), (3)Trading Policy development
Kalamazoo River Water under
25 Quality Trading development N/A (2), (3)
Demonstration
26 Michigan Water Quality coordination saving 10-20$/lb of P reduced (2), (3)Trading Rules
27 Minnesota River control saving 18 $/lb for PS alone, to 4-5 $/lb for the (2) (3)
Nutrient Trading Study regulation combination of subsidies for NPS BMP(3)
. . Mat econtrol savings in WWT costs and avoid uncertainty (2), (3),
28 Rahr Malting Permit regulation regarding industrial user fees to POTW (11)
Southern Minnesota control (2) (3),
29 Beet Sugar Cooperative (2)o N/A (1 )Plant Permit regulation (11)Plant Permit
Chesapeake Bay d
30 Nutrient Trading n Depending on each state's trading rules (2), (3)30 Nutient di gdevelopment
Program
Neuse River Nutrient control Estimated cost of control 25-30$/lb but the offset (2), (3),
31 Sensitive Water regulation rate is 11 $/lb (13)
Management Strategy regulation rate is 11 /lb (13)
Tar-Pamlico Nutrient control The offset rate is at $29/lb while cost for at-the- (2), (3),
32 Reduction'Trading regulation plant control were estimated to be 55-65$/lb (12)
Program
Passaic ValleyPassaic Vamsley nN/A, Buyers are able to avoid non-compliance
33 Effluent Trading no relation fines, whereas sellers generate revenues from (2), (3),
Proguen Tra ing sale of excess reductions (18)Program
Truckee River Water N34 control(2,3)34 Rights and Offset regulation N/A (153)
Program
New York City under N/A, A pilot program to allow new or expanding (3
35 Watershed Phosphorus development WWTP to obtain offsets () Offset Pilot Programs
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Name of Program TMDL Cost-saving Ref.*
36 Clermont County no relation N/A (2), (3)Project
Great Miami River
Watershed Water control
37 Quality Trading Pilot control $314-384 millions over 20 years period (2)uality Trading Pilot regulation
Program
Pennsylvania Water- rlThese water meet all applicable standards and no (2), (3)
38 Based Trading no relation TMDL is planed
Simulations
Conestoga River control N/A (2)
Nutrient Pilot regulation
Pennsylvania Multi- under40 N(2)media Trading Registry development N/A
Henry County Public N/A, The trade can be seen as facilitating
41 Service Authority and no relation economic growth in the area (2), (3)City of Martinsville
Agreement
Virginia Water Quality under
42 Improvement Act and N/A (2), (3)
Tributary Strategy development
43 West Virginia Trading control N/A (2)
Framework regulation
Wisconsin Effluent control
44 Trading Rule regulation N/A(2), (3)
Development
Fox-Wolf Basin under
45 Watershed Pilot Trading development Expected cost-savings are $47 /lb of P reduced (2),(3)
Program
46 Red Cedar River Pilot under The trading saved Cumberland approximately (2) (3)
46 Trading Program development $15,000 in 1998 
Rock River Basin Pilot under N/A (2)(3)
47 N Program development(3)Trading Progra  development N/
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Appendix A-4: Summary of Analysis Results from Appendix A-1, A-2, A-3
Table A4.1 Type of Trading vs. Number of Program
Type of trade Number of Programs
PS/PS only 5.
PS/NPS only 22
NPS/NPS 1
PS/PS and PS/NPS 14
PS/NPS and NPS/NPS 1
All possibility 3
N/A 1
Table A4.2 Program Structure vs. Number of Program
Program Structure Number of Programs
Watershed TP 19
Offset for 1 discharger/projects 11
State-wide TP 6
Pretreatment 2
NPDES flexible permit 1
Regulatory Offset /WNVatershed Project/Conceptual Stage 8
Table A4.3 Pollutants vs. Number of Program
Pollutant Number of Programs
Nutrient (both N and P) 11
N only 7
P only 16
TSS/TDS 3
NH3 4
Temp. 3
pH 1
BOD/DO 3
Multiple metals 3
Flows 2
Mercury 1
Selenium 2
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Table A4.4 Market Structure vs. Number of Program
Market Structure Number of Programs
Bilateral 7
Clearinghouse 6
Third party broker 3
Sole source offset 4
More than 1 Structure 8
N/A 19
Table A4.5 Area of Watershed vs. Number of Programs
Size of Watershed (acres) Number of Programs tNumber of Programs withActive Trades
<100,000 6 2
100,000<Size 1000,000 7 5
>1,000,000 15 7
N/A 19 N/A
Table A4.6 Number of Point Sources vs. Number of Program
Number of PS Number of Programs Number of Programs with
~~~~~~Number of Progra s tNumber of PS NumberofProgrActive Trades
<10 13 9
10 O<PS<50 7 2
>50 8 3
N/A 19 N/A
Table A4.7 Number of Trade Occurred in the Program vs. Number of Programs
Number of Trade Number of Programs
1 12
1< N <10 3
>10 4
no trade 28
Note: Data in the following tables correspond to Figures in Chapter 3, i.e. Data from table A4.1 is
presented in Figure 3.2, table A4.2 is presented in Figure 3.3
table A4.3 is presented in Figure 3.4, table A4.4 is presented in Figure 3.5
table A4.5 is presented in Figure 3.6, table A4.6 is presented in Figure 3.7
and table A4.7 is presented in Figure 3.8
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B.1 Tar-Pamlico Trading Program (NC)
Program Drivers
In the late 1980's, increase in algal blooms and killing fish in the upper Pamlico estuary
were linked as a cause for the excessive nutrient levels in the Tar-Pamlico River. These
conditions led the North Carolina State Environment Management Commission (EMC) to
designate the entire Tar-Pamlico River basin as having Nutrient Sensitive Water (NSW)
in 1989. This is a regulatory driver which designated a requirement of the state to develop
a nutrient management strategy for the basin. The strategy was a major drive for a trading
initiation. The state allowed a group of dischargers (primarily wastewater treatment
plants) to form an association. In 1989, the State, the dischargers' Association, and the
environmental groups signed an agreement marking the initial phase of the nutrient
trading program. The Association agreed to either reduce their nutrient loading to the
estuary or, if they exceeded an annual collective loading cap, to fund agricultural Best
Management Practices (BMPs) through the state's existing Agriculture Cost-Share
Program up to 75% of the costs of installing BMPs. In 1995, a TMDL for the Tar-
Pamlico River was developed and approved for nitrogen and phosphorus. The trading
program is one element of the implemented strategy of Tar-Pamlico nutrient TMDL
(North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resource 2003).
Characteristics of watershed/locations of participants
The Tar-Pamlico Basin encompasses 11,650 km2. The nonpoint sources account for 83%
of nutrient loads in the basin(Gannon 2003). As of 1989, there are approximately 875
hog, chicken, dairy, and turkey operations in the basin. Of the point source dischargers in
the basin, seven are major municipal, twelve are minor municipal, two are major
industrial and 127 are non municipal. The 15-member Association comprised about 94%
of the point source discharge (Gannon 2003; Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
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Permits
North Carolina officials assigned an aggregate nutrient cap to the Association. Instead of
requiring nutrient controls through the conventional permit process, state regulators
established a legal obligation to meet the cap through an alternative contractual
arrangement. The alternative legal agreement assigned to the association a fixed number
of nutrient allowances and established enforceable financial penalties if aggregate
discharge exceeded the allowance cap. However, the Association does not have a group
permit. Each discharger has a NPDES permit. The Association members' permits did not
include the limits for nitrogen and phosphorus because the Association had a legally
agreement with the North Carolina Division of Water Quality (NCDWQ) and the
USEPA. Individual Association members' nutrient limits were waived since they were
subject to a collective cap. Non-association point sources dischargers were subject to
separate limits(North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resource 2003).
The Association was responsible for allocating allowances among its members in a way
that, as a whole, the total discharge does not exceed the cap. Once members received
their allowances, they could freely reallocate allowance among themselves under the
association's internal exchange rules (Shabman 2002).
Trading Framework
The Tar-Pamlico Trading Program is divided into 3 phases. The Association framework
gives point source discharges flexibility to find cost-effective ways to reduce collective
nutrient discharge and meet the cap. In phase I (1991-1994) PS dischargers formed an
association to meet a collective and declining cap for nutrients. The association members
can trade among themselves to meet the collective cap or fund NPS controls if the
association exceeds the collective cap. In phase 2 (1995-2004) the collective cap
changed from a declining to a steady cap. Phase 2 also sets NPS reduction requirements.
The TMDL required a 30% nutrient reduction from agriculture and stormwater. Phase 3
(2005-2014) maintains the steady cap principle and will target agricultural nonpoint
sources controls.
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The structure of the program is considered to be a hybrid system because it is a
combination of a credit trading system and an incentive fee system. The program
structure is likely characterized as an exceedence tax on an association of point sources,
in which the proceeds are applied to more cost-effective NPS controls like BMPs
(NCDENR 2001). If the Association exceeds the nutrient cap, it must find nutrient
reduction BMPs by making payment to the NC Cost-Share program. The Cost-Share
program pays farmers up to 75% of the cost of installing BMPs (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et
al. 2004).The market structure of the program operates like a clearinghouse as the Cost-
Share program breaks the connection between buyers and sellers and delivers credits at a
uniform price (Woodward and Kaiser 2002).
The program cannot be considered as a cap-and-trade system because the regulator does
not give out the definite number of permit as an absolute tradable right. The point sources
do not receive individual allocations. The program works as collective-to-collective
trading, not individual-to-individual trading. The regulator sets a cap on pollution, and
permits are handed out to the Association's group cap. This feature gives the Association
flexibility in distributing the cap and setting rules to achieve equity among its members.
At the end of the year, end-of-pipe mass loads are then totaled and based on effluent
monitoring at all facilities. Individuals have to pay a 'surcharge' for exceeding individual
load at the pre-set rate. The fees are used to fund the Cost-Share program. The offset rate
is based on cost-effectiveness calculation for assumed nutrient BMPs based on research
values. Within this kind of program setting, there is no safety factor for individual
facilities and there is potential to cause local problems. Therefore, the Division of Water
Quality (DWQ) reserves the right to require nutrient controls if localized water quality
problems developed by a facility (Gannon 2003).
By allowing the facilities to operate within a "bubble", they then have the flexibility to
achieve reductions in a more cost-effective manner. However, the Tar-Pamlico program
is not trading in the standard sense where any dischargers can buy credits from another
discharger to achieve excess reductions. There is no market or individual exchange.
Agricultural nonpoint sources are not obligated to participate in the program, but rather
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they participate voluntarily through the Cost-Share program, centrally managed by the
state. In the Tar-Pamlico program, there are 2 types of trading, informal trading within
the Association, and the point/nonpoint trading. The Association has an informal point-
point source trading within itself to achieve equity for relative loading differences.
Among point sources, members agree to install nutrient removal as they expand and
consider excess load surcharge to achieve equity. In the point/nonpoint trading, the
dischargers pay an offset fee for each mass unit of pollutant by which they, as a group,
exceed a cap each year, such as a load exceedence tax. In the Tar Pamlico Trading
Program, the point/nonpoint arrangement is not really trading. The Tar-Pamlico Program
establishes responsibility as a group level as opposed to an individual level where there is
no individual polluter-level transaction. There are no market or individual exchanges. It is
centrally managed by the state. By this means, the transaction costs and administrative
costs are reduced.
Achievement
The program is considered a success because the Association has accomplished a
significant reduction in nutrient loading despite increases in flows. With a trading
approach, pollution reduction abatements now costs less than it would have in
comparison with applying uniform technology-based requirements on all of its facilities.
Due to optimizing plant performance for nitrogen and phosphorus, combined with
installation of biological nutrient removal at a couple of the larger facilities as they
underwent expansion, it yielded sufficient reductions for the Association to stay beneath
its cap each year despite increase in flow (Gannon 2003), as shown in Fig A. 1.
Environmental and economic benefits can be seen. In 1991-2003, total nutrient loading
declined 33% while flow increased 48%. In Tar River, estimated total nitrogen
concentration decreased about 0.20 mg/l from 1991-2002 or 18% (Gannon 2003). Net
cost of the program was less than $2 million, compared to the estimated cost of command
and control approach of 50 to 100 million dollars(Gannon 2003). The loading reduction
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has been achieved mostly through the bubble approach which set a collective cap for
dischargers, allowing informal PS/PS trading; despite little PSINPS trading occurring.
Figure A.l Point Source Association N+P Loads 1991 through 2002 vs. Caps,
Tar-Pamlico River Basin, NC.
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There are no documented results of trades or transactions among the association
members. The association has paid no incentive fee to date. The only activity is the
"banking of credits" as a result of minimum paYments made by the association as a
requirement of the Phase I and Phase II agreements. The minimum fee and federal grants
were used as a source of funding for agricultural BMPs for the total amount of $850,000.
Using an incentive fee to estimate environmental benefits, the association funded-BMPs
expected to reduce nitrogen loading by 22,660 kg/Yr. The association can then use the
credits to offset any loading above their cap for al O-year period since 1995 (NCDENR
1994).
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Several important characteristics of the program made the Tar-Pamlico Trading Program
one of the most successful trading programs in the U.S. First, by allowing group permits,
it increased flexibility in meeting the cap with lower transaction costs. Second, the
Association agreed to pay up-front funding to support the development of estuary
modeling and to make minimum payments for administering and implementing BMPs
(NCDENR 1994). The state created a clearinghouse to generate credits to sell at uniform
price. Third, by progressively increasing regulatory requirement, the program was
divided into many phases to gradually include nonpoint source responsibility with the
programs. Forth, the Association group of WWTPs comprised 94% of permitted
discharge flows in the Basin (Gannon 2003). Since the majority of point source polluters
are included in collective cap in the trading program. The Association can now internally
manage its members to reduce aggregated cap cost-effectively.
Implementation and Monitoring Issues
The system is designed to be collective-to-collective trading. After each year, end-of-pipe
mass loads (based on effluent monitoring at all facilities) are totaled. If they exceed either
cap, they pay at the pre-set rate $29/kg. The funds then go to the Cost-Share
program. Funds are tagged and tracked for nutrient BMPs in the Tar basin. The offset rate
is based on cost-effectiveness calculations for these BMPs.
Point source dischargers do weekly sampling and annual reporting to DEM. Nonpoint
source programs are reviewed every 5 years by DSWC. Once point sources have
purchased credits, they are no longer liable. The state assumes responsibility for
monitoring and verification of BMPs. The program inspects at least 5% but not all of the
BMPs that generate nonpoint source credits. The cost share fund must be returned when
nonpoint sources are in noncompliance. The State does not currently conduct any
instream monitoring next to agricultural fields; specifically with regards to checking the
accuracy of assumptions that went into the cost-effectiveness number. Point source loads
are based on actual water monitoring, while nonpoint source load reductions are assumed
based on research values (Gannon 2003).
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B.2 Lake Dillon Trading Program (CO)
Program Drivers
Regulatory drivers for the trading are the NPDES permit program, TMDL and Dillon
Reservoir Control Regulation. A maximum load analysis was conducted in 1982, and a
cap was placed on the total phosphorus loads from point sources that could enter Lake
Dillon. The responsibility to meet the cap was distributed between the point sources in
the region, primarily to four municipal wastewater treatment plants through modifications
in the point sources' NPDES permits.
The Dillon Reservoir Control Regulation adopted in 1984, aimed to maintain water
quality at 1982 levels. The EPA approved a TMDL for phosphorus at the Dillon
Reservoir in 1997. The regulation requires a state-local partnership to control both point
sources and nonpoint sources of phosphorus in the Lake Dillon watershed. Based on
economic analysis, the point sources could cut their average annual costs for phosphorus
reductions by about 50% if they funded nonpoint source reduction instead of plant
upgrade (Jarvie and Solomon 1998).
Characteristics of the Program
In the early 1980s, there was growing concern about the water quality in Lake Dillon.
The Lake Dillon Trading Program was established and was the second oldest effluent
trading program in the nation (Woodward 2003).The Dillon reservoir covers 3,220 acres
(NWCCOG 2002). Four municipal wastewater treatment plants discharge into Lake
Dillon and these are primary point sources. Approximately, 1,000 individual septic
systems of vacation properties and a primary residences are the primary nonpoint sources
of phosphorus, followed by urban runoff (NWCCOG 2002). The contribution to the total
phosphorus load from privately owned septic tanks nearly doubled. Their impact will
increase given projected growth expected in areas not currently served by treatment plant
(Chen 2002). In 2002, the Northwest Colorado Council of Governments affirmed that
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"nutrient enrichment due to phosphorus loading from nonpoint sources" has become "the
principle concern in the Dillon reservoir" (p.B-18) (NWCCOG 2002).
Trading Structure
Market structure at Lake Dillon is bilateral negotiation. The program has a point/nonpoint
and nonpoint/nonpoint trades. It prohibits the point/point trading and banking of nonpoint
source credits for future use. Point sources are held responsible for the compliance of all
trades. Point sources are held in violation of its NPDES limits if nonpoint sources are not
in compliance.
The program sets a 2:1 trading ratio between point sources and nonpoint sources and a
1:1 trading ratio between nonpoint sources. Additionally, a 2:1 trading ratio is imposed
requiring two pounds of phosphorus reduction for each credit to be used by a point source
effectively raising the price of trades and diminishing demand.
On the other hand, one feature of the Dillon program greatly facilitates trading. Nonpoint
pollution in the region is generated primarily by privately own septic or Individual
Sewage Disposal Systems (ISDSs). It was estimated that ISDSs generate an annual
average of 200-250 grams per person, or approximately one pound per home (Woodward
2003).The one pound per home standard became a basis on which trading could easily
proceed, greatly reducing transaction costs when a trading opportunity became available
(Woodward 2003).
There are many steps involved in organizations to be eligible for trading and credit
approval process. The trades are approved by the Commission; however, to receive the
credit, the point sources need to send the application to the Division to obtain NPDES
permit adjustment. Credits are incorporated into point source permits only after local
governments adopt regulations addressing the phosphorus contribution of the nonpoint
sources (Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment 2003).
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Achievement
Despite being allowed since 1984, up until 1999 trade did not take place under the Lake
Dillon trading program. The absence of trades can be attributed to two factors; (1)
absence of demand, and (2) some of the restrictions imposed on the program were
counterproductive. In the early 1980s, water treatment plant facilities were upgraded to
reduce loads far below the caps, effectively eliminating demand in the market.
Phosphorus loads from point sources dropped by 86% between 1981 to 1991 (Breetz,
Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004). Although point source discharges have fallen sharply,
nonpoint source loads have risen as a result of more development within the community.
Loads from these systems are predicted to increase by more than threefold when region
are fully developed. Since investment in credits for future sales is not possible, as long as
the point sources are below their caps, demand for credits generated by nonpoint source
reductions will be limited.
Secondly, the restriction of the Lake Dillon trading program does not allow banking the
credit for future use. While a point source can increase its own NPDES by reducing
nonpoint source pollution, once credits are recognized they are incorporated into that
point source's discharge permit and can no longer be transferred to other sources
(Woodward 2003).
Unique Characteristics
In 1997, a point source began seeking credits from nonpoint source reductions for the
first time. A point source Copper Mountain ski resort plans to develop the base area,
which would include lodging, restaurants and other services, 1,000 residential units, and
80,000 square feet of commercial space. The expansion is expected to lead to violation of
Copper Mountain's NPDES permit by 40 lbs, even after upgrading the plant. The
expansion plan created the demand for phosphorus credits which did not exist during the
trading programs' first sixteen years (Woodward 2003). Because the rules did not allow
trading between point sources which were generating phosphorus far below their
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permitted levels, the only option available was to identify nonpoint source reductions that
would qualify for trading.
After considering various options, Copper Mountain made an agreement with the Frisco
Sanitation District. Copper Mountain offered to pay the homeowners $6,000 system
investment fee in Frisco's service area which included the cost of connecting their
residence to the Frisco plant. To compensate the 40 lb increase in Copper Mountain's
phosphorus load, a total of 80 homes had to be connected to the municipal sewage
system. Based on the one-pound-per-home standard and taking into account the 2:1
trading ratio, the project would reduce Copper Mountain's cost to under $500,000, saving
$1.5 million (Woodward 2003). The uniqueness of the program is that the nonpoint
sources are uniformed source. The homeowner needs only to connect to the service line
to generate credits. The credit is clearly defined: one homeowner/one credit.
The project was completed in 1999 and the expansion in Copper Mountain's phosphorus
permit was granted, thereby completing the first trade in the nearly twenty year-old Lake
Dillon program. The benefits from trading are clearly financial and also appear to have
led to environmental gains because of the 2:1 trading ratio. The trade probably generated
phosphorus reductions in excess of what was predicted. In September 2003, the
Commission updated the regulation to reflect a 13-lb increase in Copper Mountain's load
allocation, which the plant had earned by adding an additional 26 homes to the sewer
system in Frisco's service area (Woodward 2003).
Program Obstacles
The limited demand for credits is a major barrier of the program. Because the point
sources want to upgrade rather than buy credit, by they are still below the cap. Therefore,
since treatment plants in the watershed found affordable way to reduce phosphorus
discharges, opportunities for point/nonpoint trades have not been nearly as numerous as
was originally anticipated.
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The program prohibits point sources from trading surplus pollution allowances and has
no provision that allows for banking of credits for future sale. The regulators in the
program believe that the right to pollute is not a commodity that can be freely traded
between polluters. If a source seeks to expand its pollution, it must compensate the public
(in this case through nonpoint source reductions) rather than compensating other sources
(Woodward 2003). Together these features diminish incentives for point sources to abate
phosphorus, either by upgrading within their own plants or by early reductions in advance
of trades.
B.3 Long Island Sound Nitrogen Trading Program (CT)
Background of the Program
The Long Island Sound watershed comprises the entire Connecticut coastline and
portions of New York's coast. Due to excess nitrogen discharge from WWTP, it caused
hypoxia conditions and algal blooms in Long Island Sound. The bulk of the Long Island
Sound's watershed is in Connecticut. Only Connecticut is part of the trading program.
The area is approximately 3.5 million acres. The point sources are major sources of
nutrient discharges. Nonpoint sources of nitrogen to the Sound include atmospheric
deposition of automobile emission and stromwater runoff form urban and residential
areas.
Program Driver
Under the CWA, municipal water treatment plants must reduce the annual loadings of
total nitrogen to meet a statewide aggregate target as established in the TMDL. The 1990
nitrogen level becomes the first cap. The 58.5% N discharge reduction reflected in the
TMDL and WLA's becomes the final cap in 2014 (NCAB 2003). Annual reduction limits
will be established through the issuance of a 'Watershed Permit' to the state under the
NPDES program and general permit authority of the State. The permit will establish the
total nitrogen limits to the Sound and will be reduced each year from 2000 through 2014
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until the state reduction goal is achieved. The individual point sources (sub-discharges) in
the permit will be reduced by their proportional share of the annual percentage reduction.
The permit will include only nitrogen limits and related monitoring and reporting
requirements, all other discharge requirements will remain in the sources NPDES permit
(NCAB 2003).
The State passed a rule (Public Act 01-180) which created the authority for a general
permit, established a Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board, and provided an alternate
compliance program. The General Permit forms the backbone of the trading program in
CT, as all sewage treatment plants fall under a single general permit. Connecticut's
General Permit for Nitrogen Discharges in the Long Island sound reflects annual limits
established in the TMDL. Facilities that discharge less total nitrogen than a permit allows
receive credits for nitrogen removal. The credits are bought and sold annually through the
Credit Exchange Program.
TMDL was approved in 2001 to achieve DO standard. TMDL is based on improving
water quality at the end point, estuary. The TMDL sets transport factors for each point
source. Water quality equivalence parameters are only established at endpoint. Nitrogen
is targeted as a limiting factor causing algal blooms. A cap for total nitrogen (TN) is set
(decreasing over 15 year period) for allocation to point sources annually in TN
pounds/day. The initial loading to Long Island Sound from all municipalities combined in
TMDL is 48,709 lbs/day in 2000. In 2014, the TMDL will require loadings from all
municipalities combined to be reduced to 17,774 lbs/day. Each facility was allocated a
percentage of a statewide TMDL loading equal to their percentage contribution to the
statewide current discharge flow rate. All WWTPs have individual TN allocations based
on their percentage of the total load, and equivalency factor which relate to the plant's
distance to the endpoint.
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Unique Characteristics
The General Permit, which took effect in 2002, acts as an umbrella for WWTPs nitrogen
requirement. It replaces the need for separate and complex permits for each WWTP
nitrogen requirement. The General Permit outlines the requirements to buy or sell credits
based on the WWTP's equalized nitrogen loading. The General Permits set annual
nitrogen limits for each WWTP below its TMDL waste load allocation to ensure TMDL
compliance.
There are 79 WWTPs participating in the trading program. The 79 treatment plants are all
subject to the Nitrogen Exchange Program, and do not have to undertake any additional
application process to complete a trade besides the procedures required under the General
Permit (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
There is no nonpoint sources involvement in trading. Nitrogen removal from nonpoint
sources is currently considered more expensive than point sources. TMDL does specify a
goal of 10% NPS nitrogen reduction. It is interesting that cost of NPS control in the Long
Island Sound have proven to be much more costly than point source controls (p.85)
(Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004). The purchase of point source credits to offset NPS
reduction is unlikely to happen, due to the high cost of removing N from NPS in the
sounds, the limited force of the regulations, and the impracticality of monitoring their
reductions.
The federal Clean Water Fund (CWF) is a critical resource for a system of state-revolving
loans and grants, which fund the construction for nitrogen removal upgrades for certain
WWTPs. These upgrades are necessary to meet the decreasing nitrogen loading caps.
Trading allows more flexible and efficient use of these funds. To meet the program
nitrogen targets, both CFW availability and trading approach are necessary.
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The program accomplishment is through point source reductions with minimal reliance
on NPS reduction via trading, and utilizes the Clean Water Fund (CWF) as the
mechanism to finance the construction of municipal nitrogen reductions.
Trading Framework
Plants receive nitrogen credits in any amount for their discharge limit if the General
Permit exceeds their actual discharges. The CTDEP adjusts nitrogen credits using an
"equivalent factor" to account for the locations of treatment plants and their varied
impact on the Sound. The equivalency factor makes nitrogen reductions closer to
hypotoxic zones more valuable than reductions occurring further from these zones,
encouraging plants with more detrimental discharges to remove nitrogen beyond their
permit requirement and sell the credit (CGA 2001).
The State selects the National Credit Advisory Board to run the program. The Nitrogen
Credit Exchange Program is likely a clearinghouse in which WWTPs buy and sell their
credits. The cost of a credit is set annually by CTDEP. Price is based on capital and
O&M costs of nitrogen removal each year, and from annual review of plants'
performance. The program does not collect a transaction fee for credit sales.
At the end of March of each year, the CTDEP determines the total number of credits to
be bought and sold, publishes the annual value of nitrogen credits, and notifies each plant
of its nitrogen credit balance. The end of July is the deadline for plants to purchase
credits for the CTDEP to meet their discharge limit. By the middle of August, the
CTDEP must purchase all available credit (CGA 2001). The mechanism creates certainty
and makes it easier for plants to sell and buy credits.
To prevent a hot spot problem, the State reserves the right to revoke or modify a PS's
authorization under the General Permit for reasons necessary to protect human health or
the environment, or to implement the TMDL. Instead of a free market, the use of the
National Credit Advisory Broad is meant to protect poorer communities.
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Achievement
The program achieves the nitrogen reduction goals at a lower cost. The State expects to
be well ahead of the reduction targets established in the TMDL for nitrogen. In the first
year of the trading program, the NCAB notified 38 trades from municipalities purchasing
a total of $1.32 million worth of credits to compliance with the General Permit. During
the same period, 41 treatment plants reduced nitrogen below their permits, selling a total
of 2.76 million worth of credits. The State purchased excess credit using the Clean Water
Fund amounting to $1.44 million (p. 4)((CTDEP) 2003). The cost savings, over the 15-
year nitrogen reduction goal via trading compared to command-and-control
approach,((CTDEP) 2003).
The key features of the success of this program to set stringent reduction requirement to
meet the TMDL (clear reduction goal) and implement the General Permit for WWTPs.
Because PS dominates the N loads in the Sound, the program does not rely on NPS
reduction. The program has the use of additional federal funds to upgrade the watershed
WWTF.
Obstacles
The Clean Water Fund supports infrastructure costs. Upgrades to municipal wastewater
treatment plants require a stable, multi-year funding. The program links the current
municipal wastewater construction financing program to the trading process. The
projected demand for the Clean Water Fund financing to support construction projects is
more than twice the amount projected be available (p. 1)(NCAB 2003).
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B.4 Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners Pretreatment Trading
Project (NJ)
Program Drivers
The Passaic Valley Sewage Commission (PVSC) Effluent Trading Project explored the
use of a trading mechanism as a means for companies to meet local pretreatment limits
for the level of metals in the effluent they discharge to a Public Owned Treatment Work
(POTW). The PVSC established metals limits for its industrial users to be tighter than
technology-based standards in order to improve the quality of the POTW sludge. The
PVSC established an effluent trading program for its industrial users (indirect
dischargers) and the trading concept was included in the PVSC's local pretreatment limits
rule in 1994 (USEPA 1998; Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners 2003; Breetz,
Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
PVSC set a pretreatment local limit to achieve exceptional quality sludge. The strong
enforcement of compliance requirements drive the trading of heavy metals. Trading allow
facilities within the same POTW service area to work together to control the discharge of
metal in a manner that is less expensive for all parties. A company that has instituted
control measures that have brought its metals levels down below the local limits can sell
these excess reductions. One or more companies with effluent levels in excess of the
local limits can buy the reductions as a means of complying with the local limit. The
trading framework is not related to TMDL. The drive for the pretreatment trading
program was the PVSC's need to meet sludge requirements, not a TMDL (USEPA 1998).
Trading Framework
Pollutants being traded in the program are heavy metals (Cadmium, Copper, Lead,
Mercury, Nickel, and Zinc). Type of trading is a point source-to-point source. There is no
nonpoint source involved in the trading. The market structure is bilateral negotiation.
Pretreatment trading is intended to provide facilities added flexibility in meeting these
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local limits, instead of installing additional pretreatment equipment, which could lead to
greater economic efficiency and cost savings.
The program has a mechanism to deal with uncertainty by setting a trading ratio to be
5:4. Twenty percent of the reductions are banked or retired for environmental benefits
(USEPA 1998). PVSC's trading regulations have a requirement that 20% of the effluent
credits sold in a trade must be reserved, or "banked". Thus, there is a built-in mechanism
for reducing the total quantity of pollutants discharged by facilities that trade.
In addition to the 20 percent reduction in pollutant loadings, a trading program may also
allow companies to realize economies of scale associated with installing larger treatment
systems at a single facility rather than smaller ones at two or more facilities. These
economies of scale can have a positive effect on the environment. Companies may reduce
their use of treatment chemicals, as well as the generation of hazardous waste from their
use. They also may reduce their use of electricity and water.
PVSC has worked to update its capabilities to process and retrieve analytical data on
discharges by its Industrial Permittees (IPs) to identify trading partners. PVSC would be
able to identify qualified trading partners more readily and contact these IPs directly to
determine their interest in trading.
As potential trading partners are considering how much of a credit to purchase or sell.
Both buyers and sellers need to consider their own business needs when calculating the
amounts to be traded so that they can comfortably operate within their adjusted permit
limits. Because PVSC local limits (and permit requirements) are expressed as
concentrations and the metals credits traded are in pounds per day, it is necessary to
convert from the effluent concentrations and volume of the seller to determine the
quantity of each metal that can be sold. A buyer also needs to convert from the pounds
per day of each metal purchased (minus 20 percent) back to a concentration level based
on its discharge volume.
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The POTW approves the trade. The POTW adjusts the permit limits of the trading
partners, lowering the limit for the seller by the amount of the trade, and raising the limit
for the buyer by the amount of the trade minus the 20 percent that is banked. Each of the
trading partners is then responsible for meeting its own adjusted permit level. Thus, one
partner would not be penalized if the other trading partner has a violation. If one partner
consistently fails to meet the permit levels set under the trade, PVSC may adjust the trade
agreement and the associated permit limits.
Achievement (USEPA 1998)
This lack of trading activity can be largely attributed to the many uncertainties that posed
barriers to trading. Although trading has been allowed under PVSC's rules since
September 1994, there were no substantive trading negotiations until more than two years
later in February 1997 when the NJ Chemical Industry Project started to facilitate trading.
The first trade occurred in July 1997. The administrative costs are negligible and the
transaction costs are not determined.
The specific rules and regulations governing trading in the PVSC service district are
beneficial to the environment because they require trades to incorporate an overall
reduction in the discharge of chemicals from participating facilities. Trading also benefits
the environment by encouraging wider compliance with local limits among facilities,
thereby encouraging real reductions in loadings.
The greater flexibility in meeting local limits afforded by trading can also lead to
economic savings for industrial facilities that buy and sell effluent credits thus helping to
sustain local economic conditions. In addition, by providing increased opportunities for
facilities to comply with local limits, trading improves the effectiveness of POTWs as
regulators. Trading can provide an economic boost for a community by alleviating
constraints that POTW local limits may impose on operations at existing or new facilities.
This may be especially true when a POTW needs to revise local limits due to a changing
industrial base, for future growth, or to meet more stringent criteria.
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Obstacles (USEPA 1998)
Lack of information about other potential traders is also a barrier for establishing trades.
Potential traders have claimed that limited access to appropriate discharge monitoring
data hinders their efforts to find partners. Although discharge monitoring data are
available to the public, they are available only from the regulatory agencies (e.g.,
POTWs).
Small volume dischargers face additional barriers for establishing trading agreements,
and lack the resources needed to research and negotiate trades. Small volume dischargers
have also encountered some difficulty in pricing. It is difficult to obtain favorable pricing
for small quantity trades because of the transaction costs.
Therefore, POTWs may well be positioned to encourage trading by facilitating efforts to
search for trading partners. For example, when new limits are proposed, POTWs could
distribute information on which IPs might be interested in trading. This information could
also be distributed to facilities that apply for new hookups to the POTW as a means of
introducing them to trading. In addition, the POTW could provide this information as part
of its enforcement response to violations.
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B.5 The Grassland Area Farmers Trading Program (CA)
Characteristic of the Program
The agricultural land in the Grassland Drainage Area is productive, but unfortunately the
soil contains a high level of selenium, a naturally occurring trace element. In high
concentrations, selenium can be toxic to birds and other wildlife. Because much of the
land in the Grassland Drainage Area has a shallow layer of clay, it must be tiled in order
to avoid raising the water level and damaging the crops. Agricultural drainage water is
collected in tiles under the fields and then pumped out through sumps. Selenium collected
in the sumps goes out with the agricultural drainage water (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al.
2004).
The Grassland Area Farmers is a regional consortium of seven irrigation and drainage
districts in the San Joaquin Valley. The Grassland Area Farmer covers 97,000 acres of
irrigated farmland. The Grassland Tradable load program was the first water quality
trading program among nonpoint sources. Farm drainage in the region is collected into a
series of pipes and canals prior to discharge and therefore can be monitored. Farmers are
organized into locally-controlled irrigation districts, so that the administrative task of
tracking drainage outputs can be piggy-backed (Young and Karkoski 2000).
Program Drivers
The Grassland Bypass Project is the foundation for the Tradable Loads program. The
bypass project enabled the seven districts in the Grassland Drainage Basin to use the
federal San Luis Drain to convey drainage to the San Joaquin River. The Agreement of
Use of the drain established aggregate monthly and annual selenium discharge limits. The
districts are subject to incentive fees if they exceed their aggregate cap, and their use of
the drain will be cut off after a 20% exceedence (Austin 2001).The Use Agreement also
established the Grassland Area Farmers as a legal entity, controlled by a Steering
Committee with representatives from all seven districts. The selenium cap will be
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lowered each year through 2011, and the incentive fee for exceedences will be raised
each year, providing strong incentives for the districts to control their discharge (Breetz,
2004). The TMDL for the Lower San Joequin River was completed in 2001. The TMDL
began setting the load limits in the Use Agreement of 2005.
Quantitative limits on selenium discharges have been imposed on a regional consortium
of farm districts. This provided the foundation for the tradable loads program. The
consortium has developed a relatively streamlined institutional system that uses tradable
discharge permits to enforce the limits. Each district had the flexibility of designing its
own methods for complying with the district SLA. Individual districts use tiered water
pricing and other mechanisms to control discharges; i.e., low interest loans, workshops,
and recycling of drainage water (Young and Karkoski 2000).
The biggest incentive for the farmers is the continued use of the San Luis drain.
Continued use of the drain is a short-term and long-term incentive. In the short term,
farmers will be shut off from the drain if their discharges exceed the regional cap by 20
percent. A long-term solution must be developed to meet the long-term goal (Young and
Karkoski 2000)
Trading Framework
Trading pollutant is selenium. Type of trading is nonpoint-nonpoint source trading.
Although, since the selenium loading from irrigated agriculture is accurately measured at
the drainage pumps, it may be more similar to a point-point trading program (Woodward
and Kaiser 2002). Tradable discharge allocations and tiered water pricing are embedded
within the performance system and provides benefits such as enhanced cost-
effectiveness, innovation, and flexibility. The characteristic of the implementation system
within districts is the variety of programs that have emerged. Provided with a selenium
cap and a no-nonsense enforcement mechanism, each district has constructed a unique
portfolio of direct actions, incentives, and mandatory requirements for farmers to suit its
needs (Young and Karkoski 2000).
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There is no trading ratio in the Grassland Tradable Loads program. Instead of estimates
of BMP effectiveness for trades, the programs measured the selenium loads which
provided a high degree of certainty compared to many other nonpoint sources trading
programs. Also with retroactive trades based on actual selenium loads, there is no danger
of noncompliance with the trade agreement.
The structure of the market for this program is bilateral. Irrigation and drainage districts
sign bilateral Trade Agreements. Trades are for either monthly or annual allowance with
no banking permitted (Austin 2001).This mechanism can lower transaction costs,
particularly the information cost because the trades occur between districts within the
Grassland Area Farmers. District representatives arrange the trade at monthly meetings.
The monitoring is conducted by each district. The monitoring and reporting system
provides farmers, drainage districts, and the advisory committee with weekly updates on
progress in meeting monthly selenium load allocations. Beneficial features including
using an automated remote monitoring system, the continuous monitoring of samples, a
quick turn-around time of meetings, allows farmers to modify farm management and
irrigation practice to remain below their allocations.
The incentive fee and rebate have an influence on the success of the Grassland Area
Farmers Trading Programs. The farmer must pay incentive fees for any discharges above
the regional selenium cap. Each district pays incentive fees based on the percentage of
the fee attributed to exceeding its district-level selenium load allocation. If the
Grassland Area farmers as a group do not exceed the regional cap, no fees are paid by
any district - even if one district exceeds its allocation - as long as other districts offset
the exceedence by remaining below their allocations (Kerr, Anderson et al. 2000).
Rebate fee is a form of automatic trading between districts above and below their
allocation. A district exceeding its allocations pays a portion of a rebate fee based on its
percent contribution to the exceedence, the same as the incentive fee. Districts remaining
below their allocations receive a portion of the rebate based on their percentage of
contribution to the total quantity of all districts discharging under the regional cap (Kerr,
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Anderson et al. 2000). The fee and rebate system creates greater incentives for
controlling selenium loading and for creating trade agreements to avoid the fee.
Achievement
Economic results: In the first year (1998), only one trade occurred because of the unusual
weather and resultant uncertainty. By February 2000, nine trading agreements had
occurred, involved 39 trades (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004). These trades totaled
605 lbs of monthly selenium loads at approximately $40/lb and 128 lbs of annual
selenium loads at about $100/lb(Grumbles 2002). A total of $14,320 changed hands
during the first five years of the agreement (Grumbles 2002). Many trades exchanged in-
kind of services, which makes trading significantly less costly for a district than paying
incentive fees for a tax exceedence (Breetz, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004).
Environmental result: the selenium loading has decreased each year from 1995 to 1999
(Kerr, Anderson et al. 2000), except the wet year 1998. Farmers have decreased selenium
loading, as well as water usage, through several techniques including; increasing
recirculation of drainage water; blending drainage water with freshwater deliveries;
improved monitoring of water table conditions to pump water only when conditions
warrants; and installing more efficient irrigation equipment with low interest loans (Kerr,
Anderson et al. 2000).
Obstacles
Variable incentive fee presents problems. For example, the incentive fee is not a uniform
price per pound. Instead, it is based on ranges resulting in a variable price per pound.
That variable price has been difficult to interpret in a market situation. The fee based on a
uniformed dollar per pound is recommended (Young and Karkoski 2000).
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B.6 Minnesota Water Quality Trading Programs (MN)
Background
Starting in 1997, in Minnesota, two PS/NPS pollution trading projects, (1) Rahr Malting
Company and (2) Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative, were created in the legal
framework of National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits to
offset new point source discharges into the Minnesota River. The two trading projects in
the Minnesota River Basin cannot be regarded as truly market-based pollution rights
trading due to their new source offsetting nature and the restrictions that the point sources
faced in choosing different control options to meet pollution reduction requirements.
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) negotiated with the Rahr Malting
Company and The Southern Minnesota Beer Sugar Cooperative (SMBSC) to implement
PS/NPS trading in the Minnesota River Basin under the provision of the NPDES permits
issued to the two point sources. Both projects were offset trading which required the full
compensation of new point source loading to the Minnesota River. The two point sources
bore the burden of identifying nonpoint source trading partners and ensuring the proper
functioning of pollutant reduction measures.
A mandatory trust fund was set up by the permittee devoted to the trading project, to
achieve the required nutrient load reduction. The trust fund is a unique feature of the
Minnesota trading projects in comparison to other water pollution trading projects, in that
the permit specifies the minimum amount of the trust fund required for each project to
assure the financial viability of the trading project. A trust fund board composed of at
least one local watershed manager, one government representative, and one local water
resources organization representative, was responsible for managing the trust fimund and
approving trades. Both trading projects employ a trading ratio equal or greater than 2:1.
The actual trading ratio used in each of the two projects was a result of negotiation
among the permittee, the MPCA, and public participants.
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B.6.1 Rahr Malting Company Trading Project (MN)
Program Incentives
Starting in 1997, the reasons for creating the project were (1) the total minimum daily
load (TMDL) established by the USEPA and the MPCA for oxygen demand at the
Minnesota River below river mile 25, and (2) the Rahr's intention to build its own
wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) to expand its production while reducing wastewater
treatment costs. Rahr's processing wastewater was discharged to and treated at the Blue
Lake WWTP before the construction of its own treatment facility. Rahr attempts to buy
part of the Blue Lake WWTP's waste load allocation, but it was not successful. Rahr
eventually agreed to offset its entire projected CBOD 5 load to the river with the CBOD 5
reduction credits it would buy from nonpoint sources implementing pollution control
measures. Rahr also agreed to provide a $250,000 trust fund to financially guarantee the
realization of the trades (Fang and Ester 2003).
Trading Framework
The Rahr trading project is unique in that CBODs, the result of nutrient pollution, not the
nutrients themselves (phosphorus and nitrogen), was the traded pollutant. Based on
scientific data, the MPCA and the permittee agreed upon CBOD5 conversion ratios of 1:8
for phosphorus (i.e., for every unit of phosphorus load reduction, eight units of CBOD5
would be credited) and 1:4 for nitrogen (1:1 upstream of the TMDL zone) respectively, to
account for credits generated by the reduction of nutrient loadings to the river. A 2:1
trading ratio was used to account for the uncertainties.
Achievement
As of January 2002, Rahr Malting exceeded its goal of offsetting 150 lbs of CBOD per
day. BMP implementation is ahead of schedule. During the years of implementation,
Rahr was able to achieve the credit requirement through four trades with nonpoint
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sources. The first two trades converted farmland back to its original floodplain status and
planted native grasses and trees to stabilize the soil and prevent flood scouring. The other
two trades used structural work and bioengineering methods to stabilize eroding
riverbanks. Phosphorus and nitrogen reduction credits were generated from reduced
sediment and soil loss from the trade sites (Fang and Ester 2003).
B.6.2 The Southern Minnesota Beer Sugar Cooperative Trading Project
(MN)
Program Incentive
The SMBSC project was created under an NPDES permit issued to SMBSC in 1999 for
its planned WWTP. Similar to Rahr, SMBSC intended to build a new WWTP as part of
its development to modernize its process and expand its production scale. The permit
required SMBSC to trade with nonpoint sources to offset all its projected 4,982 lb
phosphorus/yr (2,260 kg/yr) discharged from the new WWTP (Fang and Ester 2003).
Trading Framework
The trading ratio was set at 2.6:1. The permit specifically defined the trading ratio as
follows: 1.0 for the basic load offsetting, 0.6 for engineering safety factors reflecting
potential site-to-site variations, and 1.0 for water quality improvement. With this trading
ratio, the trading requirement is translated into a total of 12,954 credits (12,954 lb
phosphorus/yr or 5,876 kg/yr) that would have to be purchased from nonpoint sources to
meet their requirement if the WWTP reaches it annual permit phosphorus emission limit.
The trust fund mandated for this project was $300,000 (Fang and Ester 2003).
- 225 -
Achievement
SMBSC was able to meet credit requirements mainly by contracting its cooperative
member sugar beet farmers to adopt spring cover cropping as an erosion control best
management practice (BMP). The BMP was the easiest and most economical way to
obtain phosphorus credits because the cooperative had a large base of sugar beet growers
(about 600) who were willing to help the cooperative meet its environmental obligations.
During period of 2000-2001, 367 parcels of land were contracted to plant spring cover
crops, which involved 164 landowners and 35,839 acres of sugar beet farmland (Fang
and Ester 2003).
Obstacles
The Minnesota River Basin was offsetting projects created to compensate for loads from
new point sources; which is not a traditional market-based pollution control mechanism.
The trading scheme still has a high degree of management responsibility of pollution
control from the regulator to the discharger. The program design coupled with the fact
that most nonpoint sources are not regulated can cause the following negative effects:
low incentives from nonpoint sources, and high transaction costs.
Minnesota had tied its PS/NPS pollution trading to the NPDES. Even though, an NPDES
offers many advantages. The most significant one is probably a higher level of
environmental accountability through the control and oversight by Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA). MPCA achieved this control and oversight by prescribing
credit-eligible nonpoint source control measures and maintaining the authority to certify
credits. However, point sources did not have the flexibility to choose between
implementing in-plant control measures and purchasing the necessary reduction from
nonpoint credits because of the legal framework of NPDES permits and the offsetting
nature of both projects. They had to buy, and were responsible for assuring the proper
functioning of nonpoint source control measures prescribed by the permits.
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B.7 The Chesapeake Bay Trading Program (PA, MD, VI, D.C.)
Characteristic of the Program
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the U.S. covering approximately 64,000
square miles in Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York,
and the District of Columbia. Chesapeake Bay has long suffered from excess nutrient
loading, which resulted in algal blooms and low dissolved oxygen levels. Rapid
population growth, agriculture runoff, and industrial development have contributed to the
high nutrient level in the Bay.
Program Drivers
The Chesapeake Bay Program set Bay-wide nutrient caps in 2000 and state and basin
allocations in 2003. TMDL will be imposed if the nutrient reduction goals set by these
policies are not achieved by 2010. Each state agreed to establish Tributary Strategies to
meet their goals. States will be responsible for developing their own trading program
based on the Bay-wide nutrient trading recommendation. The regulatory drivers for
developing trading programs vary within each state.
Trading Framework
The Chesapeake Bay Program has developed voluntary nutrient trading guidelines for its
member jurisdictions (PA, MD, VI, and D.C.). The nutrient trading guidelines were
approved in March 2001 (Chesapeake Bay Program 2001). Nitrogen and phosphorus are
trading pollutants. Trading will be one option for achieving existing nutrient reduction
goals and tributary strategies. Eligibility for trading will be defined by individual state-set
rules. Each state will be responsible for determining an individual trading policy,
establishing mechanisms for certifying and registering credits, creating a central
coordinating office for tracking trades, and developing a system for monitoring and
evaluating performance.
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Trading ratios are recommended in consideration of delivery, retirement, uncertainty, and
special needs. The buyer should be ultimately responsible for complying with its permit
and ensuring that adequate credits are delivered. Point sources will be responsible for
self-monitoring and reporting on monthly basis, while nonpoint sources must monitor on
a seasonal basis. Nonpoint source monitoring should include an annual on-site inspection
to ensure that BMPs are functioning properly. Each state will be responsible for
monitoring ambient water quality and other data for overall program assessment.
NutrientNet is an online trading registry developed by the World Resources Institute, and
can be used as one mechanism for identifying trading partners. The market structure
could be either a bilateral agreement or a clearinghouse. Types of trading which are
allowed in the program could be both PS/PS and PS/NPS trading.
Outcome
No trades have occurred in the Chesapeake Bay, and state-wide trading regulations has
not been developed. Although, interstate trading within a single watershed may become a
possibility in the future, trading will likely still proceed within each state first.
Obstacles
It is very difficult to balance many interests of a diverse set of stakeholders for
developing a Bay-wide trading guideline. Farmers, especially, do not want to be
regulated and be written into a point source permit, but point sources need to have a link
to the trades in their permits.
Maryland considered developing state rules, although recent legislation requiring POTWs
to apply limits of technology-based standards may undermine the economic incentive for
trading.
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